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While media attention as well as academic research have tended to focus on actively 
managed mutual funds (MFs) and passively managed exchange traded funds (ETFs), a steadily 
growing sector within the asset management industry is that of separate accounts (SAs). An 
increase of 340% in assets under management (AUM) over the 10-year period from 2009-2018, 
representing now more than $6.5 trillion, exemplifies the growing importance of SAs in the 
industry.1 
Although the purpose of actively managed SAs is similar to actively managed MFs – 
managing and investing money for investors – the organizational structure of these vehicles is 
quite different. A MF is managed as one homogeneous portfolio in which MF investors own 
their assets indirectly via fund shares. In contrast, SA investors own an individual account in 
which they hold their respective assets directly. All individual accounts within a SA are 
managed independently but follow a common overall strategy. This structure enables investors 
to customize their portfolio by setting style or risk preferences, which is necessary for many 
institutional investors such as retirement plans, endowments and foundations to align their 
investments with self-imposed principles and their own corporate governance. 
In recent years, the high increase in AUM and the continuing shift of SAs from being 
an exclusive investment vehicle for institutional investors and ultra-rich individuals towards 
becoming an investment alternative for financially less sophisticated, smaller institutional and 
retail investors, makes it increasingly necessary for regulators to monitor the development of 
this fast growing market segment. Accordingly, in 2015 the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
                                                 
1 Money Management Institute and Cerulli Associates (2019). 
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Commission (SEC) proposed several amendments to Part 1A of Form ADV with the intend to 
increase reporting requirements, and invited researchers and investment professionals to 
comment on that proposal.2 Based on this feedback, the SEC adopted its slightly modified 
proposal in 2016 with an effective date for the new requirements of October 1, 2017. These 
amendments require investment advisors with more than $500 million of regulatory AUM 
(RAUM) attributable to SAs, to disclose additional information annually, including their 
derivative exposures and the dollar amount of their borrowings. The SEC’s declared objective 
with these stricter reporting requirements is “to enhance our staff's ability to effectively carry 
out our risk-based examination program and other risk assessment and monitoring activities” 
with respect to SAs and their investment advisors.3 
To support this objective, this dissertation aims to increase the general understanding of 
SAs and thus to benefit research, regulation and various market participants. While many 
fundamental insights from the academic MF literature can be transferred to SAs, the essential 
difference in the vehicle structure combined with a lower level of regulatory requirements and 
the fact that most SA investors are still institutional investors differentiate SAs significantly 
from MFs.  
The first topic addressed in this dissertation is the impact of the unique organizational 
SA structure on diseconomies of scale, the diminishing effect of size on the risk-adjusted 
performance known from the MF literature. The topic of diseconomies of scale in general has 
been in the focus of academic literature since the earliest empirical studies on MFs. Sharpe 
(1966) proposed and tested the competing hypotheses regarding whether a fund exhibits 
economies or diseconomies of scale. Since that time, fund size has become a standard control 
variable in performance regressions (e.g. Grinblatt and Titman, 1989; Carhart, 1997; Sirri and 




Tufano, 1998), often with a negative and statistically significant coefficient being interpreted 
as evidence of diseconomies of scale.  
As there is no existing study on diseconomies of scale in SAs to date, Chapters II and 
III of this dissertation aim to close this research gap. Chapter II examines how the unique 
organizational structure of SAs affects the phenomenon of diminishing returns to scale. Chapter 
III takes advantage of the facts that 1) SAs openly disclose their investment approach and 2) 
quantitative and fundamental investment approaches differ in their underlying nature. These 
basic differences in their underlying nature suggest potential differences in both channels for 
diseconomies of scale, the liquidity costs channel and the information processing/hierarchy 
costs channel.  
In large asset management companies, it is common practice to offer developed 
investment strategies (e.g. “large cap value” or “small cap growth”) to different types of 
investors in parallel through several investment vehicles. A particular investment strategy could 
be offered to retail investors via a retail MF and to an institutional investor via an institutional 
MF or a SA. Chapter IV uses a comprehensive sample of these side-by-side managed SA-MF 
twins to quantify the effect of unobserved investment constraints on risk-adjusted performance. 
Since this twin setting controls directly for managerial skill, advisor efficiency and investment 
style, it represents the perfect laboratory to examine how differences with respect to regulation, 
investor preferences and the organizational vehicle structure affect performance.  
One reason for the increasing popularity of SAs is the option of a customized asset 
management combined with an above average past performance. Previous studies on the 
performance of SAs show that the SA universe as a whole was able to outperform the MF 
universe significantly (e.g. Elton, Gruber and Blake, 2014). Building on these results, 
Chapter V contains a comprehensive performance analysis of SAs answering questions such as 
whether SA managers are capable of generating value for their investors and what type of 
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investor can benefit from SAs. Furthermore, it distinguishes between luck and skill with respect 
to the superior past performance of the SA universe. 
The last Chapter VI sums up the results and highlights the key contribution of each 
article. Furthermore, it gives an understanding of how future research might build upon insights 
provided in this dissertation. In the following, Chapter I contains an overview and brief 
summaries of the research articles provided in this dissertation. 
1.2 Overview over papers included 
Paper title Co-authors Published? Journal Date 





WP, University of 
Virginia, University of 
Augsburg 
2020 
Diseconomies of Scale in Quantitative and 





WP, University of 
Virginia, University of 
Augsburg  
2020 
The Effect of Unobserved Constraints on 
Portfolio Management: Evidence from 





WP, University of 
Augsburg 
2020 
The Value of Separate Accounts for Different 
Types of Investors 
– No7 




1.2.1 Article I: On Size Effects in Separate Accounts 
The first article of this dissertation focuses on the specific effects of size on the performance of 
SAs. Based on a large and comprehensive sample of 3,770 US domestic equity SAs over a 26-
year sample period from 1990 to 2015, we find that SAs suffer from two major sources of 
diseconomies of scale: 1) liquidity constraints and market impact costs as well as 2) 
organizational stress. According to further analyses, the latter is more severe and is caused by 
                                                 
4 Accepted at the 57th Annual Meeting of the Southern Finance Association 2017, Key West, Florida, the 56th 
Annual Meeting of the Eastern Finance Association 2018, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania for presentation. 
5 “Revise and Resubmit” at the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (VHB Ranking A). 
6 Accepted at the Doctoral Student Consortium of the 23th FMA European Conference 2019, Glasgow, Scotland; 
the 56th Annual Meeting of the Eastern Finance Association 2020, Boston, Massachusetts; the 24th FMA European 
Conference 2020, Limassol, Cyprus, for presentation. 
7 “Under review” at the Journal of Asset Management (VHB Ranking B). 
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the fact that SAs have an additional structural layer compared to MFs: separate, customized 
accounts of individual investors, which increases overall management complexity and 
diminishes performance. Our results indicate that SA managers reduce portfolio complexity by 
concentrating on fewer stocks to compensate for this additional complexity in SA structure. 
Various robustness checks show that these findings are independent of the performance model 
chosen and they do not result from the low beta anomaly (Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014) or from 
incubation bias (Evans, 2010; Fama and French, 2010). While scale diseconomies have been 
extensively studied for MFs (e.g. Indro et al., 1999; Berk and Green, 2004; Chen et al., 2004; 
Evans et al., 2019; Pastor, Stambaugh and Taylor, 2020), our analyses contribute specific new 
insights into size effects in SAs, which constitute an economically important and fast growing 
segment of the institutional asset management industry. 
1.2.2 Article II: Diseconomies of Scale in Quantitative and Fundamental Investment 
Styles 
In the second article, we revisit the issue of diseconomies of scale by contrasting two different 
investment approaches: quantitative and fundamental. Using a database of SAs from 1990 to 
2018 as a laboratory, we take advantage of the fact that the two investment approaches differ 
in their underlying nature, which suggests potential differences in both channels for 
diseconomies of scale, i.e. the liquidity costs and the information processing/hierarchy costs 
channel. Even after controlling for other SA characteristics, investment advisor-, investment 
style-, time-, and SA-fixed effects or controlling for endogeneity using the Zhu (2018) 
recursive-demeaning approach, we still find that quantitative strategies exhibit statistically and 
economically significantly lower diseconomies of scale. To enhance our understanding 
regarding the potential channels through which these two investment styles differ, we follow 
the framework proposed by Pastor, Stambaugh and Taylor (2020) to examine the liquidity costs 
channel and follow the method of Cici, Jaspersen and Kempf (2017) to estimate information 
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diffusion, a proxy for information processing speed, to explore the processing/hierarchy costs 
channel. The results indicate that quantitatively managed SAs exhibit lower costs in both 
dimensions. Accounting for these differences partially explains the differences in diseconomies 
of scale. 
1.2.3 Article III: The Effect of Unobserved Constraints on Portfolio Management: 
Evidence from Separate Account-Mutual Fund Twins 
In this article, we use a large dataset of 907 side-by-side managed SA-MF twins as a setting to 
analyze how usually unobserved investment constraints affect the portfolio performance of 
actively managed investment vehicles. We follow the matching procedure of Evans and 
Fahlenbrach (2012) to collect the most comprehensive sample of SA-MF twins to date. We 
apply a modification of Cremers and Petajisto’s (2009) active share to these twins to determine 
a time-series of portfolio differences for each twin pair. Since the twin setting controls directly 
for managerial skill, advisor efficiency and investment style, we employ a similar argument as 
Kacperzyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008) and interpret differences in portfolio composition as 
unobserved investment constraints regarding regulation, investor preferences and 
organizational structure of the investment vehicle. By controlling for a wide range of twin, firm 
and portfolio characteristics, i.e. observed constraints, we are able to determine the effect of 
unobserved constraints on portfolio performance. We find strong and robust evidence that such 
unobserved constraints lead to a decrease in risk-adjusted performance in both vehicles. Even 
after controlling for differences in style factor exposures between both vehicles, our results 
remain economically unchanged.  
1.2.4 Article IV: The Value of Separate Accounts for Different Types of Investors 
The last article of this dissertation focuses on the performance of SAs. While many recent 
studies show that over the last few decades the MF industry was on average not able to produce 
sufficient risk-adjusted returns to cover their costs (e.g. Gruber, 1996; Carhart, 1997; Fama and 
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French, 2010), several studies find that the SA universe has significantly outperformed the MF 
universe (e.g. Elton, Gruber and Blake, 2014; Chen et al., 2017). Based on this observation, this 
study provides new uni- and multivariate evidence for the long-term performance of SAs. Over 
the period from 1990 to 2017, a comprehensive sample of 3,781 SAs was able to produce an 
average risk-adjusted Carhart performance of 81 bp before and -11 bp after costs. These 
numbers are in line with recent SA literature and they are a strong indication for the existence 
of manager skill in the SA universe. In order to distinguish luck from skill, I apply a 
bootstrapping methodology from Fama and French (2010) on monthly SA returns and test for 
the existence of a true nonzero alpha. The results suggest that even in a world in which every 
SA manager has the ability to generate expected returns to cover their trading costs and 
commissions, SAs are still able to achieve risk-adjusted gross returns that cannot be explained 
by pure luck. Furthermore, by dividing the sample into three subsamples based on the SA’s 
product focus, this study is the first to evaluate and differentiate the benefit of SAs as an 
investment alternative to MFs for different types of investors. In terms of risk-adjusted 
performance, it is remarkable that institutional and retail SAs show a similar risk-adjusted gross 
performance, however the significantly higher expense ratios of the retail SAs, result in a 
significant underperformance after costs while institutional SAs achieve a small but positive 
risk-adjusted Carhart performance. 
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2 Article I: On Size Effects in Separate Accounts 
 
Richard B. Evans, Martin Rohleder, Hendrik Tentesch, and Marco Wilkens  
University of Virginia, University of Augsburg 
 
 
Abstract. We are the first to investigate specific size effects in separate accounts (SAs). This 
is important because SAs represent a major investment vehicle for institutional investors. More 
interestingly, they have an additional structural layer compared to mutual funds for which size 
effects have been intensively studied. This additional layer – separate, individualized accounts 
of single investors, which increase overall management complexity – significantly diminishes 
performance. These structural diseconomies economically outweigh the liquidity and market 
impact cost related negative effects known from mutual funds. However, comparing SAs and 
mutual funds, we find that SAs outperform mutual funds on average regardless of structural 
diseconomies of scale. 
 
JEL Classification: G11, G12 





This paper is the first to investigate the specific effects of size on the performance of separate 
accounts (SAs), i.e. separately managed accounts (SMAs) and collective investment trusts 
(CITs). This topic is important for two reasons: firstly, SAs have developed into a major 
investment vehicle for institutional investors, and secondly, they have a distinctive 
organizational structure, which distinguishes them from mutual funds, for which size effects 
have been intensively studied. Thus, our analyses contribute specific new insights into size 
effects in this economically important investment segment and further, they will strengthen the 
general understanding of institutional asset management. We use a large and comprehensive 
sample of 3,770 US domestic equity SAs with monthly net and gross returns and a large variety 
of quarterly SA characteristics over a 26-year sample period from 1990 to 2015 to dig 
specifically into the effects of SA size on SA performance. Our key finding is that SAs suffer 
from two major sources of diseconomies of scale: 1) liquidity constraints and market impact 
costs as well as 2) organizational stress. According to further analyses, the latter is more severe 
and caused by the fact that SAs have an additional structural layer compared to mutual funds: 
separate, individualized accounts of single investors, which increases overall management 
complexity and diminishes performance.  
What makes SAs different to mutual funds? Within an SA each investor has an own 
account via which she directly owns the respective assets instead of owning a fund share like 
in mutual funds. All individual accounts are managed independently, but based on a common 
overall strategy. This construction offers the investor the opportunity to deviate from the 
common overall strategy by restricting or individualizing her portfolio, for example by 
implementing a tax-harvesting strategy to optimize individual after-tax returns. This special 
structure makes SAs an investment alternative to mutual funds with unique features like 
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negotiable and comparatively low fees. To be able to offer this combination of low costs and 
high individual service, SAs usually have high minimum investments between $100,000 and 
$25 million which makes them only affordable to a limited number of investors, including 
retirement plans, endowments, foundations and wealthy individuals. Thus, they are 
predominantly offered to sophisticated investors, who do not need as much customer protection 
as retail investors. Accordingly, SAs are not registered with the SEC which implies less 
regulation,8 lower reporting requirements and, consequently, lower costs. However, low 
reporting requirements lead to data limitations, which made SAs a challenging area of research 
in the past. Thus, it is not surprising, that the existing literature regarding SAs is rare compared 
to mutual funds.9 A topic that has been explored elaborately in the mutual fund literature, but 
has not been investigated for SAs in detail so far, is the effect of size on performance.  
Regarding mutual funds, the literature seems to agree on the existence of diminishing 
returns to scale. A first stream of studies traces diseconomies of scale to liquidity constraints 
and transaction costs (e.g. Berk and Green, 2004; Yan, 2008; Chan et al., 2009). Both are 
intimately connected to each other. The liquidity explanation is based on a fund’s individual 
level of holdings illiquidity. For example, large small-cap funds have on average a higher 
illiquidity exposure than large-cap funds with the same size. Stocks with a lower market 
capitalization are usually more illiquid and in addition, larger funds have a smaller universe of 
investment opportunities (e.g., Bogle, 2010). The transaction cost explanation focuses on the 
negative effect of explicit transaction costs and implicit market impact costs on performance. 
                                                 
8 Strictly speaking, this applies only to SMAs while CITs are regulated by the Office of the Controller of the 
Currency (Coalition of Collective Investment Trusts, 2015). However, this regulation is much less restrictive and 
therefore also less costly as the regulation of mutual funds by the SEC. 
9 The existing literature regarding SAs can be grouped into two segments. The studies in the first group use SAs 
to investigate characteristics of institutional investors, e.g. DelGuerico and Tkac (2002), Heisler et al. (2007) and 
Goyal and Wahal (2008). The second group studies performance and persistence in SA performance, e.g. 
Lakonishok et al. (1992), Coggin et al. (1993), Ferson and Khang (2002), Tonks (2005), Busse et al. (2010), 
Peterson et al. (2011), Elton et al. (2014). 
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Both depend on trade volume, and thus indirectly on fund size. Due to higher market impact 
costs and a longer time span to trade larger positions Beckers and Vaughan (2001) argue that 
managers are not able to implement their optimal trading strategies. Hence, they lose the 
flexibility they need to achieve positive risk-adjusted returns. This stream of literature is also 
closely related to the research of flow effects on mutual fund performance as funds’ trading on 
flows leads to liquidity constraints and market impact costs which are also more pronounced 
for larger and for small-cap funds (e.g., Edelen, 1999; Alexander et al., 2007; Pollet and Wilson, 
2008).  
A second stream of size related mutual fund literature focuses on structural differences 
between large and small organizations. Indro et al. (1999) argue that a growing company needs 
more employees, which leads to administrative stress and results in diminishing returns to scale. 
Chen et al. (2004) provide a similar explanation for structural size effects. They adopt Stein’s 
(2002) theory of hierarchy costs on mutual funds and call them organizational diseconomies. 
The larger a fund, the higher the inefficient effort managers need to convince others to 
implement their ideas. Based on different proxies for hierarchy costs, they show that larger 
funds have higher hierarchy costs. On firm level, there barely occur structural diseconomies, 
because different funds within a firm are usually managed separately. Thus, the second 
explanation is based on coordination problems resulting from an increasing complexity within 
a growing fund. In a very recent paper, Evans et al. (2017) find that diseconomies of scope, i.e. 
of managing multiple funds or even multiple fund objectives side by side, diminish the 
performance of mutual fund managers. 
Although there is no existing study with the main focus on size effects in SAs, a few 
studies provide brief comments as side-effects of their main findings. None of these studies, 
however, go on to analyze such size effects in detail. Busse et al. (2010) study performance 
persistence in quarterly SA returns. One of their results is a higher risk-adjusted performance 
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when they use equally-weighted instead of value-weighted SA portfolio returns. This indicates 
a superior performance from smaller SAs, which is in line with the presented mutual fund 
literature. Furthermore, in their cross-sectional analyses, Peterson et al. (2011) and Elton et al. 
(2014) identify factors that explain risk-adjusted SA performance and amongst others, they use 
SA and family size as control variables, respectively. The latter do not find any significant 
explanatory power for performance differences between SAs in neither logarithmized size nor 
logarithmized firm size. Peterson et al. (2011) find a negative impact of size on risk-adjusted 
performance, which supports Busse et al.’s (2010) finding. As an additional SA-specific 
variable, Peterson et al. (2011) include the number of different accounts into their model. The 
results suggest a negative impact on risk-adjusted performance. However, it is not significant. 
Nevertheless, the authors’ believe that there should be a negative correlation and conjecture 
that mostly extreme values for the number of accounts matter.  
From an economical point of view, this is a reasonable consideration. In contrast to a 
mutual fund investor, every SA investor has her own account with her own assets. From an 
investor’s perspective, this organizational structure has several advantages including higher 
transparency, multiple client services such as individual tax optimization and the opportunity 
to demand a certain degree of portfolio individualization. Lakonishok et al. (1992) state that 
especially institutional investors demand many individual services, that make their job more 
convenient. However, for the SA management, this construction is time-consuming, implies 
higher coordination effort and higher complexity in its investment decisions. SA managers have 
to manage several accounts at the same time, each with a certain demand for individualization, 
which they need to consider in their investment decision. The higher the number of accounts is, 
the lower the manager’s attention span per investor can be. Furthermore, the complexity within 
the SA increases with every additional investor. On the one hand, an SA manager needs to 
combine individual portfolio requirements, on the other hand, the individual returns should not 
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deviate too far from the overall SA return. To be able to offer high-quality service to meet each 
investor’s demand in spite of managers’ limited attention span (e.g., Kacperczyk et al., 2016; 
Gupta-Mukherjee and Pareek, 2016), SAs with more accounts potentially need more staff 
compared to mutual funds of the same size. However, it is known from the mutual fund 
literature that more staff causes administrative stress (Indro et al., 1999) and hierarchy costs 
(Chen et al., 2004), which both have a negative impact on performance. Thus, with a growing 
number of different accounts, an SA faces an additional layer in its organizational structure that 
does not exist in mutual funds and which potentially amplifies diminishing returns to scale. 
Therefore, we derive the following expectations regarding size effects in SAs. First, like 
mutual funds, we expect SAs to suffer from diminishing returns to scale in the dimension of 
total assets, i.e. due to liquidity constraints and market impact costs. Second, due to their 
additional organizational layer, in which every investor has her own account, SAs should be 
even more prone to structural size effects. Thus, we also expect SAs to suffer from diminishing 
returns to scale in the dimension of number of accounts. Third, we expect both size effects to 
exist side by side. 
Our results indicate that SAs indeed suffer from two dimensions of diseconomies of 
scale. The first is directly related to size and caused by similar reasons as in mutual funds. The 
more important dimension, however, is related to the specific structure of SAs as an increasing 
number of individual investor accounts within an SA severely hurts performance. This 
diminishing effect on performance is explained by a limited manager attention span stemming 
from an increasing overall management complexity. Furthermore, due to the specific structure 
of SAs, we find no relevant negative effects of flows on the performance of SAs. This is 
contrary to numerous findings in the mutual fund literature. This may be explained by better 
communication between SA managers and investors and by the fact that individual investor 
accounts within SAs are on average below the critical size for market impact costs. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data. 
Section 3 describes the methodology and reports the results of our main empirical analysis. 
Section 4 provides specific further analyses to tackle the reasons of size effects in SAs. Section 
5 comments on robustness and Section 6 concludes.  
2.2 Data and sample description 
As indicated above, each SA investor directly owns an account which is managed in 
conjunction with other accounts following a common overall strategy (e.g. “small-value” or 
“large-neutral”). Therefore, to maintain customer anonymity, they are reported on a pooled 
basis as one SA, which is our unit of analysis. Thus, the reported returns are composite returns, 
i.e. weighted averages of the realized returns of the different accounts within an SA. The data 
stems from Morningstar Direct from which we select the whole universe of U.S. equity SMAs 
and CITs with seamless monthly return series. This dataset initially includes 5,322 SAs with 
750,199 SA-months managed by 1,007 different asset management firms between January 1990 
and December 2015. It contains monthly returns and quarterly SA characteristics. Compared to 
prior studies, which predominately use quarterly returns, monthly return data reduces interim 
trading bias (e.g. Ferson and Khang, 2002) and allows for more precise performance 
measurement. We eliminate all SAs for which net returns exceed gross returns (48 SAs) and 
which have less than 36 monthly return observations (434). Furthermore, we exclude all index 
(360) or specialty (710) SAs.10 The final dataset consists of 3,770 U.S. equity SAs with 580,165 
SA-months and is thus one of the largest and the most comprehensive dataset used in the SA 
literature to date. Table 1 contains summary statistics for the whole sample. Panel A shows 
summary statistics by SA and Panel B reports pooled summary statistics.  
                                                 
10 We define as “specialty SAs” also all SAs with an average systematic market beta below 0.2 from the 24-month 
rolling window regressions. 
17 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Average SA total assets (TA) are about 519 million US dollar. The number of accounts, which 
is the number of different investors within an SA, is 243 on average. The average account size 
(avAS), which we compute following Eq. (1), provides us with more detailed information about 






The fact that the average number of accounts times the average account size does not roughly 
equal the average TA shows the impact of different levels of positive skewness.11 In general, 
all variables seem to be right skewed, which illustrates the high heterogeneity between the SAs. 
However, for the number of accounts, the relative difference between mean and median is 
particularly high. Hence, some SAs have an extremely high number of accounts.  
The expense ratio, which is the difference between reported gross and net returns, has 
an average of 0.86% which is lower than comparable numbers for US domestic equity mutual 
funds (e.g, 1.20% p.a., Rohleder et al., 2016). The comparatively low costs can partly be 
attributed to the high average minimum investment of 7.24 million US dollar and to the 
relatively low annual turnover of 70.15% which is distinctively lower than that of US domestic 
equity mutual funds where annual turnover is on average around 85% (e.g., Pastor et al., 2016). 
On average, SAs have 89 different holdings and 33.79% of their assets are invested in their top 
10 holdings. In the period from 1990 to 2015, SAs have experienced substantial annual implied 
percentage net flow of 14.45%. We calculate quarterly implied percentage net flow (hereafter 
“flow”) from quarterly TA and quarterly returns as in Sirri and Tufano (1998) following Eq. 
(2). 
                                                 
11 Keep in mind that data availability differs between the variables so that the numbers may not be directly 
combined (e.g., mean average account size ≠ mean number of accounts / mean total assets). 
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flowi,q = 




The positive average flow attests to the growing importance of SAs over these 26 years. To 
calculate an individualization score, we use sixteen questions asked by Morningstar regarding 
the range of services offered (e.g. an individual tax-optimization) to investors. These question 
can be answered with "proactive", "by request only" or "no", which we evaluate with 2, 1 or 0 
points. The individualization score is then calculated as the sum of these points. Thus, the 
maximum an SA can achieve is 32 points. The average number of managers, which can take 
values between 1 and 4, is 2.1. 
The dataset consist of surviving- and non-surviving separate accounts, which eliminates 
a potential survivorship bias. However, due to weaker reporting requirements than for mutual 
funds, the data is self-reported which means it is more prone to further biases, like an upward-
bias through self-selection or the opportunity to report data with a lag of up to six months. Elton 
et al. (2014), who used the same data provider in their SA study, have tested the existence of 
these biases in the Morningstar Direct Database. They do not find any serious bias and argue 
that the costs of not being included in the database are comparable to costs of revealing some 
month of bad performance. Furthermore, they argue that a possible upward bias will be 
equalized by many bad managers, who do not report at all. That argument also applies to the 
best performing managers, who do not report to protect their investment strategy or who have 
already exceeded their maximum AUM that they can handle without suffering seriously from 
diseconomies of scale.  
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2.3 Empirical analysis of size effects in SAs 
2.3.1 SA performance  
Our basic performance model is Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model, as it is the most commonly 
accepted model in modern mutual fund literature. The model is based on the following 
regression (Eq. 3):12  
ERi,t = αi
4F + 𝛽i
Mkt ERMkt,t + 𝛽i
SMB SMBt + 𝛽i
HML HMLt + 𝛽i
UMD UMDt + εi,t (3) 
where ERi,t is the return of SA i in month t in excess of the 1-month T-Bill rate, αi
4F is stock i’s 
risk-adjusted performance, ERMkt,t is the monthly market excess return, SMBt is the monthly 
size factor, HMLt is the monthly value factor (Fama and French, 1993), and UMDt is the 
monthly momentum factor (Carhart, 1997).  
To get a time-series of risk-adjusted SA performance, we follow Sharpe (1992) and 
calculate the out-of-sample performance for each SA in each month t using a 24-month rolling 
window Carhart regression from t–25 to t–1:13  
Style returni,t
4F = 𝛽i,t-1
Mkt ERMkt,t +𝛽 i,t-1
SMB SMBt + 𝛽i,t-1
HML HMLt + 𝛽i,t-1
UMD UMDt (4a) 
αi,t
ooS-4F= ERi,t – ( 𝛽i,t-1
Mkt ERMkt,t + 𝛽i,t-1
SMB SMBt + 𝛽i,t-1
HML HMLt + 𝛽i,t-1
UMD UMDt ) (4b) 
Eq. (4a) shows how the monthly style return for SA i in month t is calculated by multiplying its 
estimated factor sensitivities from the prior 24 months with the return of the corresponding risk 
factors in month t. It represents an individually constructed benchmark with the same style as 
the SA. Eq. (4b) illustrates the calculation of the monthly out-of-sample performance 
(henceforth simply “Carhart performance” unless otherwise qualified). It is the difference 
between the actual return of SA i in month t and its style return in this month. Notice that it 
                                                 
12 We thank Kenneth French for providing the corresponding risk-factors on: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.  
13 Alternative window lengths of 12 and 36 months yield economically similar results. 
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differs from the residuum of a simple regression, which is an in-sample value. Furthermore, the 
Carhart performance is winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles to control for outliers.  
In our analysis, we focus on Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. Nevertheless, Table 2 
reports SA performance and corresponding factor loadings for various factor models, including 
models we are going to use as robustness checks. Panel A shows the results for net returns and 
Panel B for gross returns, both equally-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW).  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The annualized equally-weighted Carhart net performance of -0.348% is slightly lower than the 
measured performance in the existing studies of Busse et al. (2010) or Elton et al. (2014). Our 
results suggest, that SA managers are on average not able to generate an additional value over 
a passive benchmark investment. Remarkable is the difference between the equally- and the 
value-weighted results which is distinctively lower. This is in line with the finding of Busse et 
al. (2010) and indicates a superior performance for smaller SAs.  
2.3.2 Sorted portfolio analysis of size effects 
To start our analysis, we sort SAs each quarter into quintiles based on their size, their number 
of accounts and their average account size. Afterward we calculate the summary statistics for 
the most important SA characteristics. Table 3 provides the results. Panel A shows the sorting 
by TA, Panel B the sorting by number of accounts and Panel C the sorting by average account 
size. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Regarding our first expectation formulated in Section 2.2, Panel A shows some systematic 
trends like an enormous spread in TA between the quintiles. The SAs in the smallest quintile 
have average TA of $11 million, whereas the SAs in the biggest quintile have an average of 
$2.53 billion. It is obvious, that the average account size needs to increase as well, because the 
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average account size cannot be larger than the average SA in a certain quintile. Beyond that, it 
is reasonable that also the average number of accounts within an SA increases with its size. 
However, this trend is not as strong as the growing account size. Regarding the performance in 
Panel A, we see the expected size effects. SAs have decreasing returns to scale and on average 
increasing market risk. This could be based on the fact that bigger SAs invest in stocks with a 
higher market capitalization. These stocks typically make a higher fraction of the market return, 
which explains the higher market sensitivity of larger SAs (e.g. Chan et al., 2009). Generally, 
Panel A supports our first expectation of the existence of diseconomies of scale in the dimension 
of size. 
To get a first impression regarding our second expectation, Panel B shows SAs sorted 
by their number of accounts. Here, we find an even stronger trend regarding Carhart 
performance and market risk. We have a difference of 1.54% in annualized Carhart 
performance. This means that a higher number of different investors reduces the average risk-
adjusted performance, which can be explained by a higher level of organizational stress. This 
confirms our second expectation, the existence of diseconomies of scale in the dimension of 
number of different investors. 
In contrast to that, the sorting by average account size in Panel C does not show a clear 
pattern regarding performance. Only quintile 1 has an inferior risk-adjusted performance 
compared to other quintiles. The major reason is probably the high average number of accounts. 
The SAs in quintile 2 to 5 perform similarly. For these quintiles, both prior described size effects 
seem to offset each other. E.g. in quintile 2, the positive effect of a small size is equalized by 
the negative effect of a high number of accounts. In quintile 5, it is the other way around. 
However, regarding the market risk, the quintiles differ more clearly and even stronger than in 
the two previous sortings. Generally, it seems reasonable that SAs with smaller accounts deviate 
stronger from the market. Another interesting point is the expense ratio. In Section 1, we have 
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already explained that expenses are individually negotiated between the investor and the 
management firm. Here, we see that the larger the initial investment is, the lower the average 
expenses are.  
With regard to our third expectation that both effects exist side by side, we compare the 
number of accounts and the TA over the different quintiles between Panels A and B. 
Considering the differences between mean and median, it seems that all five size quintiles in 
Panel A contain some SAs with a very high number of accounts. In Panel B, these SAs are 
probably included in quintile 5, the worst performing quintile. Similarly, every number of 
accounts quintile in Panel B seems to contain some large funds, which are likely included in 
quintiles 4 or 5, the bad performing quintiles, in Panel B. This means, we have two mostly 
independent classifications that both show a systematic trend in performance.  
Therefore, we next double-sort the monthly Carhart (1997) performance in 5x5 
portfolios by their lagged size and lagged number of accounts and by their lagged size and 
lagged average account size, respectively. Hereby, we use a conditional sorting approach where 
we first sort SAs in each month by their lagged size and then within each size-quintile we further 
sort SAs into quintiles by their lagged number of accounts or by their lagged average account 
size. The results for the sorting by size and number of accounts are displayed in Table 4. Panel 
A shows a distinctive pattern of decreasing net performance from the upper left corner of small 
SAs with few accounts (+0.902% p.a.) to the lower right corner with large SAs with many 
accounts (-1.319% p.a.). This pattern is driven both by size and by the number of accounts as 
indicated by the respective single sortings (“all”). Moreover, the high-low difference portfolios 
are statistically significant in all rows and columns. A similar pattern is displayed in Panel B 
for the gross performance of SAs, however with an upward shift of around 0.8% p.a. consistent 
with the average expense ratio displayed in Table 1. To make sure that these findings on the 
side-by-side existence of the two size effects are not driven by differences in systematic risk, 
23 
Panel C shows results for the in-sample 24-month rolling Carhart (1997) market beta. However, 
there is a weak decreasing pattern from the lower left corner to the upper right corner which is 
not in accordance with the performance pattern.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Table 5 shows the results for 5x5 sortings based on size and average account size. They are 
very similar in that there is a decreasing pattern from the right upper corner of small SAs with 
large investor accounts (0.595% p.a.) to the lower left corner of large SAs with small investor 
accounts (-1.427% p.a.). However, the highest performing portfolio is the portfolio of small 
SAs with medium (3) average account size (0.900% p.a.). Otherwise, the results using average 
account size are consistent with the results in Table 4 for the number of accounts. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
2.3.3 Panel regression analysis of size effects  
The sorted portfolio analysis shows the side by side existence of diseconomies of scale in the 
two dimensions of TA and number of accounts and average account size, respectively. To 
further examine their negative effect on the annualized Carhart performance and to control for 
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m=3 + ηi,q 
(5b) 
The dependent variable is future Carhart performance, calculated for monthly 24-month rolling 
window regressions and aggregated on a quarterly basis (q+1).14 This is necessary because most 
SAs report their characteristics only on a quarterly basis. Besides, the independent variables are 




m=1   
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log size (Log TAi,t), log number of accounts (Log #Accsi,t), log average account size (Log 
avASi,t), and the usual control variables. Further, we control for style-fixed effects by style-wise 
demeaning and for time-fixed effects by quarter-wise demeaning (within transformation).15 
This type of regression allows inferences on the effect of cross-sectional differences in 
characteristics on cross-sectional differences in future performance while controlling for overall 
influences like the business cycle. We standardize all variables to mean zero and unit standard 
deviation to ease comparisons between independent variables. Following Peterson (2009), 
standard errors are two-dimensionally clustered by SA and quarter to consider 
heteroscedasticity, time-series and cross-sectional correlation. Table 6 provides the results for 
net and gross returns. M1 refers to Eq. (5a) and M2 to Eq. (5b), respectively. This differentiation 
enables a detailed view on the relationship between the overall size of the SA and the number 
of different investors. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
As expected, size has a significantly negative effect on the future Carhart performance in both 
models. This is in line with the existing mutual fund literature. The number of accounts is the 
most interesting variable for this analysis. It accounts for the structural difference between 
mutual funds and SAs as it considers an effect that does not exist in mutual funds. As expected 
from the prior results, it has a negative influence on Carhart performance. Comparing the effects 
of TA and number of accounts by their standardized coefficients, an increase of one standard 
deviation in the log number of accounts is more detrimental to performance as a one standard 
deviation increase in log size.  
                                                 
15 Further model specifications also include SA fixed-effects. The results are economically the same. Results are 
available upon request.  
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Thus, with a higher number of individual investors with potentially competing elements 
of individualizations either the attention span of SA managers per investor goes down which is 
detrimental to performance (e.g., Kacperczyk et al., 2016) or SAs must hire more staff which 
causes administrative stress and hierarchy costs, consistent with Chen et al.’s (2004). Both 
explanation approaches belong to the structural size effects and as a result of their different 
organizational structure, these occur in SAs differently than in mutual funds.  
To be able to completely understand the relation between TA and the number of 
accounts, we alternatively consider average account size in M2. It shows a significantly positive 
impact on future performance. Thus large SAs can reduce their diseconomies of scale by 
managing only a small number of larger single investor accounts, thereby mitigating the 
negative effects of administrative stress and hierarchy costs. 
Overall, the results in this section clearly show that SAs suffer from diseconomies of 
scale. Moreover, the specific structure of SAs which makes them different from widely studied 
mutual funds is the more important reason for such negative size effects. Therefore, in the 
following, we analyze in more detail how the number of accounts influences management 
behavior and the performance of SAs. 
2.4 Further tests of the sources of diseconomies of scale in SAs 
2.4.1 Structural diseconomies of scale, limited attention and diversification 
To disentangle the reasons for diseconomies of scale in SAs, we go into more detail on SA 
behavior and the multidimensional relation between size and performance. Therefore, we 
perform further 5x5 sortings on subsamples of SA months for which we have respective 
additional information. Table 7 shows conditional double sortings where SAs are first sorted 
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into quintiles by lagged TA and then by lagged number of accounts.16 Panel A shows TA and 
the number of accounts to document the orginial sorting variables. Panel B shows the degree of 
individualization offered to investors (individualization score), Panel C shows the number of 
managers running the SA, and Panel D shows the number of different holdings. Keep in mind 
that using the same sorting algorithm in Table 4, SA performance shows a decreasing pattern 
from the upper left corner of small SAs with few accounts to the lower right corner of large 
SAs with many accounts. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
In Panel A, the upper figure represents the average TA (in million USD) of the SAs in the 
portfolio while the lower figure in parentheses represents the average number of accounts. 
Interestingly, the average number of accounts in the “Low” column is between 1 and 7, which 
makes many of these SAs closely resemble the organizational structure of mutual funds, which 
should create high “classic” diseconomies of scale but no relevant structural diseconomies. On 
the other hand, the SAs in the “High” column show very high numbers of accounts of up to 
1,181 for the largest SAs. This suggests very high structural diseconomies of scale. Panel B 
shows that the individualization score increases from the lower left corner to the upper right 
corner indicating that SAs with more accounts offer more individualization. This could be due 
to retail accounts as they usually offer tax optimization services, which are not necessary for 
institutional investors. Furthermore, the results indicate that smaller SAs offer higher 
individualization. A possible explanation is that over the last 26 years, many new SAs have 
been launched creating a very competitive environment, also vis-à-vis mutual funds, in which 
new (and therefore smaller) SAs try to attract investors by offering more individual services. 
                                                 
16 Similar double sortings using average account size yield economically consistent results and are available upon 
request. 
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At the same time, the number of managers in Panel C increases only slightly with SA 
size from 2.04 on average for the smallest quintile to 2.43 in the largest quintile. From the 
standpoint of management fee revenues, which are usually a percentage of TA, this makes sense 
because more managers can be employed. However, it is puzzling that there is no relevant 
difference in the number of managers between SAs with many and few individual accounts. In 
three of five size quintiles, the number of managers is even smaller for SAs with more accounts 
given they have approximately the same size. From the standpoint of efforts necessary to 
manage several hundreds of accounts at the same time, each with a higher degree of 
individualization on average, we would have expected relatively more managers in SAs with 
more accounts.  
The number of holdings displayed in Panel D thus reveals how SAs handle the higher 
managing effort with more or less the same number of managers. They hold significantly fewer 
different stocks, i.e. they scale rather than diversify. Specifically, while the number of stocks 
generally increases with size, as also shown by Pollet and Wilson (2008) for mutual funds, it 
decreases dramatically with the number of accounts. This suggests that, to cope with the 
organizational effort necessary to manage a large SA that has many accounts and a high level 
of individualization with roughly the same number of managers, they must reduce complexity 
by concentrating on a smaller number of stocks. This is also in line with the literature on mutual 
fund manager attention (e.g., Kacperczyk et al., 2016; Gupta-Mukherjee and Pareek, 2016). 
Overall, the results in this section deliver valuable new insights into the behavior of SA 
managers. Specifically, they show in which way SA managers faced with the task of providing 
high quality, individualized service to a large number of investors compensate for their limited 
attention span. Interestingly, they reduce portfolio complexity by concentrating on fewer 
different stocks. 
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2.4.2 Investor flow, liquidity constraints and price impact costs 
As mentioned in Section 1, the effects of size on mutual fund performance are also connected 
to the effects caused by flows, i.e. by changes of size (e.g., Edelen, 1999; Alexander et al., 2007; 
Pollet and Wilson, 2008). The reason is that flows either cause liquidity constraints and price 
impact costs or – by mitigating these effects – keep managers from following their optimal 
portfolio strategy. Both mechanisms are detrimental to performance. Looking at the descriptive 
statistics in Table 1 reveals that flows to SAs have been substantial during these 26 years. 
However, the coefficients of flow on SA performance displayed in Table 6 are insignificant 
indicating no relevant relation, which is puzzling from the standpoint of the mutual fund 
literature.  
Therefore, in Table 8, we analyze annualized flows in more detail by perfoming another 
double-sorting based on lagged TA and lagged number of accounts. Furthermore, in Table 9, 
we run piecewise linear panel regressions where the coefficient for flow may be different for 
small, medium (quintile 2-4), and large SAs following Eq. (6a), and for SAs with few, medium 
(quintile 2-4), and many accounts following Eq. (6b). To account for the specific structure of 
SAs vis-à-vis mutual funds, we additionally condition the flow-interaction variables on 
situations where flows occur without a change in the number of accounts, where flows occur in 
combination with an increase in the number of accounts, and where flows occur in combination 
with a decrease in the number of accounts, separately for inflows and outflows, respectively.17 
As above, we use 2-dimensionally clustered standard errors (Petersen, 2009). 
 
 
                                                 
17 Using gross performance as dependent variable yields economically consistent results. The same applies for 
panel regressions using average account size (avAS) instead of the number of accounts (#Accs) and conditioning 
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The results for the conditional double-sorting in Table 8 display a clear pattern that small SAs 
experienced very high inflows while large SAs experienced outflows on average, which is in 
line with the related literature (e.g., Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002; Heisler et al., 2007). 
[Insert Table 8 and Table 9 here] 
All results from the piecewise linear panel regressions in Table 9 show the expected relations 
regarding log size and log number of accounts as both have a significantly negative impact on 
SA performance. In situations where flows occur without a change in the number of accounts, 
inflows display significantly positive relations to the performance of small- and medium-sized 
SAs. As possible explanation, one could suspect that the SA management maintains a close 
communication with investors (e.g., Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002), so that new inflows may be 
anticipated quite well and are used to make valuation-motivated purchases (e.g., Alexander et 
al., 2007; Rohleder et al., 2017). Similarly, we also find high positive coefficients of inflows in 
SAs with few and medium accounts, but only significant for the latter. For outflows, we only 
find a significant negative effect on performance for SAs with few accounts. This negative 
coefficient may be explained by the fact that these accounts have on average a relatively large 
average account size (see Table 3, Panel B), so that these outflows may cause some price 
impact. In situations where flows occur with an increase or a decrease in the number of accounts 
the results display no significant effect at all.  
It is remarkable that we do not find stronger negative effects of flows on performance 
as documented regularly for mutual funds. This could be explained by the fact that both account 
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closings and inflow may be anticipated quite well due to close investor communication and the 
inflow to some accounts may be partly matched by the necessary sells for the closed accounts. 
This mitigates outside transaction costs and price impact. Moreover, the size of individual 
accounts may be below the critical level to cause price impact costs. This once more underlines 
that structural size effects caused by a high number of individual investor accounts are more 
important for SAs than classic size effects such as liquidity constraints and market impact costs. 
2.4.3 Propensity score matching 
In the previous section, we have established that SAs, like mutual funds, suffer from 
diseconomies of scale. Moreover, we identify an additional layer of diseconomies of scale vis-
à-vis mutual funds which is the number of individual investor accounts. To get a more 
comprehensive view on such structural differences between SAs and mutual funds, we run a 
matched comparison analysis based on a propensity score (e.g. Evans and Fahlenbrach, 2012)18 
between SAs and single mutual funds. Specifically, we identify for each SA at each point in 
time five neighbor mutual funds which are closest in character regarding the size, as well as 
further control variables used in previous analyses including the investment style and the risk 
characteristics. This way, an SA and the matched mutual funds are very similar in character 
except only for the number of accounts of the particular SA.  
Like the SA data, also the mutual fund data stems from Morningstar Direct from which 
we select the whole universe of U.S. equity open-end mutual fund share classes with seamless 
monthly return series.19 This dataset includes 13,006 mutual fund share classes with 1,43 mio. 
monthly obversations between January 1990 and December 2015.  
                                                 
18 The authors use a similar matching algorithm to match retail mutual funds with an institutional twin (either SA 
or institutional mutual fund) to retail mutual funds without an institutional twin to assess the effects of monitoring 
by institutional investors on fund governance. 
19 For the matching, we use share class level expense ratios, to capture the different fee structures of mutual fund 
share classes, and fund level size. 
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 For our analysis, we sort SAs with their matched mutual funds into quintiles according 
to the number of individual accounts and calculate the average Carhart alpha for each group 
and the difference in performance between the SAs and mutual funds. The results are presented 
in Table 10 where Panel A matches SAs and mutual funds on controls and investment style and 
Panel B matches them on controls and risk.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
The results on the left for net returns clearly show that SAs overall outperform mutual funds, 
which is in line with previous research (e.g. Elton et al., 2014). The results for gross returns 
additionally show that the outperformance is not entirely due to differences in fees. More 
importantly the results show that while the performance of mutual funds is stable over all 
quintiles, the performance of SAs is monotonically decreasing with a growing number of 
accounts as could be expected from previous analyses. The stable performance of the matched 
mutual funds further supports our presumption, that it is no other portfolio characteristic which 
is able to systematically explain the decreasing trend in SA performance, but the increasing 
organizational stress stemming from a growing number of accounts. Another impressive result 
is that also those SAs with the highest number of accounts still outperform their mutual fund 
counterparts. Thus, we conclude that the additional structural layer in SAs severely hurts the 
performance of SAs, however not to an extent sufficient to dive it below that of mutual funds 
with similar characteristics. 
2.5 Robustness tests 
As described in the beginning of Section 4, our baseline model is Carhart’s (1997) four-factor 
model. To rule out that the choice of the Carhart (1997) model drives our results, we 
alternatively use the CAPM (Jensen, 1968) and the Fama and French (1993) model for 
robustness. Moreover, following Elton et al. (2014) we use the fund’s particular best-fit 
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benchmark which we identify by the maximum R2 from running regressions of SAs on a large 
variety of stock indices. For overall performance results using these models, see Table 2. 
Moreover, despite the fact that the SAs in our sample are mostly invested in US domestic equity, 
they may also invest some percentage of their TA in bonds or non-US equity. Therefore, in 
further alternative models, we augment the Carhart (1997) model with an US aggregate bond 
index, and with the MSCI World Ex US index, respectively. For all of the mentioned alternative 
performance models, we run our main analyses presented in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. The results 
remain robust. Moreover, for the construction of the panel regression dataset, we run all of these 
models for monthly rolling windows of 12, 24 and 36 months. The results are similar and from 
an economical point of view they stay the same. 
As an alternative to the conditional double sorting which first sorts SAs into quintiles 
by size and then within the quintiles further by the number of accounts or average account size, 
we also use unconditional double sortings. The major difference is that with this independent 
sorting it is possible that some extreme portfolios remain vacant. For example, this is intuitively 
the case for very small accounts (size quintile 1) with a very high overall number of accounts 
(#accs quintile 5). Other than that, the economic patterns displayed in the conditional sortings 
are also observable in the unconditional sorting and thus robust. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Is there something new to learn from the structural differences between SAs and mutual funds 
regarding the effects of size on performance in professional asset management? We contribute 
to this question by providing the first in-depth investigation of the specific effects of size on the 
performance of SAs. We show that SAs suffer from two sources of diseconomies of scale. First, 
like mutual funds, SAs suffer from diminishing returns to scale in the dimension of TA, i.e. 
liquidity constraints and market impact costs. Second, due to their additional structural layer 
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compared to mutual funds, which increases their overall management complexity, SAs 
particularly suffer from organizational stress. To compensate this additional complexity in SA 
structure, SA managers reduce portfolio complexity by concentrating on fewer different stocks. 
Further, we do not find a relevant negative effect of flow on the performance of SAs, which is 
contrary to numerous findings in the mutual fund literature. This can be explained by a close 
investor communication, which enables SA managers to anticitpate new flows quiet well. 
Finally, we show that SAs outperform mutual funds with similar characteristics, even those 
SAs with the highest number of accounts. 
Our key takeaways are thus that: 1) Small SAs outperform large SAs, 2) SAs with few 
accounts outperform their counterparts with many accounts, and 3) SAs outperform mututal 
funds with similar characteristics. Overall smaller SAs with a low number of individual 
accounts are able to provide a high quality and individual service at low costs with a reasonable 
level of diversification which makes them the best performing SAs in our sample. 
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10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
          
Panel A: Summary statistics by SA 
          
Total assets (mio. $) 3,671 519.00 1020.00 5.38 28.60 128.00 499.00 1470.00 3.99 
Number of accounts (#) 3,370 243 1484 2 4 15 72 305 13.19 
Avg. account size (mio. $) 3,281 72.70 239.00 0.27 0.79 9.56 52.20 169.00 12.74 
          
Expense ratio (% p.a.) 3,770 0.86 0.60 0.31 0.55 0.75 0.97 1.34 2.06 
Min. investment (mio. $) 3,377 7.24 10.90 0.10 0.25 2.00 10.00 25.00 2.30 
Turnover (% p.a.) 2,981 70.15 63.72 18.69 29.76 52.45 88.41 140.70 3.25 
Number of holdings (#) 3,650 89 151 27 39 57 93 154 10.71 
Assets in top10 hold. (%) 3,401 33.79 17.33 17.33 23.36 30.52 38.97 51.85 1.84 
Flow (% p.a.) 3,483 14.45 32.32 -13.53 -2.59 10.66 27.39 47.68 1.46 
Individualization score 1,279 8.13 8.41 0.00 0.00 6.00 15.00 21.00 0.73 
Number of managers (#) 3,466 2.10 1.01 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.83 0.51 
          
Panel B: Pooled summary statistics 
          
Total assets (mio. $) 469,324 640.00 1360.00 4.00 23.80 134.00 582.00 1730.00 4.05 
Number of accounts (#) 386,306 231 1865 1 3 13 51 224 21.49 
Avg. account size (mio. $) 344,432 78.80 268.00 0.26 1.00 11.70 54.80 175.00 12.95 
          
Expense ratio (% p.a.) 574,377 0.86 0.81 0.00 0.36 0.72 0.96 2.04 1.62 
Min. investment (mio. $) 530,328 7.92 11.40 0.10 0.50 3.00 10.00 25.00 2.18 
Turnover (% p.a.) 189,211 66.11 61.37 16.00 28.00 50.00 85.00 131.00 3.57 
Number of holdings (#) 246,929 87 144 29 40 58 92 147 12.88 
Assets in top10 hold. (%) 91,687 33.33 17.13 16.54 22.94 30.49 38.79 50.81 1.85 
Flow (% p.a.) 417,314 12.78 89.07 -45.68 -15.04 -0.30 17.40 76.53 2.26 
Individualization score 230,689 7.96 8.28 0.00 0.00 6.00 15.00 21.00 0.75 
Number of managers (#) 479,235 2.14 1.12 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 0.50 
          
          
This table shows summary statistics for a sample of actively managed U.S. domestic equity Separate Accounts 
(SAs) from 1990/01 to 2015/12. The unit of obsersvation is the SA in Panel A and the SA-month in Panel B. The 
average account size of SA i in period t is the quotient of total assets and the number of accounts in period t. The 
expense ratio is calculated as the difference between gross and net return. Min. investment is minimum initial 
investment an investor has to make to open an account within a particular SA. The net flow of SA i in period t is 
calculated as the change in total assets from period t-1 to period t less value changes due to net returns on assets. 
For the individualization score, we use sixteen questions asked by Morningstar regarding the range of services 
offered (e.g. an individual tax-optimization) to investors. These question can be answered with "proactive", "by 
request only", or "no", which we evaluate with 2, 1, or 0 points. The individualization score is calculated as the 





Separate account performance 
         
 CAPM  Best-fit  Fama-French   Carhart 
  EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW 
         
Panel A: Net returns 
         
Performance 0.198  -0.425  0.072  -0.342  -0.332  -0.762 *** -0.348  -0.733 ** 
(% p.a.) (0.71)  (0.30)  (0.80)  (0.23)  (0.30)  (0.01)  (0.28)  (0.01)  
Market 1.005 *** 1.012 ***   0.968 *** 0.991 *** 0.969 *** 0.988 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Best-fit index   0.934 *** 0.956 ***     
   (0.00)  (0.00)      
SMB     0.230 *** 0.145 *** 0.220 *** 0.138 *** 
     (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
HML     0.043 *** 0.020 *** 0.040 *** 0.016 *** 
     (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
MOM       0.026 *** 0.013 *** 
       (0.00)  (0.00)  
         
Adj. R² 0.80  0.84  0.87  0.90  0.87  0.90  0.88  0.91  
         
Panel B: Gross returns 
         
Performance 1.119 ** 0.376  0.992 *** 0.453  0.588 * 0.037  0.571 * 0.065  
(% p.a.) (0.04)  (0.36)  (0.00)  (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.90)  (0.08)  (0.58)  
Market 1.005 *** 1.012 ***   0.968 *** 0.991 *** 0.970 *** 0.988 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Best-fit index   0.934 *** 0.956 ***     
   (0.00)  (0.00)      
SMB     0.229 *** 0.145 *** 0.219 *** 0.138 *** 
     (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
HML     0.043 *** 0.020 *** 0.040 *** 0.016 *** 
     (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  
MOM       0.025 *** 0.013 *** 
       (0.00)  (0.00)  
         
Adj. R² 0.80  0.84  0.87  0.90  0.87  0.90  0.88  0.91  
         
         
This table presents annualized SA performance and factor sensitivities from a sample of actively managed U.S. 
domestic equity SAs from 1990/01 to 2015/12. The performance for SA i in month t is the difference between its 
actual return and a style return, which is calculated using a 24-month rolling window regression and multiplying 
its estimated factor sensitivities from the prior 24 months with the values of the corresponding risk-factors in 
month t. All further factor sensitivities are measured using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model in 24-month 
rolling window regressions. Panel A displays the results for net returns and Panel B for gross returns. ***, **, and 





SA characteristics, sorted by total assets, number of accounts and average account size 
  
           
  
Total Assets  
(Mio. $) 
 






Net Flow  
(% p.a.) 
 





Q Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Mean Med. Performance Market 
             
Panel A: Sorted by total assets 
             
1 11 5 54 5 4.2 0.7 38.86 2.18 0.96 0.78 0.40 0.94 
2 47 39 78 11 12.5 4.9 18.70 0.49 0.87 0.75 0.02 0.96 
3 155 141 136 13 35.0 13.3 7.70 -0.97 0.86 0.75 -0.34 0.97 
4 479 441 196 16 76 29 1.49 -2.68 0.81 0.73 -0.55 0.99 
5 2528 1743 401 24 248 248 -2.89 -4.02 0.77 0.71 -0.73 0.99 
             
5-1 2517 1739 348 19 244 87 -41.74 -6.19 -0.19 -0.07 -1.14 0.05 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
             
Panel B: Sorted by number of accounts 
             
1 286 51 3 2 169.3 30.4 20.42 0.31 0.78 0.72 0.49 0.99 
2 594 160 6 5 112.9 29.7 12.55 -0.72 0.81 0.73 -0.12 0.99 
3 737 241 15 14 56.6 18.4 8.54 -1.61 0.85 0.75 -0.61 0.99 
4 1049 347 47 39 31 10 6.88 -1.73 0.85 0.72 -0.73 0.97 
5 916 247 1081 241 6 6 5.32 -1.71 1.01 0.75 -1.10 0.95 
             
5-1 628 197 1077 239 -164 -29 -14.61 -1.97 0.23 0.03 -1.54 -0.05 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
             
Panel C: Sorted by average account size 
             
1 127 18 675 72 1.1 0.3 24.08 1.71 1.10 0.82 -0.64 0.93 
2 227 52 153 28 4.1 2.5 18.13 0.50 0.89 0.76 -0.18 0.96 
3 406 139 44 13 14.4 12.1 9.79 -0.80 0.81 0.73 -0.41 0.99 
4 847 389 23 10 45 40 2.29 -2.03 0.75 0.72 -0.48 1.00 
5 1867 1100 13 5 326 326 0.47 -3.10 0.71 0.71 -0.30 1.00 
             
5-1 1739 1082 -663 -67 325 175 -23.59 -4.80 -0.39 -0.11 0.35 0.07 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) 
  
           
  
           
This table shows summary statistics for a sample of actively managed U.S. domestic equity Separate Accounts (SAs) 
from 1990/01 to 2015/12. The SAs are quarterly sorted into quintiles by their lagged total assets in Panel A, by their 
lagged number of accounts in Panel B, and by their lagged average account size in Panel C. The expense ratio is 
calculated as the difference between gross and net return. The net flow of SA i in period t is calculated as the change 
in total assets from period t-1 to period t less value changes due to net returns on assets. The average account size of 
SA i in period t is the ratio of total assets and the number of accounts in period t. Carhart performance of SA i in 
month t is the difference between its actual return and a style return, which is calculated using a 24-month rolling 
window regression and multiplying its estimated factor sensitivities from the prior 24 months with the values of the 





Conditional double-sorting of performance based on lagged size and lagged number of accounts 
        
 Number of accountst-1 
Total assetst-1 Low  2  3  4  High  All  High-low  
        
Panel A: Carhart performance using net returns 
        
Low 0.902 ** 0.635  0.180  -0.108  -0.784 ** 0.196  -1.653 *** 
 (0.04)  (0.17)  (0.65)  (0.78)  (0.04)  (0.59)  (0.00)  
2 0.467  -0.016  -0.316  -0.773 ** -1.209 *** -0.336  -1.662 *** 
 (0.32)  (0.97)  (0.46)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.37)  (0.00)  
3 -0.016  -0.400  -0.766 * -0.583  -1.396 *** -0.611 * -1.401 *** 
 (0.97)  (0.37)  (0.07)  (0.14)  (0.00)  (0.09)  (0.00)  
4 -0.201  -0.514  -0.906 ** -0.488  -1.098 *** -0.633 * -0.878 *** 
 (0.64)  (0.23)  (0.04)  (0.25)  (0.00)  (0.09)  (0.01)  
High -0.175  -1.046 *** -0.808 ** -1.002 *** -1.319 *** -0.860 *** -1.146 *** 
 (0.61)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
        
All 0.253  -0.340  -0.533  -0.592 * -1.160 *** -0.448  -1.390 *** 
 (0.51)  (0.38)  (0.15)  (0.08)  (0.00)  (0.19)  (0.00)  
        
High-low -1.072 *** -1.588 *** -0.960 *** -0.919 *** -0.538 * -1.054 ***  
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)     
        
Panel B: Carhart performance using gross returns 
        
Low 1.772 *** 1.635 *** 1.242 *** 1.066 *** 0.430 1.243 *** -1.315 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.26)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
2 1.255 *** 0.794 * 0.581  0.213  0.010  0.600  -1.233 *** 
 (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.17)  (0.58)  (0.98)  (0.11)  (0.00)  
3 0.735 * 0.366  0.111  0.295  -0.284  0.263  -1.041 *** 
 (0.06)  (0.41)  (0.79)  (0.46)  (0.41)  (0.46)  (0.00)  
4 0.526  0.216  -0.011  0.372  -0.005  0.226  -0.515  
 (0.22)  (0.61)  (0.98)  (0.38)  (0.99)  (0.54)  (0.12)  
High 0.538  -0.297  -0.025  -0.260  -0.354  -0.070  -0.895 *** 
 (0.11)  (0.43)  (0.95)  (0.43)  (0.22)  (0.81)  (0.00)  
        
All 1.029 *** 0.460  0.367  0.336  -0.040  0.452  -1.048 *** 
 (0.01)  (0.23)  (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.89)  (0.18)  (0.00)  
        
High-low -1.234 *** -1.824 *** -1.229 *** -1.353 *** -0.787 ** -1.312 ***  




Table 4 cont’d. 
        
 Number of accountst-1 
Total assetst-1 Low  2  3  4  High  All  High-low  
        
Panel C: Carhart market beta 
        
Low 0.976 *** 0.968 *** 0.947 *** 0.940 *** 0.931 *** 0.951 *** -0.046 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
2 1.006 *** 0.991 *** 0.976 *** 0.945 *** 0.922 *** 0.969 *** -0.085 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
3 0.997 *** 0.998 *** 0.997 *** 0.969 *** 0.945 *** 0.981 *** -0.051 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
4 1.013 *** 1.006 *** 0.998 *** 0.990 *** 0.954 *** 0.993 *** -0.060 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
High 0.989 *** 1.002 *** 1.006 *** 0.991 *** 0.963 *** 0.990 *** -0.026 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
        
All 0.996 *** 0.991 *** 0.985 *** 0.967 *** 0.943 *** 0.977 *** -0.053 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
        
High-low 0.012 *** 0.046 *** 0.061 *** 0.051 *** 0.032 *** 0.039 ***  
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)     
        
        
This table presents annualized portfolio Carhart performance and market risk for 5x5 portfolios using monthly 
returns from a sample of actively managed U.S. domestic equity SAs from 1990/01 to 2015/12. Portfolios are 
formed by sorting all SAs each quarter in quintiles by their lagged total assets and within these quintiles the SA 
are sorted into quintiles by their lagged number of accounts. Panel A and B show net and gross Carhart 
performance of SA i in month t, which is the difference between its actual return and a style return, which is 
calculated using a 24-month rolling window regression and multiplying its estimated factor sensitivities from the 
prior 24 months with the values of the corresponding risk-factors in month t. Market risk, shown in Panel C, is 
the market sensitivity of SA i in the prior 24 months. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% 





Conditional double-sorting of performance based on lagged size and lagged average account size 
        
 Average account sizet-1 
Total assetst-1 Low  2  3  4  High  All  High-low  
        
Panel A: Carhart performance using net returns 
        
Low -0.667  -0.307  0.900 ** 0.543  0.595  0.206  1.281 *** 
 (0.10)  (0.42)  (0.02)  (0.20)  (0.17)  (0.57)  (0.00)  
2 -0.998 *** -0.841 ** -0.545  0.180  0.496  -0.345  1.510 *** 
 (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.20)  (0.69)  (0.27)  (0.35)  (0.00)  
3 -1.363 *** -0.649 * -0.684  -0.392  0.041  -0.612 * 1.414 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.35)  (0.92)  (0.09)  (0.00)  
4 -1.072 *** -0.566  -1.011 ** -0.355  -0.130  -0.629 * 0.947 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.17)  (0.02)  (0.40)  (0.76)  (0.09)  (0.00)  
High -1.427 *** -0.852 ** -0.988 *** -0.688 ** -0.358  -0.864 *** 1.064 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.32)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
        
All -1.106 *** -0.645 * -0.465  -0.142  0.130  -0.449  1.244 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.05)  (0.21)  (0.70)  (0.73)  (0.19)  (0.00)  
        
High-low -0.762 ** -0.537  -1.878 *** -1.235 *** -0.956 *** -1.068 ***  
  (0.03)  (0.13)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)     
        
Panel B: Carhart performance using gross returns 
        
Low 0.689 * 0.814 ** 1.904 *** 1.476 *** 1.429 *** 1.257 *** 0.759 ** 
 (0.09)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  
2 0.213  0.144  0.345  0.984 ** 1.283 *** 0.592  1.084 *** 
 (0.55)  (0.71)  (0.42)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.11)  (0.00)  
3 -0.251  0.228  0.166  0.388  0.787 * 0.262  1.047 *** 
 (0.46)  (0.56)  (0.71)  (0.35)  (0.05)  (0.47)  (0.00)  
4 0.011  0.312  -0.131  0.365  0.593  0.228  0.585 * 
 (0.97)  (0.45)  (0.77)  (0.38)  (0.16)  (0.54)  (0.06)  
High -0.446  -0.087  -0.263  0.078  0.350  -0.075  0.791 *** 
 (0.16)  (0.81)  (0.48)  (0.80)  (0.33)  (0.80)  (0.00)  
        
All 0.042  0.281  0.405  0.658 * 0.890 ** 0.453  0.853 *** 
 (0.89)  (0.40)  (0.28)  (0.08)  (0.02)  (0.18)  (0.00)  
        
High-low -1.136 *** -0.895 ** -2.157 *** -1.402 *** -1.081 *** -1.330 ***  




Table 5 cont’d. 
        
 Average account sizet-1 
Total assetst-1 Low  2  3  4  High  All  High-low  
        
Panel C: Carhart market beta 
        
Low 0.937 *** 0.941 *** 0.944 *** 0.965 *** 0.981 *** 0.954 *** 0.044 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
2 0.924 *** 0.940 *** 0.978 *** 1.002 *** 1.002 *** 0.969 *** 0.077 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
3 0.942 *** 0.972 *** 0.997 *** 0.998 *** 0.998 *** 0.981 *** 0.056 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
4 0.957 *** 0.987 *** 1.002 *** 1.006 *** 1.011 *** 0.993 *** 0.054 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
High 0.966 *** 0.996 *** 1.005 *** 0.992 *** 0.990 *** 0.990 *** 0.024 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
        
All 0.945 *** 0.967 *** 0.985 *** 0.993 *** 0.996 *** 0.977 *** 0.051 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
        
High-low 0.029 *** 0.056 *** 0.061 *** 0.027 *** 0.009 *** 0.036 ***  
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)     
        
        
This table presents annualized portfolio Carhart performance and market risk for 5x5 portfolios using monthly 
returns from a sample of actively managed U.S. domestic equity SAs from 1990/01 to 2015/12. Portfolios are 
formed by sorting all SAs each quarter in quintiles by their lagged total assets and within these quintiles the SA 
are sorted into quintiles by their lagged average account size. Panel A and B show net and gross Carhart 
performance for SA i in month t, which is the difference between its actual return and a style return, which is 
calculated using a 24-month rolling window regression and multiplying its estimated factor sensitivities from the 
prior 24 months with the values of the corresponding risk-factors in month t. Market risk, shown in Panel C, is 
the market sensitivity of SA i in the prior 24 months. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% 








Panel regressions of SA performance  
 
 Future net performance  Future gross performance 
 M1 M2  M1 M2 
 
Log TA  -0.236*** -0.636***  -0.241*** -0.638*** 
 (0.01) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.00) 
Log Number of accounts  -0.344***   -0.341***  
 (0.00)   (0.00)  
Log Avas   0.458***   0.453*** 
  (0.00)   (0.00) 
 
Log FirmTA  -0.009 -0.009  -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.91) (0.91)  (0.93) (0.93) 
Lagged Alpha (1year) -0.178 -0.178  -0.199 -0.199 
 (0.61) (0.61)  (0.57) (0.57) 
Expense ratio (% TA p.a.) -0.416*** -0.416***  0.114 0.114 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.11) (0.11) 
Log Min. investment -0.003 -0.003  -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.97) (0.97)  (0.94) (0.94) 
Net flow  0.058 0.058  0.053 0.053 
 (0.27) (0.27)  (0.32) (0.32) 
Age 0.019 0.019  0.022 0.022 
 (0.75) (0.75)  (0.71) (0.71) 
Retail Dummy -0.285 -0.285  -0.193 -0.193 
 (0.24) (0.24)  (0.43) (0.43) 
CIT Dummy 0.434 0.434  0.447* 0.447* 
 (0.11) (0.11)  (0.10) (0.10) 
 
Time FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Style FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 
Adjusted R² 0.06 0.06  0.06 0.06 
N 77,151 77,151  77,151 77,151 
 
 
This table reports panel regressions of Separate account (SA) performance on SA size, number of accounts, and 
average account size. The sample consists of actively managed U.S. domestic equity SAs from 1990/01 to 
2015/12. Carhart performance of SA i in month t is the difference between its actual return and a style return, 
which is calculated using a 24-month rolling window regression and multiplying its estimated factor sensitivities 
from the prior 24 months with the values of the corresponding risk-factors in month t. Style and time fixed 
effects (FE) are considered using style- and quarterly demeaned variables, respectively (within transformation). 
All variables are standardized to mean zero and unit standard deviation. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. P-values are given in parentheses. Standard errors are 2-dimensionally 




Conditional double-sorting of SA characteristics based on lagged size and lagged number of accounts 
        
 Number of accountst-1 
Total assetst-1 Low  2  3  4  High  All  High-low  
        
Panel A: Total assets and number of accounts 
        
Low 14  14  13  13  21  15  8 
 
(1)  (4)  (8)  (21)  (295)  (63)  (293) 
2 67  73  71  66  72  70  5 
 
(2)  (6)  (17)  (60)  (444)  (103)  (441) 
3 203  211  216  211  205  209  3 
 
(3)  (8)  (17)  (71)  (637)  (144)  (635) 
4 591  603  602  633  600  605  10 
 
(3)  (9)  (20)  (63)  (1181)  (250)  (118) 
High 2406  2653  2757  3121  3191  2819  793 
 
(7)  (15)  (27)  (66)  (1985)  (411)  (1977) 
All 602  768  746  809  818  743  217 
 
(3)  (9)  (18)  (56)  (914)  (195)  (910) 
High-low 2388  2641  2747  3108  3173  2805   
  (6)  (11)  (19)  (45)  (1690)  (349)     
        
Panel B: Individualization score 
        
Low 7.07 *** 8.96 *** 9.50 *** 11.86 *** 11.73 *** 9.96 *** 4.70 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
2 6.61 *** 7.08 *** 7.68 *** 10.63 *** 11.76 *** 8.82 *** 4.94 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
3 5.79 *** 5.92 *** 6.30 *** 8.07 *** 11.02 *** 7.68 *** 5.00 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
4 3.61 *** 4.48 *** 5.77 *** 6.68 *** 11.01 *** 6.66 *** 7.44 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
High 4.90 *** 4.47 *** 3.92 *** 4.83 *** 9.19 *** 5.74 *** 4.24 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
        
All 5.68 *** 6.02 *** 6.56 *** 8.27 *** 10.86 *** 7.73 *** 5.05 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
        
High-low -2.22 *** -4.35 *** -5.74 *** -7.03 *** -2.57 *** -4.25 ***  




Table 7 cont’d. 
        
 Number of accountst-1 
Total assetst-1 Low  2  3  4  High  All  High-low  
        
Panel C: Number of managers 
        
Low 2.10 *** 2.07 *** 1.99 *** 1.97 *** 2.08 *** 2.04 *** -0.03 * 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.08)  
2 2.34 *** 2.15 *** 2.09 *** 2.14 *** 2.36 *** 2.22 *** 0.00  
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.64)  
3 2.42 *** 2.28 *** 2.18 *** 2.27 *** 2.25 *** 2.28 *** -0.17 *** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
4 2.42 *** 2.34 *** 2.30 *** 2.36 *** 2.37 *** 2.36 *** -0.03 ** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  
High 2.30 *** 2.52 *** 2.33 *** 2.51 *** 2.48 *** 2.43 *** 0.21 *** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
All 2.30 *** 2.28 *** 2.18 *** 2.25 *** 2.31 *** 2.27 *** 0.01  
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.34)  
High-low 0.15 *** 0.47 *** 0.33 *** 0.53 *** 0.39 *** 0.37 ***  
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)     
        
Panel D: Number of holdings 
        
Low 91.76 *** 72.72 *** 62.10 *** 55.42 *** 82.71 *** 74.17 *** -10.86 *** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  
2 119.51 *** 86.87 *** 76.54 *** 61.19 *** 54.79 *** 80.15 *** -65.02 *** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
3 140.37 *** 92.70 *** 74.51 *** 58.23 *** 57.06 *** 84.93 *** -83.56 *** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
4 140.18 *** 108.26 *** 93.50 *** 75.69 *** 58.27 *** 93.95 *** -80.70 *** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
High 145.91 *** 102.99 *** 105.82 *** 86.94 *** 54.85 *** 97.39 *** -89.92 *** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
All 126.01 *** 93.55 *** 82.68 *** 67.92 *** 60.48 *** 86.37 *** -65.58 *** 
 
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
High-low 52.79 *** 29.93 *** 43.11 *** 31.21 *** -25.33 *** 23.46 ***  
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)     
This table presents summary statistics for 5x5 portfolios from a sample of actively managed U.S. domestic equity 
SAs from 1990/01 to 2015/12. Portfolios are formed by sorting all SAs each quarter in quintiles by their lagged 
total assets and within these quintiles, the SA are sorted into quintiles by their lagged number of accounts. Panel 
A shows the total assets and the corresponding number of accounts in parentheses, Panel B the individualization 
score, Panel C the number of managers and Panel D the number of holdings. ***, **, and * denote significance 





Conditional double-sorting of flow based on lagged size and lagged number of accounts 
        
 Number of accountst-1 
Total assetst-1 Low  2  3  4  High  All  High-low  
        
Low 27.99 *** 30.45 *** 30.03 *** 24.80 *** 22.04 *** 26.69 *** -5.50 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
2 12.73 *** 14.38 *** 11.81 *** 12.17 *** 10.54 *** 12.25 *** -1.78  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.18)  
3 1.17  3.19 *** 2.68 ** 3.98 *** 2.68 *** 2.64 *** 1.59  
 (0.16)  (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.13)  
4 2.73 *** -3.94 *** -2.97 *** 0.26  -0.55  -0.86 * -3.19 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.69)  (0.48)  (0.07)  (0.00)  
High -1.08 ** -3.34 *** -4.95 *** -4.81 *** -3.66 *** -3.51 *** -2.36 *** 
 (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
        
All 9.54 *** 6.60 *** 6.98 *** 7.14 *** 6.12 *** 7.35 *** -3.22 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
        
High-low -28.98 *** -32.25 *** -35.13 *** -29.11 *** -25.73 *** -30.13 ***  
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)     
        
        
This table presents yearly net flows for 5x5 portfolios from a sample of actively managed U.S. domestic equity 
SAs from 1990/01 to 2015/12. Portfolios are formed by sorting all SAs each quarter in quintiles by their lagged 
total assets and within these quintiles, the SA are sorted into quintiles by their lagged number of accounts. The 
net flow of SA i in period t is calculated as the change in total assets from period t-1 to period t less value changes 
due to net returns on assets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. P-values 




Piecewise linear panel regressions of SA future net performance 
 
 Inflows  Outflows 
 No change in #accs Increase in #accs Decrease in #accs No change in #accs Increase in #accs Decrease in #accs 
 
 
Log TA  -0.223** -0.231*** -0.218** -0.230*** -0.233*** -0.235*** -0.241*** -0.233*** -0.236*** -0.234*** -0.232*** -0.240*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Log #accs  -0.348*** -0.350*** -0.368*** -0.370*** -0.365*** -0.359*** -0.352*** -0.342*** -0.367*** -0.368*** -0.358*** -0.355*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Flow : Small 0.106**  0.064  -0.030  -0.019  0.003  0.007  
 (0.01)  (0.22)  (0.63)  (0.73)  (0.95)  (0.91)  
Flow : Medium 0.086**  0.012  -0.015  -0.045  -0.040  -0.001  
 (0.04)  (0.78)  (0.76)  (0.40)  (0.35)  (0.99)  
Flow : Large 0.014  -0.039  -0.006  -0.051  0.002  0.053  
 (0.72)  (0.34)  (0.88)  (0.13)  (0.96)  (0.25)  
 
Flow : Few accs  0.076  -0.028  -0.025  -0.124***  -0.016  -0.009 
  (0.17)  (0.50)  (0.71)  (0.01)  (0.73)  (0.88) 
Flow : Med accs  0.099**  0.039  0.026  0.019  -0.012  0.014 
  (0.01)  (0.40)  (0.60)  (0.68)  (0.79)  (0.80) 
Flow : Many accs  0.032  0.005  -0.057  -0.060*  -0.029  0.031 
  (0.61)  (0.91)  (0.27)  (0.09)  (0.53)  (0.65) 
 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Adjusted R² 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
N 75,119 75,119 75,119 75,119 75,119 75,119 75,119 75,119 75,119 75,119 75,119 75,119 
This table reports piecewise linear panel regressions of Separate account (SA) performance on net flows. The sample consists of actively managed U.S. domestic equity SAs from 1990/01 
to 2015/12. In this analysis, we allow the coefficients of flow to be different for small SAs (quintile 1), medium SAs (quintiles 2-4), and large SAs (quintile 5) and for SAs with few accounts  
(quintile 1), medium accounts (quintiles 2-4), and many accounts (quintile 5), respectively. Furthermore, the variables are conditioned on situations where flows occur without a change in 
number of accounts, with an increase or a decrease in number of accounts. Style and time fixed effects (FE) are considered using style- and quarterly demeaned variables, respectively 
(within transformation). All variables are standardized to mean zero and unit standard deviation. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. P-values are 
given in parentheses. Standard errors are 2-dimensionally clustered by SA and quarter to be consistent with regard to heteroscedasticity, time series correlation, and cross-sectional correlation. 
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Table 10  
Separate Accounts vs. Mutual Funds 
Panel A: Control variables plus Morningstar investment style  
 Net                    Gross                   
 Number of accountst-1  Number of accountst-1  
 Low   2   3   4   High    Low   2   3   4   High   
SA 0.43  -0.10  -0.50  -0.67  -1.19  1.21  0.71  0.36  0.21  -0.13  
MF -1.74  -1.74  -1.60  -1.64  -1.64  -0.74  -0.73  -0.57  -0.61  -0.56  
SA - MF 2.17 *** 1.65 *** 1.10 *** 0.98 *** 0.44 ***  1.95 *** 1.43 *** 0.93 *** 0.82 *** 0.43 *** 
                      
Panel B: Control variables plus Carhart sensitivities 
 Net                    Gross                   
 Number of accountst-1  Number of accountst-1  
 Low   2   3   4   High    Low   2   3   4   High   
SA 0.43  -0.10  -0.50  -0.67  -1.19  1.21  0.71  0.36  0.21  -0.13  
MF -1.42  -1.43  -1.38  -1.42  -1.36  -0.42  -0.41  -0.36  -0.39  -0.30  
SA - MF 1.87 *** 1.33 *** 0.87 *** 0.74 *** 0.21 **   1.65 *** 1.11 *** 0.69 *** 0.59 *** 0.20 ** 
This table reports the results from a matched sample comparison test between separate accounts (SA) and mutual fund share classes (MF). The sample consists of actively managed U.S. 
domestic equity SAs and MFs from 1990/01 to 2015/12. In Panel A, we identify for each SA at each point in time five neighbor MFs which are closest in character based on a propensity 
score matching technique that considers all SA and MF control variables (total assets, expense ratio, netflow, age) as well as the investmentstyles reported in the Morningstar database. In 
Panel B, the propensitiy score considers all SA and MF control variables as well as the sensitivities to the four Carhart (1997) factors. For the comparison, SAs are sorted into quintiles 
according to their number of accounts in the previous quarter t-1. Then, the average Carhart (1997) alpha in quarter t is compared to the average alpha of the matched MFs. The difference 
(SA – MF) represents the result of a two-sample comparison t-test. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. We do not report significance 





3 Article II: Diseconomies of Scale in Quantitative and Fundamental Investment Styles 
 
Richard B. Evans, Martin Rohleder, Hendrik Tentesch and Marco Wilkens 
University of Virginia, University of Augsburg 
 
 
Abstract. We examine diseconomies of scale for two different investment approaches: 
quantitative and fundamental. Using separate account (SA) data where the investment approach 
is specified, we find that fundamental SAs exhibit greater diseconomies of scale than 
quantitative SAs. Looking at characteristics of the underlying investment strategies, we find 
that fundamental SAs hold more concentrated portfolios of lower liquidity stocks, while 
quantitative SAs trade more frequently. We also find that consistent with lower information 
processing/hierarchy costs, the speed of information diffusion is higher for quant SAs. 
Accounting for these differences partially explains the differences in diseconomies of scale. 
 
JEL Classification: G11, G12, L11, L23, L25 
Keywords: Diseconomies of scale, quantitative, fundamental, performance, flows, trading 
costs, hierarchy costs, information processing, separate accounts, institutional investing 
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3.1  Introduction 
The question of whether or not the asset management industry exhibits economies or 
diseconomies of scale has received increased attention in the academic literature as of late, but 
it is a question that dates back to the earliest papers on mutual funds. Sharpe (1966) proposes 
and tests the competing hypotheses, ultimately concluding that there is no relationship between 
size and performance.20 Since that time, fund size has become a standard control variable in 
performance regressions21 often with a negative and statistically significant coefficient being 
interpreted as evidence of diseconomies of scale. Additionally, the widely referenced Berk and 
Green (2004) model depends on the assumption of scale diseconomies. Recent papers, however 
have questioned these results noting the endogeneous relationship between fund size and 
performance. Alternative approaches to address this endogeneity, like recursive demeaning 
(Pastor, Stambaugh and Taylor, 2015 and Zhu, 2018) and regression discontinuity (Reuter and 
Zitzewitz, 2015), either fail to find diseconomies of scale at all, or find a much less 
economically significant relationship between size and performance than identified previously.  
While these papers highlight econometric concerns with the prior literature, they also 
highlight the crude nature of the proxy used for scale. While fund size is easily measured, it 
does not differentiate between the possible mechanisms for diseconomies of scale including 
liquidity – the increased trading and price impact costs associated with investing a larger pool 
of assets22, information processing – the increased difficulty of timely identifying an increasing 
                                                 
20 “A fund with substantial assets can obtain a given level of security analysis by spending a smaller percentage of 
its income than can a smaller fund; alternatively, by spending the same percentage it can obtain more (and/or 
better) analysis. On the other hand, more analysis may be required for a large fund than for a small one. In any 
event, both influences should be considered.”, Sharpe (1966), p. 131.  
21 Sharpe (1966), Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Carhart (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Chen, Hong, Huang and 
Kubik (2004). 
22 Pollet and Wilson (2008), for example, examine how managers respond to increases in fund size through 
analyzing their investment decisions. They find that the average manager responds to fund growth by increasing 
the size of their existing positions as opposed to identifying and investing in new securities, even though this 
behavior results in decreased performance. This finding suggests liquidity constraints on the scalability of fund 
portfolios is a contributing factor to diseconomies of scale in asset management. Further, Pastor, Stambaugh and 
Taylor (2018) acknowledge an important tradeoff between fund size on the one hand and the liquidity of the 
portfolio on the other hand (among other tradeoffs). 
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number of profitable investment strategies, and hierarchy costs – the cost or delay of 
communicating soft information throughout a larger firm as more people with more diverse 
functions and specializations are involved in the investment process. 
In this paper, we revisit the issue of diseconomies of scale, but contrasting two different 
investment approaches: quantitative and fundamental. Using a database of separate accounts 
(SAs) from 1991 to 2018 as a laboratory, we test for differences in diseconomies of scale across 
the two approaches. The advantage of using SA data is the disclosure of the investment 
approach, quantitative or fundamental, by the manager, which is not available for other 
investment vehicles like mutual funds. While managers using these two different approaches 
may oversee funds of similar size investing in similar securities, the underlying nature of the 
two approaches suggests potential differences in both information processing/hierarchy costs 
and liquidity cost channels. Because fundamental analysis relies on soft information production 
and communication between investment professionals in the firm (e.g. stock pitch from analyst 
to manager) to a greater degree than quantitative analysis, we expect both the information 
processing/hierarchy cost and the associated liquidity impact of increasing fund size to be 
greater for fundamental analysis. 
To illustrate why fundamental strategies may exhibit different information 
processing/hierarchy and liquidity costs, consider the two investment strategy descriptions 
below. First, Ariel Investments, LLC, Small Cap Value SA, a fundamentally managed SA, 
describe their investment strategy as follows:  
“Once we identify a new idea for the possible inclusion in our portfolio, the 
portfolio managers…conduct further research and investigation by examining: 
1.) Basic financial ratios…and 2.) Qualitative factors — company’s position in the 
market, new product potential, quality of management, stock ownership by senior 
management and stakeholders, turnaround or takeover potential…. Once it is clear 
that a candidate meets our criteria…the portfolio managers and industry analyst 
evaluate which methodology is most useful in determining whether the security can 
be purchased with a margin of safety. There are no rigid criteria to our analytical 
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process nor is the same decision-making process applied to each prospective 
investment for the strategy. Rather, we are simply looking to uncover each 
company’s intrinsic value. After the appropriate analysis is conducted, the final 
decision on whether to purchase …the security is made by the lead portfolio 
manager.”23 
This description from Ariel suggests both a high degree of soft information analysis and 
multiple feedback loops between different investment professionals at the firm before a 
decision is made to invest in a security. These potential information processing and hierarchy 
costs may also give rise to increased liquidity costs. Because the security selection process in a 
fundamental strategy is more time consuming, the investment response to sudden flows is more 
likely to scale existing holdings as opposed to diversifying into new positions (e.g., Pollet and 
Wilson, 2008). 
This stands in stark contrast to the description by the Amalgamated Bank LongView LC 
Quant SA of their quantitative investment process: 
“Investment ideas are generated through the application of a stock screening 
algorithm to a database of financial statistics for a stock universe. (…) We look to 
add value to the Fund's portfolio through a highly controlled process that utilizes 
quantitative analysis of portfolio behavior, as well as other methods of statistical 
analysis incorporating sophisticated computer technology.”24 
The quantitative investment process described by Amalgamated involves an automated analysis 
with no person-to-person communication. With primary dependence on hard information and 
little or no communication or feedback loops required between different investment 
professionals at the firm, these lower hierarchy and information processing costs are more likely 
to translate into lower liquidity costs as well as a larger number of potential investments may 
be covered by the algorithm. 
                                                 
23 Source: Morningstar Direct. 
24 Source: Morningstar Direct. 
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 To begin our empirical analysis, we first examine diseconomies of scale across quant 
and fundamental SAs. Sorting SAs by the quintile of their total invested assets, we find a 
monotonically decreasing risk-adjusted performance for fundamental SAs with a statistically 
and economically significant alpha difference of -1.15% annualized. Sorting quant SAs by size, 
however, generates a flat relationship between size and risk-adjusted performance with an 
insignificant difference of -0.06% between the largest and smallest size quintiles. 
 Given the importance of controlling for other covariates like family size, in measuring 
diseconomies of scale, we repeat the analysis in a panel regression framework. Even after 
controlling for other SA, investment advisor, investment style, time, and SA-fixed effects or 
controlling for endogeneity using the Zhu (2018) recursive-demeaning approach, we still find 
a statistically and economically significant difference in scale diseconomies between 
fundamental and quantitative strategies. While in over half of the regression specifications, 
quantitative SAs exhibit no statistically significant diseconomies of scale, the standardized 
point estimate for fundamental SAs is 2.7 times larger, on average, than the point estimate for 
quantitative SAs across the various regression specifications. 
 Because both the quantitative and fundamental SAs are investing in similar securities25, 
the difference in diseconomies of scale is striking. To better understand the potential channels 
through which these two investment styles differ on this dimension, we first explore the 
liquidity channel and then the information processing/hierarchy cost channel. To examine the 
liquidity channel, we use the framework proposed by Pastor, Stambaugh and Taylor (2020 – 
hereafter PST) who show that fund size may affect performance as part of a system of 
interrelated investment constraints, i.e. “mutual fund tradeoffs”, across fund size, turnover, fees, 
and portfolio liquidity. They further decompose portfolio liquidity into stock liquidity (i.e. the 
                                                 
25 Over the sample period, quant and fundamental SAs have approximately 96% of their holdings in common on 
a value-weighted basis. 
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costs of trading a given stock) and diversification (i.e. the coverage or number of stocks in a 
portfolio and balance, the weight in those given stocks).  
We examine the differences in turnover, fees, and portfolio liquidity for fundamental 
and quantitative SAs. In terms of turnover and fund fees, we find that quantitative SAs have 
higher turnover and lower expense ratios. Consistent with the equilibrium suggested in PST, 
this higher turnover/lower fee combination for quantitative separate accounts is also 
accompanied by higher portfolio liquidity relative to fundamental SAs. The higher portfolio 
liquidity of quantitative SAs is accomplished through both holding higher liquidity stocks and 
more diverse portfolios. Decomposing portfolio diversification into its two components – 
coverage and balance – we find that quantitative SAs have both more extensive coverage (i.e. 
hold a greater total number of stocks) and have greater balance (i.e. less concentration in any 
given stock) than fundamental SAs. 
 While on average quantitative SAs exhibit much greater portfolio liquidity, we also 
examine how portfolio liquidity changes as SA size increases for both quantitative and 
fundamental SAs. We find that while diversification increases with increased size in a similar 
fashion for both investment strategies, stock liquidity declines at a faster rate for quantitative 
SAs relative to fundamental. Given the much higher average stock liquidity for quantitative 
SAs to begin with, however, it would take a nearly two standard deviation increase in 
quantitative SA size to equalize the stock liquidity between the two. 
While analyzing quant and fundamental SAs through the PST framework provides 
direct evidence of differences in portfolio liquidity between the two strategies, they do not give 
much insight into the underlying economic rationale behind these liquidity differences. The two 
strategy descriptions above, however, provide one plausible explanation, namely the difference 
in information processing and hierarchy costs inherent in the strategy. For example, the 
fundamental strategy description highlighted both a high degree of soft information analysis 
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(causing high information processing costs) and multiple feedback loops between different 
investment professionals at the firm (high hierarchy costs). In contrast, the quant strategy 
description suggests a primary dependence on hard information (low information processing 
costs) and an automated analysis with no person-to-person communication (low hierarchy 
costs).  
 The PST liquidity analysis provides indirect evidence of the role of hierarchy and 
information processing costs. The lower coverage and balance of fundamental SAs relative to 
quant SAs is consistent with higher information processing costs. Similarly, the higher portfolio 
turnover of quant strategies is consistent with lower hierarchy costs. 
While the liquidity channel has been the subject of a number of previous studies,26 the 
literature’s sparse treatment of the information processing and hierarchy cost mechanisms 
attests to the difficulty in measuring these two dimensions directly. The industrial organization 
literature, however, provides some insight into how to potentially test these mechanisms. 
Radner and Van Zandt (1992), Radner (1993), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) and Stein (2002) 
all model different aspects of the information processing problem in firms. These papers point 
to the efficient transfer of information through a firm as a key outcome of low information 
processing/hierarchy costs in a firm. Empirically, we attempt to measure the efficient transfer 
of information in two ways.  
First, we look at the speed of information diffusion within SA firms as a proxy for low 
hierarchy and information processing costs. We estimate information diffusion following the 
method of Cici, Jaspersen and Kempf (2017).27 If quant SA firms use hard information to a 
higher degree and their investment decision process involves fewer or even no feedback loops, 
                                                 
26 E.g., Pollet and Wilson (2008), Pastor, Stambaugh and Taylor (2018). 
27 Specifically, we identify the purchase of a new security not held by other separate accounts of the investment 
advisor as an information acquisition event. The information event is assumed to continue until the initiating 
account decreases its position in the security. We then measure the time elapsed until other SAs of the same 
investment advisor purchase the security as well during the time period associated with the information event. 
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we would expect information to diffuse faster through quant firms than through fundamental 
ones. Using detailed portfolio holdings information of quant and fundamental SAs, our test 
confirms this expectation in that information diffusion speed is higher at quant firms, consistent 
with lower information processing costs. Moreover, while the overall lower information 
diffusion speed is rather constant in firm size for fundamental firms, we observe a reverse U-
shape for quant firms. When quant firms increase, they initially achieve economies of scale 
(e.g., Indro et al., 1999) as SAs share more investments and the respective information. 
However, with further increase information diffusion speed decreases, consistent with quant 
firms diversifying strategies rather than increasing diversification within SAs (e.g., Pollet and 
Wilson, 2008) such that SAs cease sharing investments and the respective information. This, 
again shows the interconnectedness of the liquidity and information processing/hierarchy 
channels. 
Second, we look at the hard vs. soft information content of the investment decisions 
made by quantitative vs. fundamental asset managers through a factor analysis of their 
performance. If the performance of a given fund is better captured by the systematic return 
factors identified in the literature (e.g. market, SMB, HML and MOM), this proxies for the 
greater use of systematic or hard information by the manager. Across all four models we employ 
(CAPM, CAPM using the manager preferred benchmark “MPB”, Fama-French, and Carhart), 
the average adjusted R2 of the quantitative SAs is between 4.5% and 7.6% higher than of 
fundamental SAs. Moreover, we analyze the change in factor loadings and adjusted R2 in 
reaction to changes in the portfolio management using a difference-in-differences approach and 
find a statistically significantly lower change in the strategy as measured by these variables 
from the old manager to the new manager for the quantitative investment strategies, also 
consistent with greater use of hard information and lower hierarchy costs, as the model largely 
determines the investment decision. 
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We then repeat our risk-adjusted performance analysis, accounting for manager ability 
through fixed effects, the differential liquidity costs associated with quant and fundamental 
strategies as well as broad proxies for information processing/hierarchy costs (i.e. the aggregate 
size of quant/fundamental strategies and the number of quant/fundamental SAs at an advisor). 
While our manager fixed effect baseline regression still shows evidence of higher diseconomies 
of scale for fundamental SAs, controlling for the PST liquidity proxies and the broad proxies 
for information processing/hierarchy costs both help to explain the difference in diseconomies 
of scale between the two. 
Two recent papers analyze the performance of quantitative vs. fundamental investment 
strategies. Harvey, Rattray, Sinclair, and Van Hemert (2017) examine the performance of 
discretionary (fundamental) vs. systematic (quantitative) hedge funds from 1996 to 2014. They 
find that discretionary equity hedge funds do outperform systematic equity, but they take more 
risk and have higher factor exposures. After controlling for this risk, both systematic equity and 
macro strategies outperform their discretionary counterparts. Abis (2017) models the 
equilibrium outcomes for quant and discretionary funds, assuming quant funds have superior 
information processing skills, but less flexible investment strategies, both consistent with our 
findings. The model predicts that quantitative funds will hold more stocks, have pro-cyclical 
performance, and hold positions that are more likely to suffer from overcrowding. She then 
classifies a sample of mutual funds as following quantitative or discretionary investment 
strategies using machine learning and empirically confirms these predictions of her model. 
Relative to the previous literature, our contribution is threefold. First, we document 
underperformance of quantitative strategies relative to fundamental strategies with respect to 
classic factor models but not relative to the manager-preferred benchmark in a sample of 
institutional separate accounts. Second, we directly test for differences in diseconomies of scale 
between the two investment strategies and find quantitative SAs exhibit statistically and 
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economically significantly lower diseconomies of scale. Third using proxies for liquidity costs 
and hierarchy/information processing costs, we show that quantitatively managed SAs exhibit 
low costs on both dimensions. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our dataset, explains how we 
measure performance and presents summary statistics. Section 3 examines performance and 
diseconomies of scale differences between quant and fundamental SAs. Section 4 tests two 
possible channels for these differences, liquidity costs and hierarchy/information processing 
costs. Section 5 concludes.  
3.2 Data and Performance measurement 
3.2.1 Data and sample construction 
We obtain survivorship bias-free data on actively managed US domestic equity separate 
accounts (SAs) over the period 1990 to 2018 from Morningstar Direct.28 We recognize as “SAs” 
all separately managed accounts (SMAs) and collective investment trusts (CITs) following 
Elton, Gruber and Blake (2014). Management firms report as an SA the pool of individual 
customer accounts managed by the same management team and following the same strategy 
(e.g. “small value”). The returns and SA characteristics are thus customer account-weighted 
composite measures. We exclude those SAs with reported net returns exceeding gross returns 
and those with less than 36 monthly return observations. Following Elton, Gruber and Blake 
(2014) we exclude index SAs both by their names and by an R2 above 99% from a performance 
regression against the SA’s “best-fit benchmark”, which we identify by regressions of the SAs 
against a wide range of stock market indices.29 We exclude “specialty” SAs both by their names 
and by stock market betas below 0.2 from the performance regression. Because our analysis 
                                                 
28 Elton, Gruber and Blake (2014), who use a similar dataset from 2000 to 2010, test for potential further biases 
arising from low reporting requirements compared to, e.g., mutual funds, and conclude that the data is unbiased. 
29 Appendix A shows the list of managers’ self-stated or “manager preferred benchmarks” (MPB). We use the 
indices on this list to determine the SAs “best-fit benchmarks”.  
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focuses on the differences between SAs with pure quantitative (hereafter, quants) and 
fundamental investment strategies (hereafter, fundamentals), we exclude those SAs, as self-
categorized by the SAs and reported conveniently by Morningstar, whose investment strategy 
does not focus solely on one strategy or the other.30 The final sample contains 1,780 SAs of 
which 363 are quantitative and 1,417 are fundamental strategies. For those, we obtain quarterly 
SA characteristics as well as investment advisor level data including firm. We also obtain 
quarterly SA level portfolio holdings in the sub-period from 2001 to 2018 for the majority of 
our sample SAs.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1 presents summary statistics on SA characteristics separately for quants (Panel A) and 
fundamentals (Panel B). Quants have lower total assets (TA) on average ($386m vs. $740m) 
and their annual expense ratio, calculated as the difference between reported gross and net 
returns, is lower than for fundamentals (0.73% vs. 0.93%). The average annual turnover of 
110.33% for quants is twice as high as the turnover of fundamentals (53.71%). At the same 
time, quants are less concentrated, with 155 different holdings on average and 29% of TA in 
the top 10 holdings. Fundamentals are more concentrated, with only 62 different holdings on 
average and 34% of TA in the top 10. Quants are younger with an average age of 7.66 years 
compared to 9.51 years on average for fundamentals. A slightly higher fraction of quants have 
an institutional focus (24.2% to 21.8%) and only half as many quants have a retail focus (5.0% 
vs. 10.2%).  
SAs of both investment strategies have experienced substantial annual implied 
percentage net flow with 9.93% for quants and 11.37% for fundamentals. We calculate 
quarterly implied percentage net flow (hereafter “flow”) from quarterly TA and quarterly 
                                                 
30 This excludes 470 SAs following a combination of quantitative and fundamental investment decision 
approaches. Further, it excludes 484 SAs following a purely “technical” approach. 
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returns as in Sirri and Tufano (1998) following Eq. (2). This positive average flow attests to the 
growing economic importance of SAs over the past 29 years. 
flowi,q = 
TAi,t – TAi,q-1 (1+Ri,q)
TAi,q-1
 (1) 
Panel C of Table 1 shows by-year market value-weighted summary statistics on the stock 
holdings common to quant and fundamental SAs. The numbers show that the investment 
universes of quant and fundamental SAs overlap by 95.99% on average, with a minimum of 
90.75% in 2001 and a maximum of 99.25% in 2015. Thus, both investment approaches hold 
virtually the same stock universe. 
3.2.2 Performance 
To measure risk-adjusted SA performance, we use the CAPM (Jensen, 1968), the CAPM vis-
à-vis the manager-preferred benchmark (MPB; e.g., Elton, Gruber and Blake, 2014), the 
Fama/French (1993) model and the Carhart (1997) model. The models are based on the 
following regressions (Eq. 2, 3, 4 and 5).  
ERi,t = αi
CAPM + 𝛽i
Mkt ERMkt,t + εi,t (2) 
ERi,t = αi
MPB + 𝛽i
MPB ERMPB,t + εi,t (3) 
ERi,t = αi
FamaFrench + 𝛽i
Mkt ERMkt,t + 𝛽i
SMB SMBt + 𝛽i
HML HMLt + εi,t (4) 
ERi,t = αi
Carhart + 𝛽i
Mkt ERMkt,t + 𝛽i
SMB SMBt + 𝛽i
HML HMLt + 𝛽i
UMD MOMt + εi,t (5) 
ERi,t is the return of SA i in month t in excess of the 1-month T-Bill rate, αi
Carhart is SA i’s risk-
adjusted performance, ERMkt,t is the monthly market excess return, 𝛽i
Mkt is the SA’s sensitivity 
to the market, ERMPB,t is the monthly excess return of the manager-preferred benchmark index, 
SMBt is the monthly size factor return, HMLt is the monthly value factor return and MOMt is 
the monthly momentum factor return. εi,t is a mean zero error term.  
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For the CAPM, the Fama/French and the Carhart model, we use the common risk factors 
provided via Kenneth R. French’s data library.31 As MPBs, we use 74 different self-stated 
benchmarks indices for which we obtain monthly returns from Morningstar Direct.32 Using the 
MBP implicitly accounts for the fact that sophisticated investors may chose SAs specifically 
for their stated investment style and therefore manager compensation/motivation may depend 
on their MBP-performance rather than on the performance vis-à-vis the “academic benchmark”. 
To obtain monthly estimates of risk-adjusted SA performance for the panel regressions, 
we follow Sharpe (1992) and calculate the out-of-sample performance, αi,t
ooS, for each SA i in 
each month t. Specifically, the style benchmark return (Eq. 6a) is defined as the sum of the SA’s 
loadings to the respective risk factors k = 1, …, K during the 24-month “in sample” rolling 
window from t–25 to t–1 ( β
i,t–1
 k  ) times the risk factor (excess) returns in month t (fk,t).33 The 
SAs out-of-sample performance in month t is the difference between the SAs excess return 
(ERi,t) and the style benchmark return (Eq. 6b). To account for outliers and estimation errors in 




 = ∑  β
i,t–1
 kK
k=1  fk,t (6a) 
αi,t
ooS= ERi,t –  Style return𝑖,𝑡 (6b) 
Table 2 reports annualized average out-of-sample alphas as well as in-sample risk-factor 
loadings and R2 statistics for all four models, separately for quants (Panel A) and fundamentals 
(Panel B). “EW” denotes equal-weighted and “VW” denotes size-weighted results across 
                                                 
31 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. We thank Kenneth French for 
providing the data. 
32 See Appendix A for a list of the 74 MPBs. 
33 Repeating the analysis with alternative sample window lengths of 12 and 36 months yields economically similar 
results. 
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SAs.34  Looking first at the single index MPB results, we see that both the quant and 
fundamental SAs have EW alpha point estimates above zero and slightly negative VW alpha 
point estimates, but neither are statistically different from zero. With the CAPM, both EW and 
VW alphas are negative albeit insignificant for quant and fundament SAs, with the respective 
VW results being lower. With the Fama-French and Carhart alphas, however, there are two 
interesting patterns. First, the fundamental SA alphas are consistently higher than the quant SA 
alphas. Second, while there is little or no difference between the EW and VW alphas for the 
quantitative SAs, indicative of little or no decrease in performance for larger portfolio sizes, 
there is a marked difference in the EW and VW alphas for fundamental SAs. The much lower 
VW alphas suggests that for fundamental SAs, the larger portfolios underperform the smaller 
portfolios, a first indication that diseconomies of scale may play a more important role for 
fundamentals than for quants. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Regarding risk factor loadings, the market risk betas are near one for all measures and for both 
SA groups, however slightly lower for fundamentals. Fundamentals have higher average SMB 
betas while quants have higher HML betas on average. Fundamentals have no significant 
exposure to the momentum factor while quants have a significant exposure, consistent with 
momentum being a quant strategy rather than a fundamental one. Lastly, with respect to the 
model fit, quants show consistently higher R2 statistics than fundamentals with differences 
between 4.5% and 7.6% depending on the model and weighting scheme. In the rest of the 
analysis, we focus on the MPB and Carhart models as the most relevant models from investor 
and academic standpoints, respectively.35  
                                                 
34 Similar regressions for gross-returns are qualitatively the same, however, on a higher level. Further, due to the 
difference in the total expense ratio displayed in Table 1, the difference between quants and fundamentals is 
smaller. 
35 Repeating the analysis with the CAPM and the Fama/French model risk-adjusted performance yields 
qualitatively similar results. 
64 
Table 3 presents hypothesis tests of the differences in monthly out-of-sample alphas, in-
sample risk factor sensitivities and R2 statistics between quant and fundamental strategies. The 
first three columns report statistics for quants, the next three for fundamentals and the three 
rightmost columns report the respective differences. Quants have significantly lower mean and 
median Carhart alpha than fundamentals. They have higher market risk, lower exposure to 
SMB, higher exposures to HML and momentum, and they have higher adjusted R2s. The table 
also reports standard deviations of the alpha, beta and adjusted R2 estimates. Almost all of the 
statistics are significantly more stable through time for quants compared to fundamentals as 
indicated by the negative and significant differences in standard deviations. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
3.3 Differences in the Impact of Size on Performance 
3.3.1 Portfolio Sorting by SA Size 
In a first step to analyzing the differences in diseconomies of scale between quant and 
fundamental investment strategies, we follow the classic method of Chen et al. (2004) and 
calculate the average performance of quarterly rebalanced size-quintile portfolios. Table 4 
reports the results for all SAs (left columns) and separately for quant (middle columns) and 
fundamental SAs (right columns). For all SAs, the risk-adjusted performance of the “Low” size 
quintile is positive but statistically insignificant at +0.19% p.a. for the Carhart model and 
statistically significant at +0.97% p.a. for the MPB model, respectively. The performance of 
the “High” size quintile is negative but only statistically significant for the Carhart model risk-
adjusted performance. The “High-Low” difference is negative and statistically significant, 
consistent with the general existence of diseconomies of scale in SAs.  
However, looking at quant and fundamental SAs separately reveals that this finding is 
driven by the decline in performance as size increases for fundamental SAs. Specifically, the 
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“High-Low” difference in Carhart alpha for quants is close to zero and statistically insignificant 
and all size quintiles show very similar performance at around –1.00% p.a. The “High-Low” 
difference in MPB alpha is relatively small and only weakly statistically significant. 
Conversely, especially for the Carhart model fundamental SAs show highly negative and 
statistically significant “High-Low” differences and almost monotonically decreasing 
performance from the significant “Low” size quintile (0.54% p.a) to the significant “High” 
quintile (–0.61% p.a.). This is a first indication that diseconomies of scale differ across quant 
and fundamental SAs. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
3.3.2 Panel Regressions of Future Performance 
While the quintile sorting in Table 4 is compelling because an accordingly structured 
hypothetical investment strategy would earn positive risk-adjusted returns, it cannot be ruled 
out that this univariate result stems from other sources than differences in size. Therefore, Table 
5 reports a wide range of panel regression approaches, where we explain quarterly future net 
Carhart model risk-adjusted performance (at+1, t+3
ooS, Carhart
) with lagged SA size (Log TA), 
fundamental and quant group fixed effects36 and various other SA and firm control variables 
(Eq. 7a). Further, to separate the effects of size on performance for quant and fundamental SAs, 
we include interaction terms between Log TA and indicator variables for quant and fundamental 
SAs (Eq. 7b). The different panel regressions include pooled regressions (M1, M2), style-fixed 
effects regressions (M3, M4), style- and time-fixed effects regressions (M5, M6), SA-fixed 
effects regressions (M7, M8)37 and Zhu (2018) recursive demeaning two-stage least squares 
regressions to control for the endogeneity between size and performance (M9, M10). All 
variables are standardized to a unit standard deviation to ease comparisons between the 
                                                 
36 To include both dummies without imposing multicollinearity, we run the regressions without a global constant. 
37 We consider fixed effects via within group demeaning. 
66 
coefficients. Standard errors are two-dimensionally clustered by SA and date to consider time-
series and cross-sectional correlations. 
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The first column (M1) reports an overall negative effect of Log TA on future performance, in 
line with the univariate sorting for all SAs in Table 4. As for the most important control 
variables, the fundamentally managed SA indicator variable has a positive effect on 
performance, consistent with the higher average performance in Tables 2 and 3. Higher expense 
ratios are associated with lower future performance, in line with the previous literature.38 Higher 
minimum investment amounts are associated with higher future SA performance while a retail 
investor focus is associated with lower SA performance, both consistent with better monitoring 
by more sophisticated and institutional investors (Evans and Fahlenbrach, 2012).  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
                                                 
38 Similar panel regressions using future gross returns as dependent variable yields economically similar 
coefficients. 
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The second column (M2) shows separate coefficients on Log TA for quant and fundamental 
SAs. Consistent with our previous result on the separate size quintile sorting in Table 4, the 
coefficient for fundamental SAs is negative and statistically and economically significant. A 
one standard deviation increase in Log TA is associated with a decrease of future Carhart alpha 
of 0.341% per quarter. In contrast, the coefficient for quant SAs is statistically insignificant and 
the point estimate is close to zero (0.094%). The effects are significantly different from each 
other as indicated by the difference in coefficient p-values reported directly below the 
coefficients. Repeating the regressions with various fixed effects to control for systematic 
differences between styles or structural differences over time (M3 – M6) does not change this 
finding materially. Considering constant cross-sectional differences (M7, M8)39 and recursively 
demeaned cross-sectional differences between SAs (M9, M10)40, which may include manager 
talent and skill, reveals that quant SAs also show diseconomies of scale but significantly weaker 
so than fundamental SAs. Overall, this evidence is consistent with the existence of 
diseconomies of scale in active management, which is significantly stronger in the fundamental 
investment process than the quant investment process. 
3.4 Diseconomies of Scale Channels 
3.4.1 Liquidity Costs 
As elaborated in the introduction, there are two channels frequently put forward to rationalize 
the existence of diseconomies of scale in active investment management: higher liquidity costs 
and higher hierarchy and information processing costs. In this subsection, we intensively test 
                                                 
39 Note that quant dummy, fundamental dummy, minimum investment amount, retail focus dummy, and CIT 
dummy are constant within SAs and therefore absorbed by the SA fixed effect. 
40 Note that while SA fixed effects consider constant cross-sectional differences between SAs, the recursive 
demeaning method also considers potentially endogenous changes of such differences over time, thereby 
mitigating bias by blunt application of fixed effects (Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor, 2015). Variables, which are 
constant within the SA (quant, fundamental, minimum investment amount, retail focus and CIT) are therefore 
included in the regressions in their un-demeaned form. All other variables are recursively demeaned following the 
instructions in Zhu (2018). The first stage results of the 2SLS regression approach are reported in Appendix B. 
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whether the differences in diseconomies of scale between the quant and fundamental investment 
processes is driven by differences in liquidity costs. Therefore, we extend the equilibrium model 
provided by Berk and Green (2004) and further developed by Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor 
(2020, hereafter PST) to separately consider the “separate account tradeoffs” of quant and 
fundamental SAs. Such tradeoffs exist between liquidity, turnover, and expense ratio, which 
are at the discretion of the management, and size, which is (for the most part) externally 
determined by investor decisions. 
Specifically, we exactly follow the methodology laid out in PST to construct the 
quantity “portfolio liquidity” as well as its components “stock liquidity” and “diversification”, 
with sub-components “balance” and “coverage”. Therefore, we use the quarterly holdings of 
our sample SAs and the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund.41 Further, to be consistent 
with PST, we also construct the quantity “turnover” following their definition as the “dollar 
amount traded divided by [TA]”, which deviates from the SEC’s definition (minimum of sales 
and purchases divided by TA).  
Panel A of Table 6 mirrors PST’s Table 1 by explaining portfolio liquidity with the 
other tradeoff variables. In addition, we explain portfolio liquidity with its components and with 
the quant and fundamental dummies. Most importantly, we interact all of the tradeoff variables 
with these dummies, to capture differences between the different investment processes. Panel 
B mirrors PST’s Table 4 by explaining the components of portfolio liquidity. Panel C reports 
regressions of the other tradeoff variables, expense ratio and turnover ratio, against the liquidity 
components. Like PST, we use quarter-style fixed effects and cluster by SA. All variables are 
standardized to unit standard deviation. 
                                                 
41 We obtain quarterly (1992–2013) respectively monthly holdings (2014–2018) of the Vanguard Total Stock 
Market Index fund from Morningstar Direct.  
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Fundamental SAs have lower portfolio liquidity on average, indicated by the 
significantly negative coefficient on the respective dummy variable (Panel A). This is due to 
lower diversification, lower coverage, lower balance, and the fact that quants show higher stock 
liquidity (Panel B). This general difference may be a first indication, that the liquidity channel 
affects fundamentals more strongly. Then, as SAs grow, fundamentals increase portfolio 
liquidity (Panel A). This is consistent with the tradeoff hypothesized by PST, as larger funds 
have to make larger trades, which is easier with more liquid stocks. This is, however, not the 
case for quants, which seem not to face this tradeoff, probably due to the already high average 
portfolio liquidity. Panel B thus reveals that both quants and fundamentals increase 
diversification in reaction to growth, consistent with PST. Quants do this mainly by increasing 
coverage while fundamentals equally increase coverage and balance. In contrast to PST, 
growing quants decrease stock liquidity as their widened coverage must be achieved by 
investing in less liquid stocks. However, given the much higher average stock liquidity for 
quant SAs to begin with (+0.710) it would take a nearly two standard deviation increase in 
quant size (–0.355) to equalize the stock liquidity between the two. Moreover, the fact that the 
increase in coverage counteracts the decrease in stock liquidity explains the insignificant 
coefficient of quant size in Panel A. This tradeoff between stock liquidity and diversification 
can also be seen in the opposing signs of “Stock Liquidity : DQ” in explaining diversification 
and its components in Panel B. Growing fundamentals keep stock liquidity constant, such that 
the increase in diversification explains the overall increase in portfolio liquidity. Also, the 
negative but small coefficient on “Diversification : DF” on stock liquidity confirms the tradeoff 
hypothesized by PST, however not for quants. Thus, there are strong “within portfolio liquidity 
tradeoffs” in quants, while fundamentals show strong “outside tradeoffs” between portfolio 
liquidity and the other tradeoff variables. This difference may explain differences in scale 
diseconomies. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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With respect to the other tradeoff variables, quants have lower expense ratios on average (Panel 
C), consistent with the summary statistics in Table 1. Both quant and fundamentals become 
cheaper as they grow, consistent with correlations between the variables shown in Table 6 of 
PST, with quants becoming cheaper at a slightly higher pace. Further, more liquid quants are 
significantly cheaper, consistent with PSTs hypothesized tradeoff (Panel A). This is mainly due 
to higher diversification and especially higher coverage (Panel B). The PST tradeoff, however, 
does not hold for fundamentals, which show no or a weakly positive relation between portfolio 
liquidity, and here especially stock liquidity, and expenses. Panel C explains this by showing 
that more expensive fundamentals increase stock liquidity but at the same time decrease 
diversification, trading off the two components of portfolio liquidity. 
With respect to turnover, quants have significantly higher turnover than fundamentals 
(Panel C), consistent with the summary statistics in Table 1. Further, quants decrease turnover 
as they grow (consistent with PST’s Table 6), while fundamental turnover is unrelated to size. 
Consistent with PST, more expensive quants increase their turnover. Fundamentals show no 
relation between turnover and expenses. With respect to portfolio liquidity, Panels A and B 
show no relevant relations while Panel C reveals that fundamentals holding more liquid stocks 
also trade more, consistent with PST’s hypothesized tradeoff that it is easier and less costly to 
trade liquid stocks. 
In summary, explicitly controlling for differences between the investment processes 
concerning the tradeoffs between size, fees, and turnover, we show that quants and 
fundamentals react to changes in size quite differently with respect to portfolio liquidity and its 
components. This may explain the differences in diseconomies of scale between the competing 
strategies. Thus, if liquidity costs were the dominant channel, explicitly considering PST 
portfolio liquidity and its components in the performance regressions would narrow the gap 
between coefficients of size on performance for quants and fundamentals. 
71 
3.4.2 Hierarchy and information processing costs 
To examine whether differences in hierarchy and information processing costs determine the 
differences in diseconomies of scale is not a trivial exercise. As laid out in the introduction, 
there have not been any empirical tests of the channel, which is mainly due to the lack of 
measurable quantities representing hierarchy and information processing. 
As a first analysis of differences in hierarchy and information processing costs between 
quant and fundamental SAs, we follow a method proposed by Cici, Jaspersen and Kempf (2017) 
to measure the “speed of information diffusion” (ID) in mutual fund advisory firms. Intuitively, 
information may travel faster through an organization if physical and hierarchical distances 
between individuals are smaller and if the information is processed faster at intermediate 
stations, which depends on the nature of the information and the technology used. Therefore, 
we expect that higher ID may proxy for lower hierarchy and information processing costs, i.e. 
lower costs and delay in communicating relevant information. 
Specifically, identifying “initial buys” of stocks by any SA within the SA firm, i.e. the 
buy of a stock not held by any other SA at the time, 42 ID speed measures how long it takes for 
the other SAs of the firm to buy the same stock, i.e. to obtain and use the information. If all SAs 
buy the stock within the same quarter, then the ID speed of the firm for this particular initial 
buy equals one. If no other SA buys the stock until the initial buyer sells the stock, indicating 
there is new information, the ID speed of the firm for this particular initial buy is zero. 
Summarizing the ID speeds of all initial buys of an SA firm may therefore proxy for the firm’s 
hierarchy and information processing costs with higher ID speed indicating lower costs. 
Equation 8 shows how ID speed is calculated for each initial buy43. 
                                                 
42 For the determination of ID, we use the holdings of all SAs available to us via Morningstar, not only those of 
pure quant or fundamental SAs. In total, we use the holdings of 3,338 SAs managed by 897 firms. 
43 Eq. (1) from Cici, Jaspersen, Kempf (2017), pg. 151. 
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IDf,s,q=
If,s,q  –  1 
If,s.q+Jf,s,q –  1
 (8) 
If,s,q is the number of SAs managed by investment advisor f, which buy stock s in quarter q 
(initial buy) and Jf,s,q is the number of SAs managed by that same investment advisor that follow 
suit during the information interval. This interval ends when the investment advisor’s 
assessment or valuation of the stock changes as demonstrated by the initial buyer selling the 
position.  
Table 7 reports statistics for ID speed where Panel A shows mean ID speed separately 
for majority quant and majority fundamental firms.44 Panel B shows separate results for firms 
where the identified initial buys are majorly performed by quants (fundamentals), i.e. where 
majorly quant (fundamental) SAs are the entry points of the information. Panel C shows 
separate results for firms where the identified “following buys” are majorly performed by 
quants (fundamentals), i.e. where the intermediate information processors are majorly quants 
(fundamentals). In all three panels, the ID speed reported for quants is significantly higher than 
that of fundamentals, indicating that quant firms – and by extension quant SAs – have lower 
hierarchy and information processing costs. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The rows of the table show results for selections of firms with respect to the number of SAs. 
Assuming that firm size increases with the number of SAs managed, the overall lower ID speed 
is rather constant in size for fundamental firms. However, we observe a reverse U-Shape for 
quant firms. As very small quant firms increase, their ID speed increases indicating economies 
of scale (e.g., Indro et al., 1999). This is consistent with SAs sharing more investments and the 
respective information. As quant firms further increase, however, ID speed decreases, 
                                                 
44 Quant (fundamental) majority means that more than 50% of the firm’s SAs identify as quants (fundamentals). 
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consistent with diversifying strategies rather than single SAs (e.g., Pollet and Wilson, 2008). 
This is consistent with SAs ceasing to share investments and the respective information. 
 Another way to look at information processing costs is to examine the nature of the 
information processed by quants and fundamentals. While both quant and fundamental SAs can 
be expected to process quantitative data, i.e. hard or systematic information, in their investment 
process, only fundamentals additionally process qualitative data, i.e. soft information. 
Compared to hard information, which can be automatically processed by IT in large quantities 
at high speeds, soft information must be processed, interpreted, and communicated by people, 
sometimes including multiple feedback loops between individuals on different hierarchical 
levels, as indicated by the investment process description by Ariel Investments, LLC, Small Cap 
Value SA (see Introduction). One may expect that the differential use of hard and soft 
information between quants and fundamentals may also show in their investment strategy 
outcomes. Specifically, we expect that quant investment strategies, which are based on 
systematic signals only, show higher consistency in their style and risk factor loadings 
compared to fundamental strategies. The latter additionally rely on qualitative signals, which 
may not show as systematic signals in quant data. In addition, we expect that, for the same 
reasons, quant strategies stay closer to their benchmarks. 
A first indication of this being true may be seen in Table 3, which shows higher 
performance model R2 statistics and lower factor beta standard deviations for quants than for 
fundamentals. However, to control for endogeneity in such descriptive statistics, Table 8 takes 
a specific look at changes in the management teams of the SAs in a difference-in-differences 
analysis. If the managers of fundamental SAs process more soft information, the investment 
strategy is likely to change with a new investment team introducing new views, opinions and 
approaches to valuation. For quant SAs, however, if the investment strategy relies primarily on 
hard information processing via the team’s algorithm, the investment strategy should exhibit 
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less deviation after a change in the individuals managing the SA. To test if this is the case, we 
therefore look at changes in the factor exposures of the two different strategies across a manager 
change event. Using Morningstar Direct data to identify SA manager names over time, we 
identify those SA-date observations where there is a change in the SA management team.45 For 
each of these management changes (t=0), we analyze the absolute differences in factor 
exposures, tracking error relative to the factor model and the factor model adjusted R2 between 
the year prior to the change (months t–12 to t–1) and the year after the change (months t+1 to 
t+12). Table 5 reports these differences for all SAs and separately for quant and fundamental, 
as well as the difference-in-differences between the two groups.  
As measures of consistency in the investment strategy, we first look at differences in 
performance regression betas and document that changes in the four Carhart (1997) factor betas 
around manager changes are significantly larger in fundamental SAs than in quant SAs. The 
difference-in-differences with respect to the MPB market beta is also negative but only weakly 
significant. The overall investment strategies of quant SAs are less affected by manager changes 
than those of fundamental SAs, suggesting more stable investment process relying more on 
hard information, which is less costly to process and communicate. 
 [Insert Table 8 here] 
We also look at differences in fit and active risk as measures of potential changes in investment 
strategy across the manager changes. We calculate differences in the tracking error (TrE) vis-
à-vis the Carhart model and the MPB index (e.g., Cremers and Petajisto, 2009) as well as the 
R2 statistics from both performance regression models (e.g., Amihud and Goyenko, 2013). 
Again, the differences are higher for fundamentals than for quants as indicated by negative 
differences-in-differences, but statistically significant only in the case of R2. Overall, the results 
                                                 
45 We obtain detailed information on the names and terms of all members of the SAs management teams from 
Morningstar Direct. We focus on manager exit and not the addition of a new manager, because it is unclear how 
much immediate influence a new manager has on the SA’s production function while it is clear that the immediate 
influence of a manager leaving directly drops to zero. 
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in Table 8 are consistent with the hypothesis that quant SAs rely more on hard information, 
indicative of lower information processing costs. 
3.4.3 Diseconomies of Scale Controlling for Channels 
Given the evidence that both channels, liquidity costs and information processing/hierarchy 
costs affect quantitative and fundamental strategies and firms differently, we revisit our 
examination of the diseconomies of scale between quant and fundamental SAs controlling for 
these differences. We repeat our panel regressions of performance accounting for the 
components of PST’s portfolio liquidity as well as broad proxies for information processing 
and hierarchy costs. Recognizing that manager ability is also related to fund size (e.g. Berk and 
Green (2004)), we include manager fixed effects. Since SAs may have multiple managers, we 
reconfigure the panel regression data to manager-SA-date observations but then weight the 
observations by the inverse of the number of managers. All variables are standardized to unit 
standard deviation to ease coefficient comparisons. Standard errors are clustered on the 
dimensions of dimensions of firm and date. The results are presented in Table 9. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
The first column (M1) repeats the basic regression with manager fixed effects, but without 
channel variables as reference. Consistent with the results from M8 and M10 in Table 5, both 
quant and fundamental strategies exhibit diseconomies of scale, but the difference is 
significantly higher in fundamentals. The coefficient differences is 0.135. 
In the second column (M2), we include the PST tradeoff variables turnover, stock 
liquidity, balance, and coverage but not allowing for the quant and fundamental strategies to 
differ. We see that higher turnover decreases alpha, consistent with higher transaction costs, 
and higher coverage increases alpha, consistent with the benefit of diversification shown by 
Pollet and Wilson (2008). However, stock liquidity and balance show coefficients near zero 
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and the inclusion of the PST variables does not materially affect the difference in diseconomies 
of scale across the two strategies. 
Recognizing the important insight from PST that different funds/strategies may arrive 
at different equilibria regarding the tradeoffs between fund size, liquidity, turnover and 
expenses, we repeat the analysis in specification M3, but allow for the quant and fundamental 
strategies to weight differently on these four dimensions. Consistent with different equilibria, 
we see that quant performance increases strongly with stock liquidity and coverage while 
slightly decreasing with balance. Fundamental performance, on the other hand, increases in 
balance while being unrelated to the other two components. We also see that allowing for 
different quant and fundamental coefficients on the PST components reduces the difference in 
diseconomies of scale to a statistically insignificant 0.103. 
Finally, in the last column (M4), we add broad proxies for information processing and 
hierarchy costs at the firm level. While our specific tests for information processing and 
hierarchy costs are consistent with differences between quant and fundamental SAs, the unique 
settings under which they are measured (i.e. initiation of a new stock position or a change in 
the management team) do not lend themselves to usage in our regression setting. At a broader 
level, information processing and hierarchy costs should be related to the size of an investment 
advisor and the number of investment professionals working for that investment advisor. The 
key insight from tables 7 and 8 is that these costs differ across different types of investment 
strategy. 
To proxy broadly for information processing and hierarchy cost differences across the 
two types, we simply include dimensions of organization size (i.e. firm assets under 
management and number of separate accounts), but allow them to differ by investment style – 
quant or fundamental. To ensure these measures are capturing firm wide dimensions separate 
from the SA of interest, we calculate them excluding the separate account of interest. As a 
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result, the difference between the coefficients further decreases (0.077). Hence, the inclusion 
of the liquidity costs, information processing and hierarchy proxies helps to explain the 
difference in diseconomies of scale between quant and fundamental investment strategies. 
3.5 Conclusion 
While the recent debate surrounding diseconomies of scale in active asset management has 
largely centered around econometric issues, of equal importance is identifying and testing the 
underlying economic mechanism. In this paper, we investigate differences in diseconomies of 
scale associated with different investment strategies: quantitative versus fundamental. We find 
that quant strategies exhibit statistically and economically significantly lower diseconomies of 
scale. To better understand the potential channels through which these two investment styles 
differ, we first explore the liquidity channel and then the information processing/hierarchy cost 
channel. 
With respect to liquidity costs, we extend the “mutual fund tradeoffs” framework by 
Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2020) and find that such equilibrium tradeoffs are very different 
for quants compared to fundamentals. Further, with respect to information processing and 
hierarchy costs, we find that quant investment firms show higher speed of information diffusion 
and that quant strategies are more stable around management changes, both consistent with 
lower information processing and hierarchy costs in quant SAs. Finally, we relate these 
differences in both channels to the differences in diseconomies of scale between quant and 
fundamental SAs and find that accounting for these differences partially explains the 
differences in diseconomies of scale. 
Overall, our results provide an alternative approach to assessing the important issue of 
diseconomies of scale in the asset management industry – namely, focusing on the underlying 
economics. Ex ante, quantitative strategies would seem to suffer less from the issue of 
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diseconomies of scale and this is what we find. Additionally, our results shed light on important 
differences between these two, often competing, investment styles.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1  
Summary Statistics 
          
 N Mean SD 
Percentile 
Skewness 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
          Panel A: Summary statistics by SA (Quants) 
          
Total Assets ($M) 360 386.00 726.00 6.02 36.30 127.00 468.00 1100.00 4.92 
Firm Assets ($B) 356 80.02 175.00 0.67 2.62 10.80 53.20 215.00 2.98 
Expense Ratio (% p.a.) 363 0.73 0.47 0.29 0.45 0.65 0.87 1.20 2.24 
Minimum Investment ($M) 322 12.20 14.70 0.05 0.25 5.00 20.00 25.00 1.30 
Number of Holdings (#) 350 155 151 32 72 113 194 301 3.48 
Assets in Top 10 Hldgs (%) 343 29 21 12 16 24 31 48 2.20 
Net Flow (% p.a.) 348 9.93 29.16 -15.20 -4.35 7.60 21.19 40.24 -0.33 
Turnover Ratio (% p.a.) 311 110.33 76.16 26.67 64.39 90.78 131.77 239.53 1.43 
Number of Managers (#) 350 2.39 1.14 1.00 1.49 2.18 3.48 4.00 -0.11 
Age (years) 363 7.66 4.21 2.96 4.46 7.12 9.92 12.79 1.31 
Institutional Focus 88 24.2%        
Retail Focus 18 5.0%        
Institution&Retail Focus 222 61.2%               
          Panel B: Summary statistics by SA (Fundamentals) 
          Total Assets ($M) 1,402 740.00 1390.00 12.50 56.40 211.00 765.00 1980.00 3.97 
Firm Assets ($B) 1,380 60.50 147.00 0.48 1.65 5.99 43.00 158.00 4.60 
Expense Ratio (% p.a.) 1,417 0.93 0.59 0.48 0.64 0.81 0.97 1.35 2.40 
Minimum Investment ($M) 1,340 7.29 10.70 0.10 0.50 3.00 10.00 25.00 2.47 
Number of Holdings (#) 1,408 62 40 30 38 53 76 101 4.30 
Assets in Top 10 Hldgs (%) 1,378 34 13 20 25 32 40 50 1.57 
Net Flow (% p.a.) 1,386 11.37 22.14 -12.02 -2.38 8.55 22.87 39.25 0.71 
Turnover Ratio (% p.a.) 1,293 53.71 41.52 16.81 25.95 41.75 69.31 105.99 2.23 
Number of Managers (#) 1,389 2.10 1.01 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.65 0.34 
Age (years) 1,417 9.51 5.59 3.97 5.71 8.21 11.87 16.25 1.68 
Institutional Focus 309 21.8%        
Retail Focus 144 10.2%        
Institution&Retail Focus 824 58.2%               





Table 1 cont`d. 
Panel C. Market value-weighted common stock holdings 
             
 # SAs  % Holdings   # SAs  % Holdings 
Year Q  F  Common Q only F only  Year Q  F  Common Q only F only 
             
2001 31 120 90.75% 0.70% 8.49%  2011 187 954 98.46% 0.04% 1.62% 
2002 47 260 92.02% 0.16% 7.73%  2012 199 975 97.73% 0.07% 2.26% 
2003 50 311 93.39% 0.15% 6.26%  2013 190 952 94.38% 0.03% 5.95% 
2004 73 382 91.49% 0.21% 8.09%  2014 192 969 97.72% 0.05% 2.28% 
2005 100 489 95.37% 0.11% 4.59%  2015 199 952 99.25% 0.05% 0.84% 
2006 146 552 94.98% 0.12% 4.78%  2016 190 912 99.08% 0.05% 1.02% 
2007 166 648 96.95% 0.11% 2.88%  2017 186 843 97.30% 0.15% 2.57% 
2008 221 775 97.83% 0.16% 1.82%  2018 165 776 96.89% 0.17% 2.87% 
2009 216 809 97.87% 0.19% 1.80%  
Average 2001–2018 95.99% 0.14% 3.85% 
2010 201 889 96.40% 0.07% 3.51%  
             
             
This table shows summary statistics for a sample of actively managed U.S. domestic equity separate accounts 
(SAs) from 1990/01 to 2018/12. Panel A shows quantitatively managed SAs, Panel B reports the characteristics of 
fundamentally managed SAs. The expense ratio is calculated as the difference between gross and net return. Min. 
investment is minimum initial investment an investor has to make to open an account within a particular SA. The 
net flow of SA i in period t is calculated as the change in total assets from period t-1 to period t less value changes 
due to net returns on assets. Panel C shows market-value weighted statistics on common stock holdings between 




Table 2  
Annualized Performance and Risk Factor Loadings 
         
 MPB  CAPM  Fama-French   Carhart 
  EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW 
         
Panel A: Quants 
         
Alpha 0.040  -0.254  -0.399  -0.533  -0.714 * -0.675 * -0.954 ** -0.884 ** 
 (0.92)  (0.50)  (0.48)  (0.14)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Market  0.987 *** 0.997 *** 1.010 *** 0.986 *** 0.982 *** 0.982 *** 0.997 *** 0.992 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
SMB       0.208 *** 0.086 *** 0.194 *** 0.077 *** 
       (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
HML        0.101 *** 0.109 *** 0.110 *** 0.117 *** 
        (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
MOM           0.065 *** 0.041 *** 
           (0.00)  (0.00)  
         
Adj. R² 0.905 
 
  0.944 
 
  0.840 
 
  0.890   0.912 
 
  0.939 
 
  0.921 
 
  0.945 
 
 
         
Panel B: Fundamentals 
         
Alpha 0.368  -0.153  -0.050  -0.423  -0.254  -0.536 * -0.142  -0.485 * 
 (0.32)  (0.67)  (0.93)  (0.28)  (0.39)  (0.06)  (0.63)  (0.09)  
Market  0.947 *** 0.969 *** 1.006 *** 1.014 *** 0.963 *** 0.986 *** 0.959 *** 0.979 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
SMB        0.263 *** 0.154 *** 0.257 *** 0.149 *** 
        (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
HML        0.040 *** -0.003  0.035 *** -0.008 * 
        (0.00)  (0.46)  (0.00)  (0.08)  
MOM          -0.004 * -0.002  
          (0.09)  (0.42)  
         

















         
         
This table presents annualized alpha/risk-adjusted performance and risk factor sensitivities from a sample of 
actively managed U.S. domestic equity SAs from 1990/01 to 2018/12. Panel A shows quantitatively managed SAs, 
Panel B reports fundamentally managed SAs. The alpha/risk-adjusted performance for SA i in month t is the 
difference between its actual return and a style benchmark return, which is calculated using a 24-month rolling 
window regression and multiplying its estimated factor sensitivities from the prior 24 months with the values of 
the corresponding risk-factors in month t. All factor sensitivities are measured using either the manager-preferred 
benchmark (MPB), the CAPM, the Fama/French (1993) or the Carhart (1997) factor model with 24-month rolling 
window regressions. ***, **, and * denote significantly different means from two-sided t-tests in means at the 1%, 





Table 3  
Hypothesis Tests of Monthly Performance and Risk Factor Loadings 
Variable 
Quants  Fundamentals  Differences 
N Mean SD Med  N Mean SD Med Mean SD Median 
 
Carhart alpha 53,605 -0.08 1.36 -0.07 
 
240,079 -0.01 1.71 -0.04 
 
-0.07 *** -0.35 *** -0.03 *** 
MPB alpha 40,793 0.00 1.27 0.01 
 
206,376 0.03 1.71 0.01 
 
-0.03 *** -0.43 *** 0.00 
 
Market (Carhart) 54,098 1.00 0.12 1.00 
 
241,955 0.96 0.16 0.96 
 
0.05 *** -0.03 *** 0.04 *** 
Market (MPB) 41,359 0.99 0.12 0.99 
 
207,105 0.95 0.17 0.95 
 
0.04 *** -0.05 *** 0.04 *** 
SMB 54,098 0.19 0.38 0.05 
 
241,955 0.26 0.37 0.19 
 
-0.06 *** 0.01 *** -0.14 *** 
HML 54,098 0.11 0.26 0.08 
 
241,955 0.03 0.32 0.04 
 
0.08 *** -0.06 *** 0.05 *** 
MOM 54,098 0.07 0.14 0.04 
 
241,955 0.00 0.17 -0.01 
 
0.07 *** -0.02 *** 0.05 *** 
 
adj. R2 (Carhart) 54,098 0.93 0.09 0.95 
 
241,955 0.87 0.11 0.90 
 
0.05 *** -0.02 *** 0.04 *** 
adj. R2 (MPB) 41,359 0.91 0.12 0.95 
 
207,087 0.83 0.15 0.88 
 
0.08 *** -0.03 *** 0.06 *** 
 
 
This table presents means, standard deviations and medians of monthly alpha/risk-adjusted performance and risk 
factor sensitivities from a sample of actively managed U.S. domestic equity SAs with either a quantitative or a 
fundamental investment approach from 1990/01 to 2018/12. The alpha/risk-adjusted performance for SA i in 
month t is the difference between its actual return and a style benchmark return, which is calculated using a 24-
month rolling window regression and multiplying its estimated factor sensitivities from the prior 24 months with 
the values of the corresponding risk-factors in month t. All factor sensitivities are measured using either the 
manager-preferred benchmark (MPB) or the Carhart (1997) factor model with 24-month rolling window 
regressions. ***, **, * indicate significantly different means (medians) ((standard deviations)) from two-sided t-
tests in means (Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for differences in medians) ((Levene’s robust test for equality of 





Table 4  
Annualized Performance by Lagged Size Quintile 
 All  Quants  Fundamentals 
Total assetst-1 Carhart MPB  Carhart MPB  Carhart MPB 
         
Low 0.19  0.97 ***  -0.92 * 0.50   0.54 * 1.08 *** 
 (0.72)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.22)   (0.08)  (0.00)  
2 -0.17  0.47  -1.11 ** -0.04   0.24  0.89 *** 
 (0.58)  (0.21)  (0.01)  (0.93)   (0.47)  (0.00)  
3 -0.47  0.09  -0.98 ** 0.00   -0.30  0.50  
 (0.11)  (0.81)  (0.02)  (0.99)   (0.35)  (0.22)  
4 -0.67 ** -0.06  -0.87 ** -0.20   -0.50  0.53  
 (0.04)  (0.87)  (0.02)  (0.61)   (0.15)  (0.16)  
High -0.75 *** -0.22  -0.99 *** -0.22   -0.61 ** -0.26  
 (0.00)  (0.53)  (0.01)  (0.29)   (0.03)  (0.86)  
         
All -0.39  0.25  -0.88 ** -0.01   -0.13  0.64 ** 
 (0.17)  (0.47)  (0.01)  (0.97)   (0.67)  (0.02)  
         
High-low -0.93 *** -1.21 ***  -0.06  -0.70 *  -1.15 *** -1.34 *** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.88)  (0.09)   (0.00)  (0.00)  
         
         
This table presents annualized Carhart and MPB alpha/risk-adjusted performance for quarterly rebalanced size-
quintile portfolios from a sample of actively managed U.S. domestic equity SAs with either a quantitative or 
fundamental investment approach from 1990/01 to 2018/12. Carhart alphas for SA i in month t are the difference 
between the SA actual net return and a style benchmark return, which is calculated using a 24-month rolling 
window regression and multiplying its estimated factor sensitivities from the prior 24 months with the values 
of the corresponding risk-factors in month t. ***, **, and * denote significantly different means from two-sided 





Panel Regressions of Performance 
           
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 
           
Ln TA -0.021**  -0.019**  -0.023***  -0.149***  -0.092***  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Ln TA : DQuant  -0.040  -0.029  -0.045  -0.382***  -0.027** 
  (0.25)  (0.34)  (0.13)  (0.00)  (0.03) 
Ln TA : DFundamental  -0.115***  -0.107***  -0.115***  -0.603***  -0.081*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
           
p-Val: Ln TA : DQ – Ln TA : DF = 0  0.03**  0.03**  0.04**  0.01***  0.00*** 
           
DQuant -0.009 0.104 -0.004 0.078 -0.005 0.123   -0.013 -0.035** 
 (0.76) (0.27) (0.86) (0.38) (0.81) (0.16)   (0.41) (0.04) 
DFundamental 0.076*** 0.301*** 0.070*** 0.279*** 0.069*** 0.293***   -0.011 -0.029 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.66) (0.32) 
           
Net Flow 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.005 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.22) (0.35) (0.13) (0.20) 
Firm TA -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.017** -0.016** -0.022 -0.008 
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.36) (0.35) (0.87) (0.79) (0.03) (0.04) (0.35) (0.15) 
Lagged Alpha (1-year) 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.009 -0.003*** -0.038*** -0.021 -0.021 
 (0.72) (0.73) (0.75) (0.76) (0.68) (0.68) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.37) 
Expense Ratio (% TA p.a.) -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 0.004 0.005 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.48) (0.35) (0.25) (0.34) 
Minimum Investment 0.013** 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 0.009 0.008   -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11) (0.17)   (0.65) (0.64) 
Age -0.023** -0.023** -0.022** -0.023** -0.009* -0.010** -0.063*** -0.068*** -0.012 -0.017 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.06) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.60) (0.44) 
DRetail -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.101*** -0.100***   -0.027* -0.028** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.06) (0.05) 
DCIT 0.026 0.023 0.025 0.023 0.012 0.010   0.004 -0.003 
 (0.36) (0.41) (0.32) (0.37) (0.62) (0.69)   (0.88) (0.92) 
           
Style FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes     
Time FE     Yes Yes     
SA FE       Yes Yes   
Recursive demeaning (Zhu, 2018)         Yes Yes 
Adjusted R² 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
N 88,690 88,690 88,690 88,690 88,690 88,690 88,690 88,690 86,987 86,987 
           
           
This table reports panel regressions of SA alpha/risk-adjusted performance on SA size (Log TA) for of actively managed U.S. domestic equity SAs from 1990/01 to 2018/12. Carhart 
alpha/risk-adjusted performance of SA i in month t is the Sharpe (1992) out-of-sample performance calculated using 24-month rolling window regressions. All variables are 
standardized to mean zero and unit standard deviation. Fixed effects are considered using within group demeaning. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, 





Separate Account Tradeoffs 
 
 Panel A. Portfolio Liquidity  Panel B. Portfolio Liquidity Components  Panel C. Further SA Tradeoffs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) Divers. Coverage Balance Stock Liq. Expense Ratio  Turnover Ratio  
 
Log TA : DQuant 0.011 0.097 -0.136 0.082 0.299* 0.645** -0.127 -0.355*** -0.187*** -0.181*** -0.139*** -0.133** 
 (0.95) (0.53) (0.39) (0.59) (0.07) (0.03) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Log TA : DFundamental 0.214*** 0.212*** 0.085 0.082 0.324*** 0.259*** 0.336*** -0.041 -0.141*** -0.140*** -0.040 -0.034 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.24) (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.42) (0.00) (0.00) (0.49) (0.55) 
DQuant 0.303 -0.351 0.242 -0.828* 0.072 0.554 0.140 0.710** -0.190*** -0.124 0.349** 0.298* 
 (0.57) (0.43) (0.61) (0.07) (0.89) (0.52) (0.63) (0.04) (0.00) (0.14) (0.04) (0.09) 
DFundamental -0.460*** -0.712*** -0.401*** -0.688*** -0.719*** -0.479*** -0.309** 0.106 0.068 -0.003 0.026 0.006 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.32) (0.13) (0.96) (0.83) (0.96) 
Expense Ratio : DQ -0.035** -0.030* -0.012 -0.041** -0.074*** -0.138*** 0.008 0.033**   0.013 0.014* 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.40) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.53) (0.03)   (0.13) (0.10) 
Expense Ratio : DF 0.015 0.009 0.016* 0.015 0.003 -0.001 0.006 0.021*   -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.14) (0.32) (0.10) (0.11) (0.67) (0.86) (0.62) (0.06)   (0.13) (0.13) 
Turnover Ratio : DQ -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 0.001 0.004 0.015 -0.004 0.003 0.013* 0.014*   
 (0.76) (0.77) (0.46) (0.88) (0.68) (0.43) (0.19) (0.32) (0.07) (0.07)   
Turnover Ratio : DF 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.005 0.007 -0.010* -0.004 -0.015* -0.013   
 (0.66) (0.44) (0.48) (0.45) (0.31) (0.10) (0.08) (0.18) (0.08) (0.10)   
Stock Liquidity : DQ  0.174***   -0.140*** -0.332*** 0.075**  -0.022**  -0.002  
  (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.76)  
Stock Liquidity : DF  0.213***   -0.005 -0.087*** -0.035  0.029*  0.021*  
  (0.00)   (0.75) (0.00) (0.31)  (0.09)  (0.07)  
Balance : DQ    0.137***  -0.106***       
    (0.00)  (0.00)       
Balance : DF    0.104***  -0.100***       
    (0.00)  (0.00)       
Coverage : DQ    0.301***   -0.046**      
    (0.00)   (0.01)      
Coverage : DF    0.385***   -0.198***      
    (0.00)   (0.00)      
Diversification : DQ   0.255***     0.001  0.001  0.005 
   (0.00)     (0.87)  (0.90)  (0.72) 
Diversification : DF   0.333***     -0.024***  -0.021***  -0.004 
   (0.00)     (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.61) 
 
Quarter-Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.33 0.43 0.44 0.27 0.34 0.37 0.74 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 
N 60,489 60,489 60,489 60,489 60,489 60,489 60,489 60,489 60,489 60,489 60,489 60,489 
 
This table reports the results from panel regressions with the PST – portfolio liquidity components as dependent variables (Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor, 2020) in the period 
from 01/2001 to 12/2018. All regressors are measured contemporaneously with the dependent variable. All variables are standardized to mean zero and unit standard deviation. 
All regressions include sector×quarter fixed effects (FEs) and cluster by SA. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7  
Speed of Information Diffusion within SA Firms 
            
            
 Panel A. Quant vs. Fundamental  
Majority Firm 
 
Panel B. Quant vs. Fundamental 
Majority Initial Buyers 
 
Panel C. Quant vs. Fundamental 
Majority Following Buyers 
 Quant Fund. Difference  Quant Fund. Difference  Quant Fund. Difference 
            
            
Firms ≥ 3 SAs 0.7442 0.5999 0.1443***  0.7347 0.6085 0.1262***  0.7365 0.6086 0.1279*** 
(197 firms)   (67.60)    (58.76)    (59.70) 
            
Firms ≥ 5 SAs 0.7864 0.5851 0.2013***  0.7722 0.6019 0.1702***  0.7747 0.6025 0.1722*** 
(94 firms)   (79.38)    (65.81)    (67.09) 
            
Firms ≥ 7 SAs 0.7037 0.5852 0.1185***  0.6840 0.6169 0.0671***  0.6846 0.6181 0.0665*** 
(42 firms)   (32.52)    (18.14)    (18.11) 
            
            
This table shows measures of Information Diffusion (ID) following Cici, Jaspersen, and Kempf (2017) within SA firms separately for 
i) firms majorly (>50%) managing quantitative SAs vs. fundamental SAs, ii) Initial Buys majorly made by quantitative vs. fundamental 
SAs, and iii) Following Buys majorly made by quantitative vs. fundamental SAs, in the period from 01/2001 to 12/2019. Higher 
values of ID denote higher speed of Information Diffusion. ID may range from 0 to 1. Statistical significance of the difference (Quant–
Fund) is tested by unpaired mean difference t-tests against the H0 that the difference is zero. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Impact of Management Changes 
     
 Differences Diff-in-Diffs 
Variable (t-12;-1; t1;12) All Quants Fundamentals (Quants – Fundamentals) 
     
| Carhart market beta diff | 0.196 0.125 0.209 -0.083 *** 
| SMB beta diff | 0.275 0.130 0.301 -0.171 *** 
| HML beta diff | 0.305 0.214 0.322 -0.108 *** 
| MOM beta diff | 0.247 0.125 0.270 -0.144 *** 
| MPB beta diff | 0.115 0.087 0.121 -0.034 * 
     
| TrE Carhart diff | 0.471 0.381 0.488 -0.107  
| TrE MPB diff | 0.482 0.453 0.488 -0.035  
     
| Adj. R2 Carhart diff | 0.087 0.045 0.095 -0.050 *** 
| Adj. R2 MPB diff | 0.059 0.018 0.068 -0.049 *** 
     
# Changes 479 97 382   
# Differences in betas (Carhart) 374 73 301   
# Differences in betas (MPB) 301 54 247   
     
     
This table shows the results of a difference-in-difference analysis for SAs with a quantitative investment 
approach and SAs with a fundamental investment approach in the period from 01/1990 to 12/2018. For each 
point in time, in which a manager leaves the management team (t=0), we measure the absolute differences in 
different investment strategy measures between the year prior to the change (months t–12 to t–1) and the year 
after the change (months t+1 to t+12). As measures of investment strategy, we use differences in performance 
regression model betas including market betas (Carhart and MPB) as well as in risk factor betas for the SMB, 
HML and MOM factors, tracking errors (TrE) vis-à-vis the Carhart model and the MPB index (e.g., Cremers and 
Petajisto, 2009) and the R2 statistics from both performance regression models (e.g., Amihud and Goyenko, 







Panel regressions of performance with PST Liquidity Components, Family Characteristics and Manager-SA 
Fixed-Effects  
     
 M1 M2 M3 M4 
     
Ln TA : DQuant -0.127*** -0.126*** -0.171*** -0.155*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln TA : DFundamental -0.262*** -0.264*** -0.273*** -0.232*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
     
p-Val: Ln TA : DQ – Ln TA : DF = 0 0.03** 0.03** 0.14 0.25 
     
     
DQuant 0.280*** 0.283*** 0.452*** 0.384*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
DFundamental 0.541*** 0.546*** 0.564*** 0.465*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Expense Ratio  -0.033*** -0.033***   
 (0.00) (0.00)   
PST Turnover Ratio   -0.012**   
  (0.01)   
Stock Liquidity   0.000   
  (1.00)   
Balance   0.007   
  (0.36)   
Coverage   0.027***   
  (0.01)   
Expense Ratio : DQ   -0.036** -0.037*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Expense Ratio : DF   -0.037*** -0.035*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Turnover Ratio : DQ   -0.012*** -0.013*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Turnover Ratio : DF   -0.010* -0.010* 
   (0.08) (0.06) 
Stock Liquidity : DQ   0.024*** 0.025*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Stock Liquidity : DF   -0.006 -0.003 
   (0.56) (0.74) 
Balance : DQ   -0.011* -0.008 
   (0.09) (0.22) 
Balance : DF   0.018* 0.021** 
   (0.08) (0.05) 
Coverage : DQ   0.027*** 0.027*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Coverage : DF   0.022 0.020 
   (0.20) (0.23) 
Ln # of Quants in the Family    0.035 
    (0.46) 
Ln # of Fundamentals in the Family    0.112*** 
    (0.00) 
Family TA in Quant SAs    -0.140*** 
    (0.00) 
Family TA in Fundamental SAs    -0.170*** 
    (0.00) 
     
Manager-SA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SA and Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
N 100,435 100,435 100,435 100,435 
     
     
This table reports panel regressions of SA alpha/risk-adjusted performance on SA size (Log TA), Pastor, Stambaugh, 
and Taylor (2020) Portfolio Liquidity components and family characteristics for of actively managed U.S. domestic 
equity SAs from 2001/01 to 2018/12. Carhart alpha/risk-adjusted performance of SA i in month t is the Sharpe (1992) 
out-of-sample performance calculated using 24-month rolling window regressions. All variables are standardized to 
mean zero and unit standard deviation. Fixed effects are considered using within group demeaning. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. p-values are reported in parentheses. 
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Figure 1 
Alpha/risk-adjusted annualized performance by lagged size quintile 
 
 
Panel A. Carhart (1997) 4-factor Alpha 
 




This figure shows the alphas of quarterly rebalanced size quintile portfolios of quantitative 
and fundamental US domestic separate accounts in the period from 01/1990 to 12/2018. 
Alphas are denoted in % p.a. Black bar charts show quant SAs, grey bars show fundamental 
SAs. Panel A. shows alphas measured against the “academic” Carhart (1997) 4-factor 
model. Panel B. shows alphas measured against the manager preferred benchmark reported 












































List of manager-preferred benchmarks (MPBs) 
S&P 500 Dividend point S&P 1500 TR 
MSCI EAFE PR USD S&P 500 TR USD 
Citi Treasury Bill 3 Mon USD S&P 500 Composite TR USD 
DJ US Select Dividend TR USD S&P 500 TR (1989) 
MSCI USA Minimum Volatility GR USD S&P 500 NR USD 
S&P MidCap 400 TR S&P 500 PR 
CBOE S&P 500 BuyWrite BXM Russell 2000 TR USD 
Russell Mid Cap Value TR USD Alerian MLP Infrastructure TR USD 
Russell Mid Cap Value NR USD Russell 2000 PR USD 
Russell 1000 Growth TR USD Russell Top 200 TR USD 
Russell 2500 Growth TR USD Russell Micro Cap Growth TR USD 
Russell 1000 Growth NR USD Russell Micro Cap Growth PR USD 
Russell Mid Cap TR USD DJ US Industrials TR USD 
MSCI ACWI NR USD DJ US TSM Micro Cap TR USD 
Russell 3000 Growth TR USD S&P 100 TR 
Russell 1000 Growth PR USD S&P SmallCap 600 PR USD 
S&P 500 Ig/Commercial & Profe Service PR FTSE RAFI US 1000 TR USD 
Russell 3000E Growth PR USD Wilshire US Large Value TR USD 
Russell 3000 Growth PR USD Morningstar US Div Composite TR USD 
S&P 500 Growth TR USD Russell 1000 Value TR USD 
Russell Mid Cap Growth TR USD Russell 3000 Value TR USD 
Russell Mid Cap Growth PR USD Russell 3000 Value PR USD 
S&P Global 1200 TR Russell Micro Cap TR USD 
MSCI World NR USD Russell 3000 Equal Weighted TR USD 
S&P 1000 TR Russell 2000 Value TR USD 
Russell 2500 TR USD Russell 2000 Value PR USD 
Russell 2500 NR USD S&P 500 Value TR USD 
Russell 2500 PR USD Russell 2000 Growth Energy TR USD 
Russell 2000 Growth TR USD Russell Micro Cap Value TR USD 
Russell 2000 Growth PR USD Russell 2000 Equal Weight NR USD 
Russell 2500 Value TR USD Russell 2000 Equal Weighted TR USD 
Russell 2500 Value PR USD Russell Top 200 Value TR USD 
Russell 1000 Dynamic TR USD Vanguard Russell 1000 Value Index I 
Russell 1000 TR USD MSCI ACWI All Cap GR USD 
Russell 3000 TR USD Wilshire 5000 Total Market Full TR USD 
WisdomTree Dividend TR USD Wilshire Large Company Value Instl 





First stages from Zhu (2018) – M9 and M10 of Table 5 
 











    
Ln TA 0.395***   
 (0.00)   
Ln TA : DQuant  2.446*** 0.222*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln TA : DFundamental  0.030** 2.006*** 
  (0.03) (0.00) 
    
DQuant 0.067*** -7.651*** -0.585*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DFundamental -0.133*** -0.050* -4.356*** 
 (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) 
Firm TA 0.001 -0.013*** 0.003 
 (0.80) (0.00) (0.20) 
Lagged Alpha 12M -0.025*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Flow 0.060*** 0.023*** 0.047*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age 0.297*** 0.067*** 0.242*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Expense Ratio -0.059*** -0.018*** -0.048*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Minimum Investment -0.072*** -0.005* -0.063*** 
 (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) 
CIT Dummy 0.327*** 0.227*** 0.239*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Retail Dummy 0.220*** 0.048*** 0.184*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.19 0.29 
N 86,987 86,987 86,987 
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4 Article III: The Effect of Unobserved Constraints on Portfolio Management: 
Evidence from Separate Account-Mutual Fund Twins 
 
Martin Rohleder, Hendrik Tentesch, René Weh, and Marco Wilkens 
University of Augsburg 
 
 
Abstract. Using a unique sample of separate account-mutual fund twins, we provide evidence 
for a negative effect of unobserved investment constraints on portfolio management. Since the 
twin sample controls directly for manager skill, firm efficiency and investment style, 
differences in portfolio composition are likely to be the result of differential constraints such as 
regulation and investor preferences. While controlling for observed constraints like size and 
liquidity, we document a negative effect of unobserved constraints on the risk-adjusted 
performance of both portfolios. The effect is stronger for separate accounts, which seem to be 
more strongly constrained than mutual funds. 
 
JEL Classification: G11, G23 







The investment process of a fund manager is a portfolio optimization under various constraints. 
Such constraints may encompass legal regulation, investor preferences, institutional structures, 
as well as economic constraints like the managers’ skill and time capacity. The mutual fund 
literature offers a wide variety of papers analyzing how different constraints affect mutual fund 
performance. Most recently, Pastor, Stambaugh and Taylor (2020) show that managers face 
trade-offs between several economic constraints such as skill, fund size, and portfolio liquidity, 
which set limits to a funds’ performance. Other studies analyze how investment restrictions 
(Almazan et al., 2004) or investors’ liquidity needs (Rohleder et al., 2018) constrain fund 
managers and, consequentially, hurt the funds’ performance. While many constraints regarding 
fund, firm and portfolio characteristics are well known and have been studied in depth,46 there 
are further constraints that we are aware of, but which are more difficult to observe and quantify 
directly, like the effect of legal regulation or investors’ preferences. Moreover, even more 
constraints are likely to exist that are still unknown and therefore completely elude observation.  
This paper aims at shedding new light on how such unobserved constraints affect 
portfolio management. However, they are by definition unquantifiable as separate constraints. 
To solve this problem, we construct an innovative measure to catch the combined effect of all 
constraints in one quantity. Therefore, we use the portfolio holdings of individual investment 
managers, who manage a separate account (SA) and a mutual fund (MF) at the same time with 
the same investment style for the same investment firm. Such SA-MF twins provide us with a 
unique laboratory to assess the influence of unobserved constraints while directly controlling 
                                                 
46 For example, Berk and Green (2004), Chen et al. (2004), Pollet and Wilson (2008), Pastor, Stambaugh, and 
Taylor (2015), and Evans et al. (2020) analyze diseconomies of scale in portfolio management. Yan (2008) analyze 
the effect of liquidity on portfolio performance. Sirri and Tufano (1998), Edelen (1999), Alexander, Cici and 
Gibson (2007), Rakowski (2010), Fulkerson and Riley (2016), and Rohleder, Schulte, and Wilkens (2017) 
investigate the impact of flows and flow risk on fund performance. Cici, and Palacios (2015) and Natter et al. 
(2016) investigate how the restriction of certain investment practices, like derivative use, impact fund performance. 
Cici, Dahm and Kempf (2018) look into the trading efficiency of mutual fund families. Evans, Gil-Bazo, and 
Lipson (2017) analyze diseconomies of scope caused by managers managing multiple mutual funds. 
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for individual investment ability (i.e. manager skill) and fund family effectiveness (e.g. the 
trading desk; see Cici, Dahm, Kempf, 2018). Because we can assume that the investment 
manager would ceteris paribus bring the same investment ideas to creating optimal portfolios 
for both vehicles, differences in the portfolio holdings should be a result of different observed 
and unobserved investment constraints. This identification follows the idea of Kacperczyk, 
Sialm, and Zheng (2008) who argue that the difference between the fund return and the buy-
and-hold return of the fund’s holdings represents unobserved actions of MFs.  
Unobserved investment constraints may include, for instance, differences in regulation, 
investor preferences and the organizational structure of both vehicles. By controlling for a wide 
range of twin, firm and portfolio characteristics, i.e. observed constraints, we are able to 
determine the effect of unobserved constraints on portfolio performance. Since larger 
differences in the constraints should affect managers’ efficiency in implementing her optimal 
investment strategy, we expect a negative impact on her overall portfolio performance. In this 
context, Evans, Gil-Bazo, and Lipson (2019) show that investment managers managing 
multiple MFs deliver lower performance, because they allocate less time and attention to each 
fund. They term this effect “diseconomies of scope”. In our view, this negative performance 
effect should be smaller for side-by-side managed funds with similar constraints because the 
attention to one portfolio also benefits the other. Likewise, the effect should be larger if these 
funds have different constraints because they compete for attention. 
To identify SA-MF twins, we follow a methodology proposed by Evans and 
Fahlenbrach (2012). Our sample stems from Morningstar and consists of 907 twin pairs with 
22,916 twin-quarter observations in the period from 1997 to 2016 with contemporaneous 
holdings reports available for both portfolios. Even if the purpose for both vehicles is the same 
– collecting and investing money for investors – the structure and the institutional conditions 
are quite different. Besides a lower level of regulation and fewer reporting requirements for 
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SAs, there is also an important difference between their organizational structures. Within a SA 
each investor owns an individual account in which she directly holds the respective assets. This 
structure enables investors to restrict or customize their portfolio, for example by setting style 
or risk preferences or putting bans on specific stocks. The degree of codetermination or 
individualization, respectively, depends on the bargaining power of the investor, which depends 
on the size of the investor’s account. MFs do not offer such options because investors own the 
assets only indirectly via the fund shares. Consequentially, MFs are managed as one 
homogeneous portfolio. Considering such differences in vehicle structure and constraints, we 
can expect material deviations in the portfolio composition.  
To derive a proxy for differences in usually unobserved constraints between two 
investment vehicles, we implement a holdings-based portfolio distance measure (PDM) that 
allows us to determine quarterly portfolio differences for each twin pair. To do so we apply a 
modification of Cremers and Petajisto’s (2009) active share, which originally measures 
investment activity as deviation from a passive benchmark. In contrast, our PDM compares SA 
holding weights to those of the corresponding actively managed MF twin. This way, we are 
able to analyze a time-series of portfolio deviations for each twin pair. A mean of around 22% 
and a median of around 8% suggest that these twin portfolios are rather similar in general. 
However, since under equal conditions, a manager should manage both MF and SA in the same 
optimal way, we consider such portfolio differences noteworthy. Further, the cross-sectional 
variation in PDM between the twins is strong enough to analyze the impact of unobserved 
constraints on portfolio performance. 
We apply several univariate and multivariate analysis methods. Using a quintile sorting 
approach based on the PDM, we find first evidence that larger differences in constraints 
between the twins are associated with a lower risk-adjusted performance in both SAs and MFs. 
This is in line with the notion that portfolio management suffers when confronted with stricter 
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investment constraints. Furthermore, we document correlations between PDM and several twin 
characteristics, which is not surprising as PDM captures observed and unobserved constraints. 
To control for observed constraints, we include a large set of twin, firm and portfolio 
characteristics in the subsequent regression analyses, including variables for the manager 
overlap between the twins and the number of managed accounts in the SA, which partly 
approximate for customization effects and differences in the organizational structure. This way, 
we are able to quantify the consolidated impact of all unobserved constraints on overall 
portfolio performance. We find strong and robust evidence that these constraints lead to a 
decrease in risk-adjusted performance. Even after controlling for differences in the investment 
risk and style factor exposures between SA-MF twins, our results remain economically 
unchanged. Furthermore, we find performance decreases in both SAs and MFs, though slightly 
stronger in SAs. We interpret this result to mean that SAs face stronger constraints on average 
than their MF twins.  
These findings contribute specific new insights to the recent literature on SAs. In related 
studies, Elton, Gruber and Blake (2014) and Evans et al. (2020) compare the performance of 
equity MFs and SAs. They show that the SA universe significantly outperforms the MF 
universe on a risk-adjusted basis. However, in a direct comparison of SAs and MFs offered by 
the same company, but not necessarily managed by the same manager, Elton, Gruber and Blake 
(2014) find no significant difference in performance. They conclude that smaller boutique firms 
are responsible for the better performance of the SA universe compared to the MF universe. 
Chen et al. (2017) conduct a similar study and reveal that the matching approach on firm level 
used by Elton, Gruber and Blake (2014) does not correctly control for managerial skill. 
Therefore, they analyze managers that concurrently manage at least one SA and one MF, which 
allows them to control for managerial skill as well as firm-level effects. Their results show a 
significantly better performance for SAs compared to MFs. In our twin analysis, we can confirm 
these findings for net returns but not for gross returns. Thus, considering that the negative 
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impact of investor preferences in SAs tends to be stronger than in MFs, an initially higher SA 
performance, which might be due to a lower level of regulation and fewer reporting 
requirements, seems to compensate for this difference.  
Overall, the contribution of this work is threefold. First, it is the most comprehensive 
SA-MF twin analysis to date, which will lead to more reliable insights into SA-MF twin 
arrangements. Second, by comparing holdings between two actively managed institutional 
investment vehicles using PDM, we propose a method to measure differences in portfolio 
compositions. Third, by establishing this measure as a proxy for all differences in unobserved 
constraints between the twins, we are the first to show empirical evidence for the consolidated 
negative impact of such usually non-measurable constraints on portfolio performance. Hence, 
investors should be careful when investing in investment vehicles that show a substantial 
portfolio difference compared to a side-by-side managed twin, since the performance tends to 
be lower for both the MF and the SA. In the process, we confirm and extend previous studies 
on SAs in general, a so-far understudied class of investment vehicle considering their 
importance for institutional investors. 
4.2 Data and Methodology 
4.2.1 Data 
The aim of this work is to analyze differences in portfolio management between investment 
vehicles exhibiting similar starting conditions, i.e. vehicles with the same manager, same 
investment company, same style, but with different regulatory, organizational or economic 
constraints. We find such a comparison laboratory in the contrast between US domestic equity 
MFs, which mainly target retail investors and are therefore highly regulated to provide customer 
protection, and US domestic equity SAs, which mainly target institutional investors and are 
unregulated but still face constraints due to the bargaining power of their investors and their 
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organizational structure. This allows us to discover usually unobserved institutional and 
organizational constraints influencing the portfolio management of an asset manager and to 
examine their effect on portfolio performance. Since one could expect that under equal 
conditions she would implement her best investment ideas in both vehicles, observed deviations 
between the two portfolios are most likely a result of different investment constraints. 
To identify such SA-MF twins, we apply the methodology of Evans and Fahlenbrach 
(2012) to our sample, which comes from Morningstar Direct. Before the twin-matching, the 
data comprises 3,152 MFs and 3,781 SAs for the period from 1990 to 2016. It is thus one of the 
most comprehensive samples in recent SA literature. Morningstar provides detailed information 
on the names and terms of individual managers for both vehicles, the investment company as 
well as on the investment style, via the Morningstar equity style box. Matching US domestic 
equity SAs and MFs based on these criteria, results in 1,463 MF-SA twin pairs with 14,297 
unique twin years. This represents around four times as many twin pairs as those used by Evans 
and Fahlenbrach (2012) and almost eight times as many twin years as in Chen et al. (2017).47 
As more than 40% of all funds in our sample are a part of a twin arrangement, it seems to be 
common practice for investment firms to offer SA-MF twins to different kind of investors. To 
be included in later analyses, these twins must pass through the following filters: i) We remove 
passively managed twins identified by fund name following Elton, Gruber and Blake (2014). 
ii) We require a minimum of 36 monthly observations for net and gross returns per twin. iii) 
There must be at least five contemporary holding reports for both vehicles showing at least one 
equity holding. Our final sample consists of 907 twin pairs with available holdings data for the 
period 1997 to 2016.48 Obtaining all SA and MF holdings from Morningstar conveniently 
                                                 
47 We define a twin as a separate account and a mutual fund, both stemming from the same investment firm, with 
the same investment objective, and at least one common manager. In unreported alternative tests, we require both 
management teams to be identical, i.e., 100% common managers. This stricter matching requirement reduces our 
sample significantly; however, the main results regarding PDM stay economically unchanged. To control for a 
different management composition in both vehicles, we include the variable percentage of common managers in 
all panel regressions. 
48 To our best knowledge, Chen et al. (2017) is the only other paper using SA holdings. 
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allows us to use an internal Morningstar identifier to match the holdings across both portfolios, 
which ensures a high-quality match.49 
Table 1 describes and compares common twin characteristics on a quarterly basis for 
MFs (Panel A) and SAs (Panel B). SAs are larger on average than their MF twins. The minimum 
investment of roughly $13.1M is clearly higher for SAs than for MFs ($0.3M), which restricts 
SAs factually to institutional investors and very wealthy individuals. The higher the 
contribution of these clients to the SA, the stronger their bargaining power becomes. MFs are 
therefore more expensive than SAs. While investors in MFs pay on average 1.25% per year, 
SA investors only pay approximately 1.11%. Besides the negotiation of fees, they might also 
influence the portfolio composition, e.g., by putting bans on specific types of stocks. As 
expected from the twin nature of the data, there is only a minor difference in the number of 
holdings. The turnover ratio seems to be slightly higher in MFs, but this might be primarily due 
to the higher fluctuation in cash flows caused by the higher number of retail investors in MFs. 
Moreover, the turnover ratio data is often missing for SAs, which might bias the statistic. With 
respect to age, it is surprising that with 14.3 years the SAs are on average older than the MFs 
with 10.6 years. This may be related to fund incubation, as Evans (2010) reports that successful 
SA strategies are often subsequently offered to the public via MFs. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
4.2.2 Performance Measurement 
We evaluate SA-MF twins using both absolute and risk-adjusted returns from the CAPM, the 
Fama and French (1993) 3-Factor, and the Carhart (1997) 4-Factor model.50 To obtain a time-
series of alphas, we follow Sharpe (1992) and run rolling regressions (Eq. 1) to calculate the 
                                                 
49 We have a coverage of 99.3% for all equity holdings over time. If the Morningstar identifier was not available, 
we first used CUSIP9 and then the security name as an alternative. The security name was always available. 
50 We thank Kenneth French for providing the corresponding risk-factors on: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.  
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out-of-sample performance (Eq. 2) for each SA and each MF in each month 𝑡 + 1 using style-


















MOMt+1)   (2) 
𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the monthly excess return of vehicle 𝑖 in month 𝑡 over the risk-free rate, 𝐸𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the 
excess return of the market, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. Without further factors, 𝛼𝑖,(𝑡) corresponds 
to the in-sample Jensen (1968) or CAPM alpha of vehicle 𝑖 during the window ending in 𝑡. By 
adding 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡, we obtain the Fama and French alpha and by further adding 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 




𝑀𝑂𝑀 are the style betas of vehicle 𝑖 during 
the window ending in 𝑡. For the quarterly panel regression, we sum the monthly alphas during 
the respective quarter and multiply the result by four to obtain an annualized measure. Twin 
alphas are calculated as the total assets-weighted average of the out-of-sample alphas estimated 
separately for SAs and MFs.51 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics on MF (Panel A) and SA (Panel B) performance. 
With a difference of 1 bp per year, the annualized gross return is almost identical in both panels; 
however, after the consideration of fees, SAs exhibit a performance 12 bps higher due to their 
lower expense ratio. With respect to risk-adjusted returns, the difference between SAs and MFs 
becomes slightly larger. For example, the difference in their average gross (net) Carhart alpha 
is 7 (15) bps per year. These statistics are in line with existing literature. Elton, Gruber and 
Blake (2014) and Evans et al. (2020) report that SAs outperform MFs on average, however, 
without focusing on twins and thus neglecting differences in manager skill. Similar to Chen et 
al. (2017), this paper addresses this issue by implementing a twin analysis. 
                                                 
51 The use of equal weighting does not change later reported results economically. 
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
4.2.3 Portfolio Distance Measure 
To measure potential differences in portfolio management, caused by all kinds of investment 
constraints, we apply a holdings-based portfolio distance measure (PDM), which is a 
modification of the active share (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009). Instead of comparing the SA 
portfolio to a passive reference index to measure investment activity, we use the corresponding 
MF twin portfolio as the reference, as shown in equation (3). This way, we receive a time-series 








For each quarter 𝑡 and twin pair 𝑇𝑊, PDMTW,t is the sum of the absolute differences between 
matched equity holding weights between the two portfolios, divided by two to avoid double 
counting. 𝑤𝑆𝐴,𝑗,𝑡 refers to the SA portfolio weight of stock 𝑗 in quarter 𝑡 and 𝑤𝑀𝐹,𝑗,𝑡 to the MF 
holdings weight in the same stock. Stocks exclusively held in one vehicle exhibit a weight of 
zero in the corresponding twin. Given this definition, the PDM is identical for both twins. This 
procedure is favorable to a comparison employing return based measures like, e.g. the tracking 
error, since the comparison between the portfolios is based on actual portfolio composition 
rather than solely on correlations, which may understate the differences (see Cremers and 
Petajisto, 2009).  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Panel A of Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for PDM, presented pooled, by quarter and by 
twin. The pooled mean of 21.99% and the corresponding median of about 7.88% suggest that 
twin portfolios are in general rather similar. Following the interpretation in Cremers and 
Petajisto (2009), an average SA (MF) is 100% long in its reference MF (SA) and beyond that 
it is invested with 21.99% in a long-short portfolio, that is long in over-weighted assets and 
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short in under-weighted assets. Since a manager, all else being equal, can generally be expected 
to manage both MFs and SAs in the same way, we consider such differences noteworthy. This 
is in line with our expectation that investment managers encounter different restrictions in the 
management of these two vehicles, which affect the portfolio composition of one or both. 
Figures calculated by quarter and by twin support this notion. The by twin standard deviation 
of 26.47% represents the cross-sectional variation of PDM between twins. In contrast, Panel B 
shows an average within twin time-series standard deviation of 6.01%. Thus, it seems that PDM 
is rather stable within twins compared to a strong cross-sectional variation between twins. 
4.3 The Effects of Differences in Constraints on Performance 
4.3.1 Univariate Quintile Sorting 
Investment companies typically offer the same investment strategy via MFs to retail investors 
and via SAs to institutions. Even when the same manager manages both vehicles, we observe 
different portfolio compositions as seen in Section 2 introducing the PDM. Assuming an 
unconstrained portfolio manager would establish the same optimal strategy in both vehicles; 
these differences are likely due to investment constraints forcing her to deviate from this 
optimal strategy in at least one of those vehicles. In this section, we want to examine whether 
this inefficiency in portfolio management causes a significant decrease in performance. 
To test this premise, we start with a quarterly quintile sorting based on the PDM. In 
Table 4, Quintile 1 contains the 20% of twin observations with the lowest PDM and thus the 
smallest differences in constraints. Likewise, Quintile 5 contains the largest 20% of differences 
in constraints. Pooled means and medians are calculated across all twins and quarters. Besides 
CAPM, Fama French and Carhart alphas, we also show several vehicle characteristics like total 
assets, expense ratio, minimum investment, number of holdings, turnover ratio, and age. Panel 
A shows MFs while Panel B shows SAs. For PDM, which is naturally identical in both panels, 
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Quintile 1 shows an average close to zero. This suggests that a significant number of twins hold 
the exact same portfolio. Conversely, we also observe twins with a very high portfolio 
difference in Quintile 5 showing an average PDM of 68%. This means that more than two-
thirds of the twin portfolios are different, suggesting large differences in the investment 
constraints between the vehicles. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The comparison of returns and alphas across the quintiles and especially the significant 5–1 
differences indicate that greater portfolio differences and thus larger differences in constraints 
lead to lower performance for both SAs and MFs. For example, the average annualized 5–1 
difference in the Carhart MF alpha equals 40 bp and is significant at the 5% level. With regard 
to returns, the difference is smaller but still significant. Panel B shows similar results for SAs 
with even larger differences. Overall, these first results tend to confirm our expectation that 
stronger investment constraints negatively affect both twin vehicles, MFs and SAs. Moreover, 
it seems that SAs are affected more strongly. 
With regard to the other fund characteristics, it is striking that Quintile 5 with the highest 
average PDM seems to be rather different in general.52 For example, accordingly allocated twin-
quarter observations for total assets are significantly lower on average compared to the 
remaining four quintiles. This is also diverges from previous findings on diseconomies of scale, 
an observed investment restriction, which suggests larger portfolios underperform smaller ones 
(e.g., Chen et al., 2004, for MFs and Evans et al., 2019, for SAs). With respect to age, Quintile 
5 observations are from younger portfolios than the observations of the remaining quintiles. 
Conversely, expense ratios, the numbers of holdings and turnover ratios increase almost 
monotonically over all PDM quintiles in both panels.  
                                                 
52 Section 3.5 presents a robustness analysis excluding Quintile 5 to control for potentially false twin matches. 
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4.3.2 Panel Regressions of Joint Twin Alphas 
In the previous section, we document univariate evidence that PDM correlates negatively with 
performance. However, we also note correlations of PDM with a number of other fund 
characteristics. This is not surprising, since PDM is based on the difference in holdings between 
the SA and MF and therefore captures all differences in observed and unobserved constraints 
between the twins. By considering as many controls for observed constraints as possible in the 
following regressions, we hope to isolate the effect of unobserved constraints on portfolio 
efficiency and performance. For this reason, we explain joint twin out-of-sample alphas with 
PDM and a broad range of portfolio characteristics to obtain the consolidated effect of all 
unobserved constraints following Eq. (4): 

















𝛼𝑇𝑊,𝑡+1 is the joint twin out-of-sample gross alpha in quarter 𝑡 + 1 using either the respective 





 correspond to several twin characteristics 𝑗, such as log total assets, 
expense ratio, flow, age, cash holdings and turnover ratio. More specifically, 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑇𝑊,𝑡
𝑗
 is the 
average of the respective SA and MF characteristics in quarter 𝑡 and is included to capture 
cross-sectional differences between twin pairs, while 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑊,𝑡
𝑗
 is the difference between the SA 
and MF characteristic in quarter 𝑡 and is included to capture differences within a twin pair. 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑇𝑊,𝑡
𝑘  refers to the levels of further control variables for which the level-difference 
separation is not applicable. Those include the holdings’ average bid-ask spread to capture 
liquidity and the log number of holdings to capture diversification. The SA-MF difference of 
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both measures is by construction highly correlated with PDM.53 The log number of accounts 
within the SA captures differences in the organizational structure and client customization 
effects, while the fraction of institutional share classes in the MF may control for outside 
monitoring effects. Both variables are exclusive to the respective vehicle. The log firm total 
assets and the percentage of common managers are identical for both twins. We cluster standard 
errors by twin to account for the low time-series variation of PDM within the twins compared 
to the strong cross-sectional variation between the twins shown in Table 3. Considering all 
those control variables, we expect coefficient 𝑏1 to measure the consolidated effect of 
unobserved constraints on portfolio performance. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Table 5 reports the corresponding regression results. Column 1 shows a pooled regression with 
a significantly negative coefficient of PDM on the twin Carhart alpha, which confirms our 
expectation of a negative effect of unobserved constraints on portfolio management efficiency 
and performance. Columns 2 to 4 show economically similar results for regressions, including 
style- and/or time fixed effects. The simultaneous application of style- and time fixed effects 
reduces the significance of the effect to the 5% level. In Columns 6 and 7, we obtain results 
similar to those in Column 4 using the Fama and French and CAPM alphas as the dependent 
variable, respectively. Only an analysis considering twin-fixed effects in Column 5 produce a 
statistically insignificant coefficient of PDM on performance. This is no surprise, however, 
because one may assume that unobserved constraints, such as legal regulations, are rather stable 
over time within a twin pair. As already indicated in Table 3, the within twin standard deviation 
of PDM is relatively small compared to the cross-sectional variation. Overall, we interpret these 
                                                 
53 A larger difference in those variables automatically induces a stronger difference in portfolio holdings. However, 
their inclusion in unreported alternative regressions does not change our results economically. 
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results as strong evidence of a harmful effect of unobserved constraints on portfolio 
performance.54 
4.3.3 Panel Regressions of Separate Twin Alphas 
So far, we show that differences in unobserved constraints between the twins harm their joint 
performance, the average twin alpha. In the next step, we want to determine whether this 
negative impact equally affects both investment vehicles or if it differs in strength between SAs 
and MFs. On the one hand, customization wishes regarding the portfolio construction or 
specific liquidity needs of institutional investors could drive PDM. Such constraints directly 
affect portfolio management in SAs but not in MFs. On the other hand, MFs are constrained by 
strict regulation and oversight by the SEC in order to assure customer protection, while SAs are 
not. Hence, it is per se unclear whether the negative effect of PDM on portfolio performance is 
greater for SAs than for MFs. A first indication may be derived from the quintile sorting in 
Table 4 where the univariate effect is slightly stronger for SAs. To shed further light on this 
question, we repeat the investigation from Section 3.2, but instead of using the joint twin 
performance as the dependent variable, we directly explain SA and MF alphas by using each 
twin observation twice. Following Eq. (5), we conduct a piecewise linear regression by 
including two separate PDM variables to measure their separated influence on the SA and MF 
alpha: 





















                                                 
54 Table 5 contains only a selection of our regression models. In non-reported results, we conduct further 
performance regressions using net and gross alphas of the CAPM, the Fama French 3-Factor and the Carhart 4- 
Factor model. In all specifications, we obtain economically similar results. They are available upon request. 
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𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1 is the out-of-sample gross alpha of SA or MF 𝑖 in quarter 𝑡 + 1.
55 𝑃𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝐴 refers to the 
PDM of the twin pair if the alpha is from the SA and 0 otherwise. The opposite applies to 
𝑃𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝐹. We maintain all control variables at twin level and for the SA-MF difference by 
duplicating the observations. We add a SA dummy to capture a potential average performance 
difference between SAs and MFs. We cluster standard errors by vehicle. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Table 6 shows the corresponding results. In Column 1 to 5, we explain Carhart alphas, in 
Column 6 Fama and French alphas, and in Column 7 CAPM alphas, respectively. For all 
models, the effect of PDM on performance is stronger for SAs than for MFs. For example, 
considering Column 1 and the average PDM of 22% in Table 3, the annualized risk-adjusted 
performance decreases by 32bp for SAs and only by 21bp for MFs. Considering time fixed 
effects, the negative impact of the PDM on the risk-adjusted performance turns insignificant 
for MFs, but remains highly significant for SAs. Thus, SAs seem to be more constrained in 
their management process than their MF twins. Which constraints drive this difference cannot 
be told due to the catch-all construction of PDM. However, one may speculate that differential 
preferences and customization wishes by SA investors represent stronger constraints than the 
uniform regulation in MFs. 
4.3.4 Controlling for Different Style and Risk Factor Exposures 
Up to now, we have shown that different unobserved constraints harm the joint portfolio 
performance of a twin manager and that investor preferences in SAs seem to have a stronger 
impact than regulation constraints in MFs. An important sort of investor preference in SAs are 
specific risk factor targets. Thus, higher PDM values might be the result of retail and 
institutional investors having different risk factor objectives, since clients in MFs usually cannot 
                                                 
55 We receive economically similar results when we use net instead of gross alphas. 
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specify individual targets. On the one hand, taking risk-adjusted performance as the dependent 
variable should already account for such differences. On the other hand, setting caps and floors 
for several risk factor parameters presumably restricts portfolio management in more complex 
ways than simply levering an otherwise optimal portfolio up or down to the desired factor beta. 
To address these concerns, we repeat our investigation from Section 3.2 by including style betas 
in the regression following Eq. (6):56 





























 are the joint value-weighted twin betas with respect to the Market, SMB, HML 
and MOM. Analogously, we include for each twin 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑊,𝑡
𝑗
 as the beta difference 
between the SA and MF. This way, we are able to control directly for differences in risk factor 
characteristics between SA-MF twins. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Table 7 contains the regression results using the Carhart alpha as the dependent variable.57 For 
reasons of comparability, Columns 1 and 2 repeat Columns 2 and 4 from Table 5. Columns 3 
and 4 include the market beta, Columns 5 and 6 the Fama French betas, and Columns 7 and 8 
all betas from the Carhart 4-Factor model. In all model specifications, we find highly significant 
and negative coefficients at the 1% level for the joint twin market beta. Thus, twins with higher 
average market betas achieve a systematically lower risk-adjusted performance. One reason for 
                                                 
56 In unreported results, we repeat model (5) from Section 3.3 with similar interpretations.  
57 The use of CAPM or Fama and French alphas leads to economically similar results. The same applies to net 
returns. 
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this finding might be the low-beta anomaly as reported in Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), who 
show that portfolios of high-beta assets have lower alphas than portfolios of low-beta assets. 
We observe similar, but less pronounced, results for the SMB beta. The coefficient is significant 
at the 5% level in a regression that includes style fixed effects; however, when we consider time 
fixed effects this significance disappears. Looking at the differences, we find no evidence for 
an impact of style betas on the risk-adjusted performance. 
With regard to the PDM, we observe only slightly lower negative coefficients with the 
same level of significance when we compare Columns 3 to 8 with Columns 1 and 2. Hence, 
even without considering risk targets set by investors as part of the unobserved constraints, 
there is a statistically highly significant consolidated effect of the remaining unobserved 
constraints on risk-adjusted portfolio performance.  
4.3.5 Exclusion of High PDM Twins 
The quintile sorting in Section 3.1 shows that Quintile 5 of the highest PDM observations is 
very different from the remaining quintiles. While we consider our matching of SA-MF twins 
based on manager names, investment company and investment style to be very reliable, we do 
not want to ignore the possibility of “false” twins in our sample.58 Since such false twins would 
end up primarily in Quintile 5, Table 8 repeats the analysis from Section 3.2 by excluding this 
quintile from the regression.59  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
In Columns 1 to 4, we exclude all twin observations allocated to Quintile 5 based on a quarterly 
rebalancing according to Table 4. In Columns 5 to 8, we exclude entire twin pairs sorted into 
Quintile 5 using their average PDM to avoid a time-varying exclusion of twins from the 
regressions. Overall, we obtain very similar results to the previous tables; in all models the 
                                                 
58 A high reliability is indicated by calculated return correlations of over 99%. 
59 Again, our results are very similar for all kinds of risk-adjusted performance measures. 
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PDM shows a statistically significant negative coefficient. Thus, removing potentially false 
twins does not change the economical interpretation of our results. We provide robust evidence 
that differences in unobserved constraints harm portfolio performance. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In an ideal world, the job of an investment manager would be easy as she would construct – 
given her level of skill and knowledge – an optimal portfolio without any constraints. Changes 
to the portfolio would only be necessary when she acquires relevant new information. However, 
such an ideal world does not exist. Instead, investment managers face several constraints to the 
way they construct and manage their portfolios. Such constraints may stem from legal 
regulation, from investor preferences or may be organizational and economic in nature.  
In this paper, we propose an innovative way to quantify the impact of unobserved 
constraints on portfolio management and performance. We exploit the existence of SA-MF 
twins, two portfolios managed by the same manager for the same company with the same style, 
but affected by different investor preferences, regulations and organizational structure. Hence, 
these twins represent an ideal laboratory, as differences between the portfolios are most likely 
due to differences in the constraints on each portfolio but remain unaffected by the manager’s 
skill or the investment firm’s organizational efficiency.  
Based on our datasets of 3,781 US equity SAs and 3,152 US equity MFs, we find, that 
almost 40% of the SAs and even more than 40% of the MFs, are managed as part of a SA-MF 
twin arrangement. By measuring the difference between the portfolios using a holdings-based 
portfolio distance measure, we are able to analyze a time-series of portfolio deviations for each 
twin pair, which we use to infer the impact of observed and unobserved constraints on risk-
adjusted portfolio performance. By controlling for as many observed and quantifiable 
constraints as possible, we isolate the consolidated impact of all usually unobserved and 
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unquanfiable constraints and find strong and robust evidence that differences in these 
constraints lead to a decrease in risk-adjusted performance. Even after controlling for potential 
differences in risk factor exposures between both twin vehicles, our results remain 
economically unchanged. Furthermore, we find the performance decrease to be stronger within 
SAs. We interpret this result as support for our presumption that unobserved constraints like 
customization demands set by SA investors restrict managers more strongly than regulations 
controlling MFs.  
These novel findings have several implications: First, investors should be careful when 
investing in investment vehicles that show a substantial portfolio difference compared to a side-
by-side managed twin, since the performance tends to be lower for both the MF and the SA. 
Second, despite research has already revealed numerous constraints, we are able to show that 
there are still some unexplored constraints affecting portfolio performance. Consequently, it is 
important for future research to keep finding ways of quantifying known, but so far unobserved, 
unquantifiable constraints and to continue searching for so-far unknown constraints affecting 
portfolio management. Third, while there exists an abundance of literature on MFs, research on 
investment restrictions in SAs, one of the most important investment vehicles for institutional 
investors, is rather underdeveloped given our finding that such restrictions have stronger 
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Table 1  
Twin Characteristics         
  
Obs Mean SD 
Percentile 
  10 25 50 75 90 
Panel A: Mutual Funds 
        
Total Assets (in mio.) 22,601 1,420 3,600 19 69 264 1,070 3,800 
Min. Investment (in mio.) 22,916 0.27 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 1.00 
Number of Holdings 22,916 75.08 58.57 32.00 45.00 64.00 92.00 122.00 
Expense Ratio (in %) 22,916 1.25 0.42 0.78 0.97 1.19 1.43 1.93 
Turnover Ratio (in %) 22,453 60.99 46.27 17.00 28.00 49.00 81.00 119.00 
Age 22,916 10.55 9.16 1.91 4.25 8.68 14.41 20.51 
         
Panel B: Separate Accounts         
Total Assets (in mio.) 22,056 2,090 3,530 36 136 546 2,220 6,650 
Number of Accounts 21,734 200.06 558.63 2.00 6.00 22.00 76.00 416.00 
Min. Investment (in mio.) 22,183 13.29 16.48 0.10 1.00 10.00 25.00 50.00 
Number of Holdings 22,915 75.78 52.42 33.67 46.00 66.00 93.00 121.67 
Expense Ratio (in %) 22,916 1.11 0.90 0.36 0.60 0.84 1.08 3.00 
Turnover Ratio (in %) 15,111 57.39 42.17 16.40 27.34 47.82 75.72 109.00 
Age 22,916 14.34 8.32 4.33 8.01 13.24 19.50 25.75 
This table shows descriptive statistics for fund characteristics of separate account-mutual fund twins on a quarterly basis. The 
sample consists of 907 twin pairs over the period 1997 to 2016. A twin is defined as a separate account and a mutual fund, both 
from the same investment firm, with the same investment objective, and having at least one common manager. Expense ratio and 











Twin Performance         
  
Obs Mean SD 
Percentile 
  10 25 50 75 90 
Panel A: Mutual Funds 
        
 
        
Gross Returns         
Excess Return 22,916 11.06 16.82 -32.35 -3.51 13.53 31.08 49.40 
Carhart Alpha  21,257 0.39 5.67 -12.64 -5.54 0.47 6.34 13.19 
Fama French Alpha  21,257 0.42 5.56 -12.29 -5.51 0.44 6.23 13.16 
CAPM Alpha  21,257 0.25 6.63 -15.13 -6.93 0.22 7.28 15.84 
         
Net Returns         
Excess Return 22,916 9.91 16.78 -33.36 -4.54 12.41 29.93 48.21 
Carhart Alpha  21,257 -0.72 5.66 -13.76 -6.66 -0.55 5.24 11.91 
Fama French Alpha 21,257 -0.69 5.56 -13.45 -6.60 -0.58 5.12 11.94 
CAPM Alpha  21,257 -0.86 6.65 -16.18 -7.97 -0.81 6.14 14.71 
         
Panel B: Separate Accounts         
         
Gross Returns         
Excess Return 22,916 11.07 16.67 -32.16 -3.59 13.68 31.03 49.14 
Carhart Alpha  22,143 0.46 5.60 -12.38 -5.64 0.50 6.51 13.16 
Fama French Alpha  22,143 0.48 5.49 -12.21 -5.47 0.53 6.39 12.95 
CAPM Alpha  22,143 0.29 6.57 -14.81 -6.88 0.23 7.45 15.70 
         
Net Returns         
Excess Return 22,916 10.03 16.64 -33.10 -4.63 12.61 29.89 48.16 
Carhart Alpha  22,143 -0.57 5.62 -13.51 -6.72 -0.52 5.49 12.14 
Fama French Alpha  22,143 -0.54 5.51 -13.32 -6.55 -0.50 5.42 11.99 
CAPM Alpha  22,143 -0.73 6.58 -15.96 -7.94 -0.77 6.41 14.73 
This table shows descriptive statistics for excess returns and risk-adjusted performance measures of separate account-mutual fund 
twins on a quarterly basis. The sample consists of 907 twin pairs over the period 1997 to 2016. A twin is defined as a separate 
account and a mutual fund, both from the same investment firm, with the same investment objective, and having at least one 
common manager. Excess returns are returns subtracted by the U.S. one-month treasury bill rate. The annualized excess return is 
the multiplicative sum of its monthly returns. Risk-adjusted returns are out-of-sample alphas calculated via factor loadings obtained 
from 24-month rolling window regressions from t-1 to t-24 using the CAPM, Fama French 3 factor and Carhart 4 factor model. 
The alpha of a quarter is the sum of its three monthly out-of-sample alphas multiplied by four to obtain annualized figures. Net 
returns are gross returns minus the expense ratio. Statistics are listed for mutual funds and separate accounts separately. 
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Table 3         
Portfolio Distance Measure 
  
Obs Mean SD 
Percentile 
  10 25 50 75 90 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
         
Pooled 22,916 21.99 26.67 0.04 1.10 7.88 37.96 65.26 
By Quarter 80 19.57 9.09 0.00 20.77 21.79 24.16 26.74 
By Twin 907 24.89 26.47 0.99 2.79 12.97 42.01 67.51 
         
Panel B: Within Twin Standard Deviation 
         
PDM 907 6.01 5.99 1.00 2.05 4.01 7.80 14.24 
This table shows descriptive statistics of the portfolio distance measure (PDM) for each twin pair on a quarterly basis. The sample 
consists of 907 twin pairs over the period 1997 to 2016. A twin is defined as a separate account and a mutual fund, both from the same 
investment firm, with the same investment objective, and having at least one common manager. For each quarter 𝑡 and twin 𝑇𝑊, 
𝑃𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑊,𝑡 is the sum of the absolute differences between matched holding weights of the separate account and mutual fund equity 
portfolio divided by two: 𝑃𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑊,𝑡 =  
1
2
∑ |𝑤𝑆𝐴,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑀𝐹,𝑗,𝑡|
𝑁
𝑗=1 . Non-included holdings in a portfolio exhibit a weight of zero. In Panel 
A, statistics are calculated pooled and for quarter as well as twin averages of the PDM. Panel B shows statistics of the within twin 









Table 4                       





















Panel A: Mutual Funds 
                       
 mean med mean med mean med mean med mean med mean med mean med mean med mean med mean med mean med 
Low PDM 0.17 0.04 11.27 13.79 0.59 0.63 0.70 0.66 0.36 0.26 1,380 356 1.25 1.19 0.28 0.00 67.96 63 59.80 52.00 10.80 9.00 
2 1.96 1.74 11.01 13.71 0.71 0.70 0.57 0.57 0.05 0.00 1,520 338 1.24 1.18 0.31 0.00 69.14 62 57.64 47.00 10.89 9.00 
3 9.11 7.96 11.00 13.30 0.36 0.59 0.39 0.48 0.44 0.32 1,670 347 1.28 1.21 0.28 0.00 72.96 61 59.83 42.10 10.63 8.67 
4 31.74 31.70 11.03 13.39 0.07 0.33 0.16 0.31 0.32 0.41 1,810 242 1.24 1.17 0.26 0.00 73.81 63 62.55 53.00 10.62 8.51 
High PDM 67.54 65.28 11.00 13.46 0.20 0.18 0.27 0.15 0.09 0.08 671 117 1.29 1.22 0.17 0.00 93.39 76 65.24 53.00 9.68 8.03 
                       
5-1 PDM 67.37 65.24 -0.27 -0.33 -0.40 -0.44 -0.42 -0.51 -0.28 -0.18 -709 -239 0.04 0.03 -0.12 0.00 25.43 13 5.43 1.00 -1.12 -0.97 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.22) (0.05) (0.11) (0.37) (0.64) (0.09) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.29) (0.00) 
 
Panel B: Separate Accounts 
 
 mean med mean med mean med mean med mean med mean med mean med mean med mean med mean med mean med 
Low PDM 0.17 0.04 11.28 13.85 0.63 0.70 0.72 0.71 0.42 0.34 2,340 811 1.03 0.84 13.46 5.00 70.97 66 55.32 49.03 13.64 12.92 
2 1.96 1.74 11.06 13.76 0.75 0.71 0.64 0.61 0.14 0.08 2,650 828 1.05 0.84 14.66 10.00 80.65 68 51.13 41.41 14.47 13.30 
3 9.11 7.96 10.95 13.26 0.56 0.75 0.56 0.71 0.47 0.39 1,940 539 1.13 0.82 11.20 5.00 73.30 60 55.07 40.41 16.46 15.25 
4 31.74 31.70 10.98 13.35 0.15 0.33 0.16 0.39 0.32 0.17 2,310 655 1.16 0.76 15.64 10.00 76.91 63 60.91 51.52 14.68 13.42 
High PDM 67.54 65.28 11.09 14.04 0.17 0.06 0.29 0.21 0.11 0.20 1,200 207 1.17 0.84 11.41 5.00 77.12 72 65.41 57.40 12.45 11.34 
                       
5-1 PDM 67.37 65.24 -0.19 0.19 -0.46 -0.63 -0.43 -0.50 -0.31 -0.13 -1,140 -604 0.15 0.00 -2.05 0.00 6.15 6 10.09 8.37 -1.19 -1.58 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.22) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.66) (0.00) (0.46) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
This table shows descriptive statistics of a quarterly quintile sorting based on the portfolio distance measure (PDM). Quintile 1 contains the lowest 20% of PDM values for each quarter and Quintile 5 the 
highest 20%. Means and medians are calculated pooled across all quarters. 5-1 is the difference between the top and bottom quintile. The sample consists of 907 twin pairs over the period 1997 to 2016. A 
twin is defined as a separate account and a mutual fund, both from the same investment firm, with the same investment objective, and having at least one common manager. For each quarter 𝑡 and twin 𝑇𝑊, 
𝑃𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑊,𝑡 is the sum of the absolute differences between matched holding weights of the separate account and mutual fund equity portfolio divided by two: 𝑃𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑊,𝑡 =  
1
2
∑ |𝑤𝑆𝐴,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑀𝐹,𝑗,𝑡|
𝑁
𝑗=1 . Non-
included holdings in a portfolio exhibit a weight of zero. Depending on the quarterly sorting of the PDM (%), statistics are also shown for fund characteristics and performance measures including total assets 
(mio), expense ratio (% p.a.), minimum investment of the vehicle (mio), number of holdings in the portfolio, turnover ratio (% p.a.), and age in years. Excess returns are fund gross returns subtracted by the 
U.S. one-month treasury bill rate. The annualized excess return is the multiplicative sum of its monthly returns. Risk-adjusted returns are out-of-sample gross alphas calculated via factor loadings obtained 
from 24-month rolling window regressions from t-1 to t-24 using the CAPM, Fama French 3 factor and Carhart 4 factor model. The annualized alpha is the sum of its three monthly alphas multiplied by four 
to obtain annualized figures (%). Statistics are listed for mutual funds and separate accounts separately. P-values from two-sided t-tests in means are in parentheses. 
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Table 5 
Performance Regression with Joint Twin Alphas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 4F Alpha 4F Alpha 4F Alpha 4F Alpha 4F Alpha 3F Alpha CAPM Alpha 
        
PDM -1.2550*** -1.2154*** -0.9328*** -0.7653** -0.6987 -0.8010** -0.8680** 
        
Ln(Total Assets) -0.1259** -0.1744*** -0.1010* -0.1381** -1.1597*** -0.1290** -0.1124* 
Diff. SA-MF 0.0538 0.0635* 0.0139 0.0144 0.2853** 0.0101 -0.0347 
        
Expense Ratio 0.6255 0.3348 0.0216 -0.4006 4.0993*** -0.4596 -0.9730** 
Diff. SA-MF -0.5357** -0.4150* -0.0920 0.0817 -2.1961*** 0.1030 0.3124 
        
Flow 0.0253*** 0.0259*** 0.0116 0.0114 0.0032 0.0132* 0.0020 
Diff. SA-MF -0.0083** -0.0084** -0.0028 -0.0025 -0.0033 -0.0044 -0.0019 
        
Age -0.0269* -0.0243* -0.0082 -0.0051 -0.0809 -0.0066 -0.0188 
Diff. SA-MF -0.0090 -0.0097 -0.0003 0.0008 -0.0280 -0.0007 -0.0043 
        
Cash -0.0022 -0.0050 0.0088 0.0019 -0.1175** -0.0042 0.0406 
Diff. SA-MF -0.0064 -0.0104 -0.0088 -0.0120 -0.0059 0.0030 -0.0054 
        
Turnover 0.6250 0.3853 0.1882 -0.0571 2.3352*** 0.2979 0.5923 
Diff. SA-MF -0.2336 -0.1026 -0.2581 -0.1343 -0.1702 0.1711 0.3725 
        
Bid Ask Spread 0.0407** 0.0444** 0.0001 -0.0059 0.0973*** -0.0107 0.0160 
Ln(# of Holdings) 0.7885*** 0.7752*** 0.7260*** 0.5319*** -0.8154 0.6495*** 0.4362** 
Ln(#Accs) 0.0085 0.0414 -0.0828* -0.0383 -0.1264 -0.0397 0.0297 
Ln(TA Firm) 0.0308 0.0330 0.0344 0.0517 -0.1032 0.0485 0.0614 
% Inst. Shareclass 0.3520 0.2848 0.4027* 0.2035 0.1353 0.2151 0.3561 
% Common Managers -0.3251 -0.1275 0.1010 0.1420 -0.9299 0.1703 0.7292* 
        
Style Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Twin Fixed Effects No No No No Yes No No 
N 13,923 13,923 13,923 13,923 13,923 13,923 13,923 
Adj.R2 0.00776 0.00876 0.0928 0.0939 0.0179 0.0898 0.136 
This table shows performance regressions using average gross out-of-sample twin alphas of quarter t+1 as dependent variable. The sample consists of 907 twin pairs over the period 1997 to 2016. 
A twin is defined as a separate account and a mutual fund, both from the same investment firm, with the same investment objective, and having at least one common manager. The twin alpha is 
the value-weighted average of the calculated separate account and mutual fund alpha using the total assets of the vehicles. A vehicle’s out-of-sample alpha is calculated via factor loadings 
obtained from 24-month rolling window regressions from t-1 to t-24 using the CAPM, Fama French 3 factor and Carhart 4 factor model. The quarterly alpha is the sum of its three monthly alphas 
multiplied by four to obtain annualized figures. Besides the portfolio distance measure (PDM), the regression includes several controls for fund and firm characteristics at quarter t. For each 




∑ |𝑤𝑆𝐴,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑀𝐹,𝑗,𝑡|
𝑁
𝑗=1 . Non-included holdings in a portfolio exhibit a weight of zero. Control variables for the logarithm of total assets, expense ratio (% p.a.), flow (%), age (years), cash 
proportion in the portfolio (%), and turnover (% p.a.) are at twin level, which is the average of the separate account and the mutual fund characteristic at quarter t. The regression also includes 
variables for the difference between the separate account and the mutual fund characteristic. ***, **, * denote significance of the estimated parameters at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 





Performance Regression separating between SA and MF Alphas 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 4F Alpha 4F Alpha 4F Alpha 4F Alpha 4F Alpha 3F Alpha CAPM Alpha 
        
PDM SA | SA Alpha or 0 -1.4550*** -1.3876*** -1.1632*** -0.9590*** -1.1140 -0.9595*** -0.9546** 
PDM MF | MF Alpha or 0 -0.9558** -0.9152** -0.5937 -0.4336 -0.5947 -0.5145 -0.6952* 
        
Ln(Total Assets) -0.1329*** -0.1683*** -0.1247*** -0.1477*** -1.2119*** -0.1384*** -0.1073** 
Diff. SA-MF 0.0655** 0.0759*** 0.0226 0.0223 0.2594*** 0.0136 -0.0290 
        
Expense Ratio 0.5455* 0.3083 -0.0932 -0.4308 3.9357*** -0.5088* -1.0881*** 
Diff. SA-MF -0.5239*** -0.4143*** -0.1103 0.0409 -2.2705*** 0.0748 0.3423** 
        
Flow 0.0238*** 0.0243*** 0.0104** 0.0101** 0.0014 0.0118** 0.0010 
Diff. SA-MF -0.0075*** -0.0075*** -0.0021 -0.0017 -0.0021 -0.0036 -0.0016 
        
Age -0.0270*** -0.0239** -0.0108 -0.0063 -0.0770** -0.0083 -0.0176* 
Diff. SA-MF -0.0092 -0.0093* -0.0025 -0.0008 -0.0271 -0.0031 -0.0056 
        
Cash 0.0084 0.0064 0.0179 0.0122 -0.1119*** 0.0085 0.0546** 
Diff. SA-MF -0.0089 -0.0123 -0.0107 -0.0135 -0.0024 -0.0005 -0.0118 
        
Turnover 0.5450* 0.3334 0.1301 -0.0784 2.3165*** 0.3233 0.6068* 
Diff. SA-MF -0.2367 -0.1112 -0.2679 -0.1524 -0.1900 0.1620 0.3988 
        
Bid Ask Spread 0.0466*** 0.0496*** 0.0089 0.0022 0.0954*** -0.0020 0.0219** 
Ln(# of Holdings) 0.7463*** 0.7188*** 0.7099*** 0.5026*** -1.0151 0.6094*** 0.3914*** 
Ln(#Accs) 0.0023 0.0253 -0.0691 -0.0362 -0.0461 -0.0386 0.0147 
Ln(TA Firm) 0.0414 0.0428 0.0464 0.0613* -0.0277 0.0574 0.0651* 
% Inst. Shareclass 0.1706 0.1110 0.1917 0.0273 -0.1778 0.1004 0.3370 
% Common Managers -0.4340 -0.2636 -0.0028 0.0301 -0.8829 0.1007 0.6131* 
        
Dummy SA 0.1523 0.0437 0.4106* 0.2176 0.1542 0.2468 0.1624 
        
Style Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Twin Fixed Effects No No No No Yes No No 
N 27,846 27,846 27,846 27,846 27,846 27,846 27,846 
Adj.R2 0.00852 0.00960 0.0899 0.0912 0.0388 0.0880 0.133 
This table shows performance regressions using gross out-of-sample twin alphas for separate accounts and mutual funds of quarter t+1 as dependent variable. The sample consists of 907 twin 
pairs over the period 1997 to 2016. A twin is defined as a separate account and a mutual fund, both from the same investment firm, with the same investment objective, and having at least one 
common manager. The regression includes both alphas of a twin in the same model, the alpha of the separate account and the mutual fund. A vehicle’s out-of-sample alpha is calculated via 
factor loadings obtained from 24-month rolling window regressions from t-1 to t-24 using the CAPM, Fama French 3 factor and Carhart 4 factor model. The quarterly alpha is the sum of its 
three monthly alphas multiplied by four to obtain annualized figures. Besides the portfolio distance measure (PDM), the regression includes several controls for fund and firm characteristics at 
quarter t. For each quarter 𝑡 and twin 𝑇𝑊, 𝑃𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑊,𝑡 is the sum of the absolute differences between matched holding weights of the separate account and mutual fund equity portfolio divided 
by two: 𝑃𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑊,𝑡 =  
1
2
∑ |𝑤𝑆𝐴,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑀𝐹,𝑗,𝑡|
𝑁
𝑗=1 . Non-included holdings in a portfolio exhibit a weight of zero. For measuring separate effects on the out-of-sample alpha, the regression includes 
two PDM variables. One variable for the separate account, which is zero if the alpha is from the mutual fund and vice versa. Control variables for the logarithm of total assets, expense ratio (% 
p.a.), flow (%), age (years), cash proportion in the portfolio (%), and turnover (% p.a.) are at twin level, which is the average of the separate account and the mutual fund characteristic at quarter 
t. The regression also includes variables for the difference between the separate account and the mutual fund characteristic. To be able to regress those variables on the alpha of the separate 
account and the mutual fund, each value is duplicated. The regression also includes a dummy variable equaling 1 if the depended variable refers to a separate account alpha and is zero otherwise. 
***, **, * denote significance of the estimated parameters at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at vehicle level 
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Table 7 
Performance Regression with Style Betas 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 4F Alpha 4F Alpha  4F Alpha 4F Alpha  4F Alpha 4F Alpha  4F Alpha 4F Alpha 
            
PDM -1.2154*** -0.7653**  -1.1406*** -0.7302**  -1.1369*** -0.7066**  -1.1421*** -0.7105** 
            
Ln(Total Assets) -0.1744*** -0.1381**  -0.1788*** -0.1495***  -0.1925*** -0.1577***  -0.1918*** -0.1575*** 
Diff. SA-MF 0.0635* 0.0144  0.0603 0.0134  0.0627* 0.0174  0.0625* 0.0172 
            
Expense Ratio 0.3348 -0.4006  0.4626 -0.2409  0.5567 -0.2186  0.5622 -0.2174 
Diff. SA-MF -0.4150* 0.0817  -0.5190** -0.0467  -0.5597** -0.0536  -0.5651*** -0.0559 
            
Flow 0.0259*** 0.0114  0.0236*** 0.0080  0.0240*** 0.0084  0.0241*** 0.0084 
Diff. SA-MF -0.0084** -0.0025  -0.0078** -0.0013  -0.0080** -0.0014  -0.0080** -0.0014 
            
Age -0.0243* -0.0051  -0.0235* -0.0036  -0.0201 -0.0030  -0.0201 -0.0029 
Diff. SA-MF -0.0097 0.0008  -0.0094 0.0003  -0.0088 0.0008  -0.0088 0.0009 
            
Cash -0.0050 0.0019  -0.0593* -0.0630*  -0.0638* -0.0650*  -0.0637* -0.0647* 
Diff. SA-MF -0.0104 -0.0120  -0.0183 -0.0155  -0.0179 -0.0151  -0.0180 -0.0152 
            
Turnover 0.3853 -0.0571  0.6520 0.3215  0.5998 0.2846  0.6059 0.2858 
Diff. SA-MF -0.1026 -0.1343  -0.1367 -0.1771  -0.0734 -0.1382  -0.0896 -0.1492 
            
Bid Ask Spread 0.0444** -0.0059  0.0434** -0.0064  0.0426* -0.0070  0.0423* -0.0072 
Ln(# of Holdings) 0.7752*** 0.5319***  0.8245*** 0.5869***  0.8445*** 0.6146***  0.8410*** 0.6088*** 
Ln(#Accs) 0.0414 -0.0383  0.0424 -0.0330  0.0352 -0.0347  0.0347 -0.0348 
Ln(TA Firm) 0.0330 0.0517  0.0344 0.0501  0.0229 0.0446  0.0233 0.0450 
% Inst. Shareclass 0.2848 0.2035  0.2228 0.1717  0.2322 0.1771  0.2388 0.1823 
% Common Managers -0.1275 0.1420  -0.0803 0.2242  -0.1165 0.2039  -0.1055 0.2139 
            
Market Beta 4F    -6.0110*** -6.6226***  -6.2934*** -6.7682***  -6.3017*** -6.7699*** 
Diff. SA-MF    -0.1374 1.9334  -0.0092 1.9459  -0.0335 1.9342 
            
SMB Beta 4F       -1.3231** -0.4228  -1.3318** -0.4156 
Diff. SA-MF       -0.5892 -0.4000  -0.4635 -0.3251 
            
HML Beta 4F       -0.6610 -0.4562  -0.6616 -0.4698 
Diff. SA-MF       0.1078 0.8888  -0.0044 0.8175 
            
MOM Beta 4F          -0.0387 0.0957 
Diff. SA-MF          1.2337 0.7772 
            
Style Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
N 13,923 13,923  13,923 13,923  13,923 13,923  13,923 13,923 
Adj.R2 0.00876 0.0939  0.0121 0.0979  0.0138 0.0991  0.0136 0.0990 
This table shows performance regressions using average gross out-of-sample twin alphas of quarter t+1 as dependent variable. The sample consists of 907 twin pairs over the period 1997 to 2016. A 
twin is defined as a separate account and a mutual fund, both from the same investment firm, with the same investment objective, and having at least one common manager. The twin alpha is the value-
weighted average of the calculated separate account and mutual fund alpha using the total assets of the vehicles. A vehicle’s out-of-sample alpha is calculated via factor loadings obtained from 24-month 
rolling window regressions from t-1 to t-24 using the Carhart 4 factor model. The quarterly alpha is the sum of its three monthly alphas multiplied by four to obtain annualized figures. For each quarter 




∑ |𝑤𝑆𝐴,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑀𝐹,𝑗,𝑡|
𝑁
𝑗=1 . Non-included holdings in a portfolio exhibit a weight of zero. To account for investment strategies, the strategy beta of a quarter is the average of its three monthly factor 
loadings. On twin level, the quarterly beta is the value-weighted average of the separate account and mutual fund beta using the total assets. ***, **, * denote significance of the estimated parameters at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at twin level. 
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Table 8 
Performance Regression excluding Quintile 5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 4F Alpha 4F Alpha 4F Alpha 4F Alpha  4F Alpha 4F Alpha 4F Alpha 4F Alpha 
          
Quintile Allocation Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly  Twin Twin Twin Twin 
          
PDM -1.8463** -1.9080** -2.1566*** -1.8430**  -1.4799** -1.5164** -1.7249*** -1.4716** 
          
Ln(Total Assets) -0.1036 -0.1533** -0.1202* -0.1515**  -0.1220* -0.1609** -0.1324** -0.1547** 
Diff. SA-MF 0.0576 0.0662 0.0124 0.0093  0.0647 0.0733 0.0303 0.0273 
          
Expense Ratio 0.3324 0.1765 -0.2587 -0.5743  0.3478 0.2308 -0.2148 -0.5031 
Diff. SA-MF -0.3802 -0.3229 0.0209 0.1494  -0.3869 -0.3424 0.0070 0.1237 
          
Flow 0.0289*** 0.0299*** 0.0117 0.0121  0.0270*** 0.0278*** 0.0109 0.0111 
Diff. SA-MF -0.0118*** -0.0121*** -0.0046 -0.0046  -0.0095** -0.0097** -0.0029 -0.0029 
          
Age -0.0198 -0.0153 -0.0023 0.0035  -0.0182 -0.0150 -0.0027 0.0017 
Diff. SA-MF -0.0098 -0.0099 -0.0033 -0.0012  -0.0085 -0.0084 -0.0026 -0.0002 
          
Cash -0.0255 -0.0290 -0.0065 -0.0145  -0.0132 -0.0154 0.0072 -0.0002 
Diff. SA-MF -0.0163 -0.0163 -0.0210 -0.0178  -0.0345 -0.0343 -0.0437 -0.0402 
          
Turnover 0.4338 0.2680 -0.0202 -0.2504  0.3616 0.2118 -0.1306 -0.3441 
Diff. SA-MF -0.1881 -0.0982 -0.3568 -0.2561  -0.1798 -0.1112 -0.2893 -0.2113 
          
Bid Ask Spread 0.0995*** 0.1067*** 0.0339* 0.0213  0.0973*** 0.1055*** 0.0310 0.0194 
Ln(# of Holdings) 0.6477*** 0.6408*** 0.6615*** 0.4511**  0.6722*** 0.6947*** 0.6975*** 0.5157** 
Ln(#Accs) 0.0314 0.0593 -0.0565 -0.0232  0.0297 0.0501 -0.0556 -0.0266 
Ln(TA Firm) 0.0431 0.0492 0.0366 0.0533  0.0566 0.0564 0.0446 0.0563 
% Inst. Shareclass 0.1348 0.1630 0.2597 0.1496  0.2212 0.2591 0.2973 0.1972 
% Common Managers 0.1860 0.3356 0.4172 0.4389  0.0751 0.2284 0.3312 0.3667 
          
Style Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
N 11,113 11,113 11,113 11,113  11,410 11,410 11,410 11,410 
Adj.R2 0.0117 0.0123 0.0961 0.0970  0.0113 0.0117 0.0958 0.0963 
This table shows performance regressions using average gross out-of-sample twin alphas of quarter t+1 as dependent variable. The sample consists of 907 twin pairs over the period 1997 to 2016. 
A twin is defined as a separate account and a mutual fund, both from the same investment firm, with the same investment objective, and having at least one common manager. The twin alpha is 
the value-weighted average of the calculated separate account and mutual fund alpha using the total assets of the vehicles. A vehicle’s out-of-sample alpha is calculated via factor loadings obtained 
from 24-month rolling window regressions from t-1 to t-24 using the Carhart 4 factor model. The quarterly alpha is the sum of its three monthly alphas multiplied by four to obtain annualized 
figures. Besides the portfolio distance measure (PDM), the regression includes several controls for fund and firm characteristics at quarter t. For each quarter 𝑡 and twin 𝑇𝑊, 𝑃𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑊,𝑡 is the sum 
of the absolute differences between matched holding weights of the separate account and mutual fund equity portfolio divided by two: 𝑃𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑊,𝑡 =  
1
2
∑ |𝑤𝑆𝐴,𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑀𝐹,𝑗,𝑡|
𝑁
𝑗=1 . Non-included holdings 
in a portfolio exhibit a weight of zero. At each quarter t, observations with PDM values in Quintile 5 are excluded from the regression in Column (1) to (4). In Column (5) to (8) we exclude all 
twins showing an average PDM above the 80% percentile instead. ***, **, * denote significance of the estimated parameters at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are 
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able to achieve a risk-adjusted outperformance compared to common passive benchmarks 
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adjusted returns to cover their costs. The results from a bootstrapping approach suggest that the 
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One of the central questions in academic financial literature is whether fund managers can 
achieve a superior risk-adjusted performance (“alpha”) compared to common passive 
benchmarks. Based on equilibrium accounting (Fama and French, 2010), the market is a zero-
sum game, which means that every risk-adjusted outperformance of one market participant 
must be matched by at least one other’s underperformance, both positions with equivalent size 
in terms of market value. Fund managers, who are able to succeed this zero-sum-game in the 
long run are commonly referred to as skilled. These fund managers are able to generate risk-
adjusted returns that exceed their own trading costs and commissions and thus, depending on 
their costs, they have the potential to add value for their investors beyond the value of a purely 
passive investment strategy. However, many recent studies show that over the last few decades 
the asset management industry and especially mutual fund managers were on average not able 
to produce sufficient risk-adjusted returns to cover their costs. Nevertheless, several studies 
show that separate accounts (SAs), which are commonly referred to as an exclusive investment 
vehicle for institutional investors, have outperformed the mutual fund universe significantly.  
Based on a dataset that consists of 3,781 separate accounts in the period from 1990 to 
2017, this study provides new uni- and multivariate evidence that SAs are able to succeed in 
this zero-sum game in the long run. Compared to prior studies on SAs, which predominantly 
use quarterly returns, I use monthly return data, which reduces interim trading bias (e.g. Ferson 
and Khang, 2002) and allows for a more precise performance measurement. Following a 
bootstrapping methodology from Fama and French (2010), which is a modification of 
Kosowski et al. (2006), my results suggest that even in a world in which every SA manager has 
the ability to generate expected returns to cover their trading costs and commissions, SAs are 
able to achieve risk-adjusted gross returns that cannot be explained by pure luck. Furthermore, 
to the best of my knowledge, I am the first who considers SAs as a real investment alternative 
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to mutual funds for retail investors. Although, according to recent SA literature, the very high 
minimum investment requirements make most retail investors unable to participate in this 
value-creating investment universe, I find that only 26% of the SAs in my sample are 
exclusively for institutional investors. Around 62% of the SAs in my dataset are open for both 
kind of investors, institutional and retail investors, and around 12% of all SAs in my sample are 
even exclusively for retail investors. Thus, given the significantly positive risk-adjusted gross 
performance, private investors who meet the minimum investment requirement of $100k in the 
median and $150k in the 75% percentile for pure retail SAs, could potentially benefit from 
skilled SA managers.  
These findings contribute specific new insights to the recent literature on SAs. Busse, 
Goyal and Wahal (2010) focus specifically on the performance and persistence in the 
performance of SAs. They analyze a large sample of 3,842 SAs based on quarterly net and gross 
returns over the period from 1991 to 2008 and find that an equally weighted SA portfolio was 
able to achieve a significantly positive risk-adjusted Carhart performance of 80 bp p.a. before 
costs and a risk-adjusted performance of 20 bp p.a. after costs. These results indicate that SAs 
might be able to succeed in this zero-sum-game in the long run. Furthermore, several studies 
show that SAs have outperformed the mutual fund universe significantly. Elton Gruber and 
Blake (2014) compare the monthly performance of a large sample of SA and a sample of mutual 
funds that have a minimum investment requirement of at least one million USD over the period 
2000 to 2009. They find an annualized difference in risk-adjusted Carhart performance of 60 
bp. Similarly, Evans et al. (2020a) find a statistically significant difference in risk-adjusted 
Carhart performance of almost 1% p.a. based on a nearest neighbor matching between a sample 
of US equity SAs and US equity mutual funds in the period from 1990 to 2015. In the second 
part of their analysis, Elton Gruber and Blake (2014) directly compare SAs and MFs offered by 
the same company, but not necessarily managed by the same manager and find no significant 
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difference in performance. They conclude that smaller boutique firms are responsible for the 
better performance of the SA universe compared to the MF universe. Chen et al. (2017) conduct 
a similar study and reveal that the matching approach on firm level used by Elton, Gruber and 
Blake (2014) does not control for managerial skill. Therefore, they analyze managers that 
concurrently manage at least one SA and one MF, which allows them to control for managerial 
skill as well as firm-level effects. Their results show a significantly better performance for SAs 
compared to MFs. In a similar study, Rohleder et al. (2020) find a statistically significant 
difference in risk-adjusted Carhart performance based on net, but not on gross returns.  
By dividing my sample into three subsamples based on a time-invariant indicator 
variable, the SA’s product focus60, I am able to evaluate and differentiate the benefit of SAs as 
an investment alternative to mutual funds for different types of investors. In the first step, I 
analyze core SA characteristics and differences in these characteristics descriptively. It is 
interesting to note that purely institutional SAs and SAs in which both kind of investors, 
institutional and retail investors, can invest are relatively similar to each other but differ 
significantly from the retail SA group. Retail SAs have almost 40% lower asset under 
management (AUM) compared to the average SA, they have a four times higher number of 
individual investors and an average expense ratio that is almost two and a half times higher 
compared to the average SA. In terms of risk-adjusted performance it is striking that the SA 
universe as whole is able to achieve a long-term Carhart performance of 81 bp before and -11 
bp after costs. These numbers are in line with recent SA literature and they are a strong 
indication for the existence of skill in the SA universe. With respect to the three subsamples, it 
is remarkable that all three groups show a similar risk-adjusted gross performance, the 
significantly higher expense ratios of the retail SAs however, result in a significant 
                                                 
60 The data for this study stems from Morningstar Direct. Amongst many other things, they provide the variable 
“Product Focus”, which indicates whether the respective SA has a purely institutional (“Institutional”), purely 
retail (“Retail”) or no specific product focus (“Both”).  
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underperformance of 1.44% p.a. after costs while the other groups achieve a small but positive 
risk-adjusted Carhart performance.  
In the next step, I combine the SA characteristics and the SA performance in a 
multivariate setting and analyze the risk-adjusted SA performance considering SA 
characteristics by running several panel regressions. The regression results are consistent to the 
previous results and show a significant underperformance for retail SAs and a small, but 
significant outperformance for institutional SAs after costs. Based on gross returns the 
underperformance of retail SAs disappears, which suggests that the underperformance is mainly 
driven the difference in expense ratios rather than by a systematical difference in the level of 
skill.  
In order to analyze the existence of skill in the SA universe more thoroughly, I follow 
Fama and French (2010) and test for the existence of a true nonzero SA alpha by applying a 
bootstrap simulation approach on monthly SA returns. This way, I generate 1,000 zero true 
alpha cross-sections and use them as a benchmark for the actual SA alpha cross-section. The 
results from this analysis suggest that the SA managers in each of the three subsamples have on 
average sufficient skill to extract money from the capital market on a risk-adjusted basis. 
However, based on risk-adjusted net returns, the average SA manager is not able to beat a 
simulated benchmark, in which by definition every manager is able to produce risk-adjusted 
returns that cover all their costs. In other words, based on net returns, I find no statistically 
significant evidence that the average SA manager is able to produce risk-adjusted Carhart 
returns that cannot also be explained by pure luck (sampling variation). 
Relative to recent SA literature the contribution of my work is threefold. First, it is one 
of the most comprehensive SA analysis to date using monthly rather than quarterly return data, 
which reduces interim trading bias and allows for a more precise performance measurement. 
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Second, this paper provides new evidence that SAs are able to achieve risk-adjusted gross 
returns that cannot be explained by pure luck (sampling variation). Third, by dividing the SA 
universe into three subsamples depending on the SA’s product focus, this paper is the first to 
evaluate and differentiate the benefit of SAs as an investment alternative to mutual funds for 
different types of investors. In the process, I confirm and extend the results from previous 
studies on SAs in general, a so-far understudied class of investment vehicle considering the 
value of their managed assets. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the dataset and presents summary 
statistics including SA characteristics and performance. Section 3 examines risk-adjusted 
performance based on panel regressions. Section 4 tests for the existence of skill in the SA 
universe based on a bootstrapping approach. Section 5 concludes. 
5.2 Data, summary statistics and performance 
5.2.1 Separate account characteristics 
SAs have a unique organizational structure, where each SA investor owns an individual account 
in which she directly holds the respective assets. This structure enables investors to restrict or 
customize their portfolio by setting style or risk preferences. This results in a higher 
management complexity compared to mutual funds (e.g. Evans et al., 2020b), which is why the 
fee structure and the degree of customization depends on the bargaining power of the investor, 
which depend on the size of the investor’s account. All individual accounts that follow a 
common overall strategy (e.g. “small-value” or “large-neutral”) are managed in conjunction 
with the other investor’s accounts. Thus, the reported SA returns are composite returns, i.e. the 
weighted average of the realized returns of the individual accounts within an SA. 
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 The data stems from Morningstar Direct and consists of 3,781 SAs for the period from 
1990 to 2017. It comprises monthly net and gross returns, quarterly SA characteristics and 
several time invariant snapshot variables, which makes it to one of the most comprehensive 
samples in recent SA literature. To be included in the sample I require a minimum of 36 monthly 
observations for net and gross returns. Compared to prior studies, which predominantly use 
quarterly returns, monthly return data reduces interim trading bias and allows for more precise 
performance measurement. Furthermore, I follow Elton, Gruber and Blake (2014) and exclude 
all passively managed and specialty SAs.61 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of common 
SA characteristics. Panel A provides the characteristics of the whole SA sample, Panel B 
contains only SAs that are open for investment for institutional and retail investors, Panel C 
displays SAs that are exclusively for institutional investors and Panel D shows descriptive 
characteristics of pure retail SAs.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Average total assets (TA) are about 820 million US dollar. The number of accounts, which is 
the number of different investors within an SA, is 120 on average. The expense ratio, calculated 
as the difference between reported gross and net returns, is on average 0.91% which is lower 
than comparable numbers for US domestic equity mutual funds (e.g, 1.20% p.a., Rohleder et 
al., 2018). The comparatively low costs can partly be attributed to the high average minimum 
investment of 8.65 million US dollar and to the relatively low annual turnover of 64.05%, which 
is distinctively lower than that of US domestic equity mutual funds where annual turnover is 
on average around 85% (e.g., Pastor et al., 2017). In the period from 1990 to 2017, SAs have 
experienced substantial annual implied percentage net flow of 6.61%. I calculate quarterly 
implied percentage net flow (hereafter flow) from quarterly TA and quarterly returns following 
                                                 
61 My definition of “specialty SAs” also include all SAs with an average systematic market beta below 0.2 based 
on 24-month rolling window regressions. 
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Sirri and Tufano (1998). The positive average flow attests to the growing importance of SAs 
over these 28 years. 
Around 62% of the observed SAs in my sample (2,332 SAs) are included in Panel B, 
which means, they are open for investment for both kind of investors. Therefore, I take this 
group as a benchmark to compare them with the characteristics of the pure institutional SAs in 
Panel C and the pure retail SAs in Panel D. Especially retail SAs in Panel D show remarkable 
differences in their core characteristics. They are much smaller; almost 40% on average 
compared to Panel B, and have a distinctively higher number of accounts of 415 compared to 
97. Furthermore, their average expense ratio is almost two and a half times higher, which might 
be partly explained by the lower minimum investment requirement of $0.79 million on average 
and $0.1 million in median. Compared to those numbers, the institutional SAs in Panel C are 
larger with almost $1 billion total assets and have a smaller number of different investors. 
Together with a minimum investment requirement of $12.5 million on average, this results in 
a strong bargaining power, high customization capabilities and a lower level of fees of 0.67% 
p.a. on average for those investors.  
5.2.2 Performance Measurement 
The broader aim of this work is to analyze whether the SA universe as a whole is able to achieve 
a long-term outperformance before costs relative to common benchmarks. To investigate this 
question, I examine the SA performance using both absolute and risk-adjusted returns from the 
CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) 3-Factor, and the Carhart (1997) 4-Factor model.62 To 
obtain a time-series of alphas, I follow Sharpe (1992) and run rolling regressions (Eq. 1) to 
calculate the out-of-sample performance (Eq. 2) for each SA in each month 𝑡 + 1 using style-
betas estimated over the 24-month window ending in 𝑡. 
                                                 





















MOMt+1)   (2) 
𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the monthly excess return of vehicle 𝑖 in month 𝑡 over the risk-free rate, 𝐸𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the 
excess return of the market, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. Without further factors, 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 corresponds 
to the in-sample Jensen (1968) or CAPM alpha of vehicle 𝑖 during the window ending in 𝑡. By 
adding 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡, I obtain the Fama and French alpha and by further adding 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 I 




𝑀𝑂𝑀 are the style betas of vehicle 𝑖 during the 
window ending in 𝑡. Table 2 reports the summary statistics on SA performance. Similar to Table 
1, Panel A contains all SAs, Panels B-D show the performance of the three subsamples “Both” 
in Panel B, “Institutional” in Panel C and “Retail” in Panel D. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In Panel A, it is remarkable that the SA universe is able to achieve a long-term Carhart 
performance of 81 bp before and -11 bp after costs. These statistics are in line with the results 
of Busse, Goyal and Wahal (2010), Elton, Gruber and Blake (2014) and Evans et al. (2020b). 
As previously mentioned, equilibrium accounting states that a long-term outperformance before 
costs of one investment group must result in an underperformance of at least one other market 
participant with equivalent size. Thus, the results above indicate that over the period 1990 to 
2017 SA managers were on average able to extract money from the capital markets on a risk-
adjusted basis, which is a strong indication for the existence of skill in the SA universe. This 
means that some managers have the potential to deliver an additional value beyond a purely 
passive investment strategy to their investors. The key question at this point is whether this 
counts for all three of the subsamples. 
 It is interesting to notice, that even before costs institutional SAs in Panel C achieve a 
distinctively higher excess return than the other subsamples, which however, does not seem to 
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lead to significant higher risk-adjusted gross returns. Furthermore, it is remarkable that based 
on gross returns, retail SAs in Panel D achieve similar excess and risk-adjusted returns before 
costs, after costs however, they show a significant underperformance of 1.44% p.a. This number 
is similar or even a little worse to the Carhart performance of mutual fund l (e.g. Carhart, 1997; 
Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; Rohleder, Scholz and Wilkens, 2011; Edelen, Evans and Kadlec, 
2013). Thus, although all three subsamples show significantly positive risk-adjusted gross 
returns, which I interpret as indication of skill and therefore as potential to deliver value to 
investors, especially retail SAs in Panel D have such high expense ratios of almost 2% on 
average, that this potential to create value to investors is more than overcompensated, which 
finally results in a significant underperformance. 
5.3 Panel Regressions 
In the previous chapter, I document that SA characteristics as well as performance differ 
between the three subsamples “Both”, “Institutional” and “Retail”. In this chapter, I combine 
both aspects and analyze the risk-adjusted performance considering the differences in SA 







Institutionali+ φ2 Retaili+ ∑ φm Controli,q
 mM
m=3 + ηi,q (3) 
αi,q+1
ooS is the annualized out-of-sample alpha in quarter 𝑡 + 1 using either the respective CAPM 
or Carhart model based on net or gross returns. Institutionali and Retaili are two dummy 
variables indicating whether the SA is an institutional or a retail SA respectively. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑚 
refers to SA characteristics seen above in the descriptive statistics and commonly used as 
control variables in previous SA studies such as log total assets to consider the effect of 
diseconomies of scale (e.g. Chen et al., 2004), the log number of accounts within the SA to 
capture the unique organizational structure of SAs (e.g. Evans et al., 2020b) and potential client 
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customization effects, the minimum investment requirement, total firm assets, expense ratio, 
flow and age. Further, I use different combinations of style-fixed and time-fixed effects by 
demeaning by style or quarter (within transformation). Standard errors are clustered by SA. 
Table 3 provides the results for the Carhart and CAPM performance based on gross and net 
returns respectively. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
In the model specifications M1 to M4, I find a significantly negative coefficient for the retail 
dummy over all model specifications, indicating that retail SAs significantly underperform 
based on net returns. This is consistent with my previous results in Table 2. Equally in line with 
previous results is the significantly positive coefficient for the institutional dummy, which 
shows that institutional SAs are able to outperform the rest of the sample even when I consider 
differences in SA characteristics between the subsamples. Based on gross returns, the 
coefficient of the retail dummy becomes insignificant and even changes from negative to 
slightly positive in M5 to M8. These results show, that retail SAs do not significantly 
underperform the rest of the SA universe before costs, which would be an indication for 
systematically lower level of skill. The underperformance after costs seems to be mainly due to 
the very high expense ratios of retail SAs. The significantly positive coefficient for institutional 
SAs becomes slightly smaller, however stays highly significant at the 5% level for all model 
specifications. This indicates that while considering differences in SA characteristics, 
institutional SAs are able to outperform the SA universe significantly.  
As shown in Tables 1 and 2 in the previous chapter, the average SA manager is able to 
extract money from the capital market on a risk-adjusted basis in the long run, which is a strong 
indication for skill in the SA universe. Although it is remarkable that institutional SAs have 
been able to produce a superior performance while considering differences in SA 
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characteristics, I find a highly positive risk-adjusted performance before costs for all three 
subsamples. However, examining net returns, my results show that especially retail SAs do not 
produce sufficient risk-adjusted returns to cover their costs. Thus, from a performance 
perspective, pure retail SAs do not seem to be a more attractive investment vehicle than the 
average mutual fund. On the contrary, from the perspective of an institutional or high-net-worth 
individual investor, SAs seem to be a very attractive investment vehicle, as the slightly positive 
risk-adjusted return after costs is more than competitive compared to mutual funds and passive 
ETFs.  
5.4 Luck versus Skill 
In the previous sections, I document uni- and multivariate evidence that the SA universe as a 
whole as well as all three subsamples separately are able to achieve a long-term outperformance 
compared to passive benchmarks. To examine whether this long-term outperformance stems 
from luck or from skill, I test whether there exists a nonzero true alpha in the cross-section of 
the SA universe that cannot solely be explained by pure luck. Therefore, I follow a methodology 
from Fama and French (2010), which is a modification of Kosowski et al. (2006), and apply a 
bootstrapping approach to generate 1,000 zero alpha cross-sections and use them as a 
benchmark for the actual SA alpha cross-section. This procedure allows me to consider non-
normally distributed alpha cross-sections because normality might be a poor approximation for 
SA returns. According to Kosowski et al. (2006), non-normally distributed alpha cross-sections 
can stem from two sources, 1) from non-normal individual fund return distributions and 2) from 
a heterogeneous fund sample. Typical reasons for non-normal return distributions include the 
heavily concentrated stock portfolios of SAs as well as non-normally distributed market returns, 
varying levels of autocorrelations in SA returns and dynamic investment strategies with varying 
levels of risk-taking. For these reasons, normality might be a poor approximation for SA returns 
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and thus, it is important to consider the possibility of nonnormally distributed returns. Even if 
individual SA returns are normally distributed, there is still the chance that the cross-section of 
SA returns is not. Cross-sectional differences in the SA’s live span, its level of risk-taking as 
well as fat tails and skewed distributions in individual SA residuals influence the cross-sectional 
shape of the SAs’ alpha distributions.  
To test for existence of a true nonzero SA alpha, I apply a bootstrap simulation approach 
on monthly SA returns through the following steps: First, I estimate the true alpha over the 
whole sample period from 1990 to 2017 for several performance models. Second, to obtain a 
zero alpha time-series for each SA, I subtract the estimated SA alpha from its monthly return 
series. Third, in each of the 1,000 simulation runs, I draw a random time-series (with 
replacement) of 336 months and estimate each SA’s alpha based on the zero-alpha time-series 
from the previous step. This way, I get 1,000 different alpha cross-sections, which I can use as 
a benchmark for the actual alpha time-series. I repeat this procedure for several performance 
models, including the CAPM, Fama/French and Carhart model based on gross and net returns 
respectively.63 Furthermore, instead of using the actual alpha estimates, which are the common 
measure for abnormal performance, I concentrate on the t-statistic of the alpha estimates to 
avoid a potential lack of precision in the construction of confidence intervals (Kosowski et al., 
2006). For example, SAs with a short life span and a high risk-taking strategy tend to have 
extremely high (or low) estimated alphas. By using the t-statistic (t(a)) instead of the alpha 
estimate, I normalize extreme alpha values by dividing them through their standard error and 
thus considering their high variance-estimated alpha distributions. Tables 4 shows the results 
for gross returns in Panel A and for net returns in Panel B. According to Fama and French 
(2010), the interpretation of the simulated cross-sectional values depend upon whether they are 
                                                 
63 For reasons of simplicity, I focus my analysis on the Carhart model. The results for the other performance models 
are available upon request. 
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based on gross or net returns. Setting gross alphas to zero implies a world in which every 
manager is able to generate risk-adjusted returns that cover all their trading costs and 
commissions. Setting net alpha to zero implies a world in which every manager has sufficient 
skill to produce risk-adjusted returns that cover all their costs. Columns 1-3 present the results 
for the whole SA universe and Columns 4-12 show the results of the three subsamples “Both”, 
“Institutional” and “Retail”. The columns “Act” contain the t(a) estimates at selected percentiles 
based the actual SA returns. The columns “Sim” present the average estimated t(a) values from 
the 1,000 simulation runs. The columns “%>Act” show the percentage of simulation runs that 
produce t(a) values that are greater than the actual values. This measure can be interpreted 
similar to a p-value.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
In Panel A of Table 4, I find for most of the percentiles higher actual than simulated values. For 
the whole SA universe in Columns 1-3, all percentiles above the 30% percentile show higher 
actual than simulated values in more than 90% of the cases. This means that in a world in which 
every SA manager has sufficient skill to generate expected returns to cover their trading costs 
and commissions, SAs are able to achieve risk-adjusted returns that cannot be explained by 
pure luck, which is covered by the sampling variation of the simulation. In line with previous 
results in the chapters 2 and 3, all three subsamples “Both”, “Institutional” and “Retail” show 
similar performance results based on gross returns. For institutional SAs, all percentiles above 
the 20% percentile show higher actual than simulated t(a) values in more than 90% of the cases. 
For retail SAs the 30% percentile is still indistinguishable from their simulated counterparts. 
Overall, this result is again a strong indication that SA managers have on average sufficient 
skill to extract money from the capital market on a risk-adjusted basis. However, looking at net 
returns in Panel B, in none of the percentiles the actual t(a) values are higher than the simulated 
values in more than 90% of the cases. In other words, I cannot find any statistically significant 
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evidence that SA managers have on average sufficient skill to deliver risk-adjusted returns that 
significantly exceed a benchmark, in which every manager is able by definition to produce risk-
adjusted returns to cover all of their costs. Examining the subsamples separately, I find for the 
institutional subsample (subsample for both kinds of investors) that every percentile above the 
20% percentile (70% percentile) show higher actual than simulated average values. This means, 
there are many SA managers who are able to produce risk-adjusted returns that cover their costs, 
however, when I consider the aspect of sampling variation, my results suggest their long-term 
performance after costs is not statistically indistinguishable from pure luck. For the subsample 
for retail SAs, the results show that none of the percentiles of the actual t(a) values are higher 
than their average simulated values. This is consistent to the results from the previous chapters 
and demonstrates again that retail SA managers are not able to produce sufficient risk-adjusted 
returns to cover their high expense ratios. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Since early on, performance measurement and the analysis of performance persistence 
are central topics in the academic financial literature. Most recent studies focus on the mutual 
fund industry and while they regularly find a persistent underperformance relative to common 
benchmarks, this paper provides new evidence that the average SA manager is able to extract 
money from the capital market on a risk-adjusted basis in the long run. By dividing my sample 
depending on the SA’s product focus, I am able evaluate and differentiate the benefit of SAs as 
an investment alternative to mutual funds for different types of investors. Although it is 
remarkable that institutional SAs have been able to produce a superior performance while 
considering differences in SA characteristics, I find a highly positive risk-adjusted Carhart 
performance before costs for all three subsamples. This means that all kind of investors could 
potentially benefit from this value-creating class of investment vehicles. However, examining 
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net returns, my results show that especially retail SA do not produce a sufficient risk-adjusted 
return to cover their expense ratio. Thus, from a pure performance perspective, retail SAs do 
not seem to be more attractive than the average mutual fund. On the contrary, from the 
perspective of an institutional or high-net-worth individual investor, SAs seem to be a very 
attractive investment vehicle. Besides a slightly positive risk-adjusted return after costs, which 
is more than competitive compared to mutual funds and passive ETFs, there is another 
advantage of SAs compared to other investment vehicles: Their unique organizational structure 
where each investor owns an individual account in which she directly holds the respective assets 
instead of holding a fund share. This enables investors to customize their portfolio composition 
by setting style or risk preferences independently from other investors and furthermore, it gives 
investors the opportunity to implement specific tax-loss harvesting strategies. The combination 
of these qualitative advantages and an above-average risk-adjusted performance compared to 
other investment vehicles make SA's an important, so-far understudied class of investment 
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Table 1  
SA Characteristics        
  
Obs Mean SD 
Percentile 
  10 25 50 75 90 
Panel A: All Separate Accounts 
        
Total assets (in mio. USD) 732,691 820 2070 3 21 130 614 1980 
# Accounts 656,611 120 395 1 3 13 51 223 
Firm assets (in bio. USD) 679,000 108 288 0 1 7 62 301 
Expense ratio (p.a.) 821,018 0.91 0.90 0.00 0.36 0.72 1.00 2.52 
Netflow (p.a.) 699,515 6.61 45.85 -12.04 -4.15 -0.19 4.10 19.20 
# Holdings 451,515 88 105 29 40 59 93 153 
Turnover ratio (p.a.) 281,555 64.05 54.34 15.89 27.00 49.00 83.00 129.00 
Min. investment (in mio. USD) 758,636 8.65 13.30 0.10 0.25 3.00 10.00 25.00 
         
Panel B: Separate Accounts for institutional and retail investors 
Total assets (in mio. USD) 490577 894 2140 4 27 162 727 2160 
# Accounts 445210 97 318 1 4 13 48 189 
Firm assets (in bio. USD) 442254 86 226 0 1 6 49 247 
Expense ratio (p.a.) 533423 0.82 0.77 0.00 0.36 0.72 0.96 1.56 
Netflow (p.a.) 469413 6.59 45.49 -12.11 -4.11 -0.16 4.34 19.50 
# Holdings 296826 77 77 28 40 57 89 136 
Turnover ratio (p.a.) 189957 66.63 56.13 16.30 28.30 50.66 86.90 135.99 








Table 1 cont’d. 
SA Characteristics        
  
Obs Mean SD 
Percentile 
  10 25 50 75 90 
Panel C: Separate Accounts for institutional investors only 
Total assets (in mio. USD) 171851 988 2370 3 30 161 693 2590 
# Accounts 148204 65 275 1 2 8 28 94 
Firm assets (in bio. USD) 160641 175 387 1 3 13 140 559 
Expense ratio (p.a.) 198080 0.67 0.60 0.00 0.26 0.65 0.85 1.08 
Netflow (p.a.) 165707 6.08 44.94 -11.08 -3.89 -0.23 3.06 16.35 
# Holdings 106334 127 164 31 47 73 122 291 
Turnover ratio (p.a.) 59860 63.52 53.08 16.00 27.18 49.70 82.00 128.00 
Min. investment (in mio. USD) 166157 12.50 16.50 0.05 1.00 5.00 20.00 50.00 
         
Panel D: Separate Accounts for retail investors only 
Total assets (in mio. USD) 70263 551 1900 1 7 53 286 1080 
# Accounts 63197 415 798 2 9 55 324 1574 
Firm assets (in bio. USD) 76105 176 367 1 4 23 164 490 
Expense ratio (p.a.) 89515 1.95 1.35 0.00 0.50 1.88 3.00 3.05 
Netflow (p.a.) 64395 8.17 50.52 -14.23 -5.17 -0.28 5.56 25.06 
# Holdings 48355 63 58 28 38 52 73 101 
Turnover ratio (p.a.) 31738 49.58 42.16 13.80 22.83 37.30 65.00 98.00 
Min. investment (in mio. USD) 77901 0.79 3.33 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.15 1.00 
This table shows descriptive statistics for fund characteristics of separate accounts (SAs) on a monthly basis. The sample consists 
of 3,781 SAs over the period 1990 to 2017. Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the whole sample; Panel B contains SAs for 




SA Performance         
  
Obs Mean SD 
Percentile 
  10 25 50 75 90 
Panel A: All Separate Accounts 
 
        
Net Returns         
Excess retun (p.a.) 821,018 8.17 15.86 -63.24 -21.84 12.12 41.88 72.93 
Carhart alpha (p.a.) 698,042 -0.11 6.31 -22.86 -10.69 -0.44 9.97 22.92 
Fama/French alpha (p.a.) 698,042 -0.11 6.22 -22.83 -10.69 -0.38 10.00 22.80 
CAPM alpha (p.a.) 698,042 0.30 7.29 -26.77 -11.99 -0.26 11.92 28.07 
         
Gross Returns         
Excess retun (p.a.) 821,018 9.09 15.86 -62.28 -20.88 13.08 42.74 73.80 
Carhart alpha (p.a.) 698,042 0.81 6.28 -21.84 -9.76 0.39 10.86 23.82 
Fama/French alpha (p.a.) 698,042 0.81 6.20 -21.81 -9.76 0.44 10.89 23.72 
CAPM alpha (p.a.) 698,042 1.22 7.27 -25.78 -11.04 0.57 12.82 28.99 
         
Panel B: Separate Accounts for institutional and retail investors 
         
Net Returns         
Excess retun (p.a.) 533,423 8.12 16.06 -64.32 -22.44 12.12 42.24 73.78 
Carhart alpha (p.a.) 456,345 0.03 6.60 -23.85 -11.05 -0.36 10.58 24.25 
Fama/French alpha (p.a.) 456,345 0.04 6.51 -23.83 -11.04 -0.29 10.65 24.13 
CAPM alpha (p.a.) 456,345 0.51 7.60 -27.71 -12.31 -0.12 12.68 29.61 
         
Gross Returns         
Excess retun (p.a.) 533,423 8.95 16.06 -63.48 -21.60 12.90 43.08 74.64 
Carhart alpha (p.a.) 456,345 0.86 6.57 -22.93 -10.22 0.40 11.38 25.05 
Fama/French alpha (p.a.) 456,345 0.87 6.48 -22.89 -10.22 0.46 11.43 24.96 






Table 2 cont’d. 
SA Performance         
  
Obs Mean SD 
Percentile 
  10 25 50 75 90 
Panel C: Separate Accounts for institutional investors only 
 
        
Net Returns         
Excess retun (p.a.) 198,080 8.81 15.79 -62.64 -21.00 12.84 42.69 73.20 
Carhart alpha (p.a.) 165,834 0.13 5.70 -20.56 -9.47 -0.16 9.28 21.08 
Fama/French alpha (p.a.) 165,834 0.09 5.63 -20.54 -9.51 -0.13 9.27 20.84 
CAPM alpha (p.a.) 165,834 0.35 6.84 -25.43 -11.15 -0.07 11.24 26.58 
         
Gross Returns         
Excess retun (p.a.) 198,080 9.49 15.78 -61.92 -20.37 13.54 43.32 73.95 
Carhart alpha (p.a.) 165,834 0.80 5.69 -19.80 -8.80 0.41 9.94 21.83 
Fama/French alpha (p.a.) 165,834 0.76 5.62 -19.83 -8.84 0.43 9.91 21.56 
CAPM alpha (p.a.) 165,834 1.03 6.84 -24.71 -10.46 0.49 11.90 27.29 
         
Panel D: Separate Accounts for retail investors only 
         
Net Returns         
Excess retun (p.a.) 89,515 7.08 14.76 -57.60 -20.40 10.80 38.16 66.60 
Carhart alpha (p.a.) 75,863 -1.44 5.74 -22.17 -11.34 -1.56 8.13 19.43 
Fama/French alpha (p.a.) 75,864 -1.41 5.64 -22.06 -11.27 -1.54 8.20 19.34 
CAPM alpha (p.a.) 75,863 -1.07 6.25 -24.21 -11.97 -1.45 9.30 22.39 
         
Gross Returns         
Excess retun (p.a.) 89,515 9.05 14.76 -55.68 -18.48 12.72 40.08 68.68 
Carhart alpha (p.a.) 75,863 0.56 5.70 -19.93 -9.31 0.31 10.09 21.39 
Fama/French alpha (p.a.) 75,864 0.58 5.61 -19.86 -9.21 0.33 10.12 21.30 
CAPM alpha (p.a.) 75,863 0.92 6.22 -22.06 -9.96 0.45 11.23 24.46 
This table shows descriptive statistics for annualized excess returns and risk-adjusted performance measures of separate accounts 
(SAs). The sample consists of 3,781 SAs over the period 1990 to 2017. Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the whole sample; 
Panel B contains SAs for institutional and retail investors; Panels C includes institutional SAs and Panel D contains retail SAs. 
Excess returns are returns subtracted by the U.S. one-month treasury bill rate. The annualized excess return is the multiplicative 
sum of its monthly returns. Risk-adjusted returns are out-of-sample alphas calculated via factor loadings obtained from 24-month 












 Net returns  Gross returns 
 Carhart alpha  CAPM alpha   Carhart alpha  CAPM alpha  
 M1 M2 M3 M4  M5 M6 M7 M8 
Retail Dummy -0.733*** -0.663*** -0.607*** -0.525***  -0.008 0.075 0.116 0.212 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.96) (0.58) (0.44) (0.16) 
Inst Dummy 0.251*** 0.286*** 0.219** 0.268***  0.235** 0.269*** 0.201** 0.248** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) 
Ln Total Assets -0.067*** -0.076*** -0.094*** -0.108***  -0.055*** -0.065*** -0.080*** -0.095*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Ln #Accs  -0.129*** -0.101*** -0.111*** -0.089***  -0.155*** -0.121*** -0.141*** -0.113*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Firm TA (bio) -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.35) (0.34)  (0.11) (0.18) (0.46) (0.50) 
Expense Ratio -0.251*** -0.283*** -0.217*** -0.266***  0.174*** 0.137*** 0.210*** 0.158*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006  -0.001 -0.000 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.62) (0.72) (0.32) (0.28)  (0.86) (0.96) (0.43) (0.37) 
Min.Invest (mio) 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.015***  0.010*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Net Flow 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002* 0.002*  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002* 0.002* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.08) 
Constant 0.287 0.423 0.929*** 1.006***  0.626 0.742 1.2648*** 1.394*** 
 (0.70) (0.57) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.40) (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) 
Style FE No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.16  0.09 0.09 0.16 0.16 
N 111,669 111,669 111,669 111,669  111,669 111,669 111,669 111,669 
This table shows performance regressions using net and gross out-of-sample Carhart alphas of quarter t+1 as dependent variable. The sample consists of 
3,781 SAs over the period 1990 to 2017. An out-of-sample Carhart alpha is calculated via factor loadings obtained from 24-month rolling window regressions 
from t-1 to t-24 Carhart 4 factor model. ***, **, * denote significance of the estimated parameters at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard 






Percentiles of Carhart t(a) for actual and simulated SA returns 
 All  Both  Institutional  Retail 
Column 1 2 3  4 5 6  7 8 9  10 11 12 
Pct Act Sim %>Act  Act Sim %>Act  Act Sim %>Act  Act Sim %>Act 
Panel A: Gross returns 
1 -2.41 -2.57 0.43  -2.44 -2.49 0.49  -2.52 -2.73 0.45  -2.30 -2.73 0.23 
2 -2.01 -2.18 0.42  -1.97 -2.14 0.45  -2.11 -2.26 0.46  -2.02 -2.23 0.36 
3 -1.75 -1.96 0.36  -1.73 -1.94 0.38  -1.78 -2.01 0.38  -1.74 -1.99 0.29 
4 -1.58 -1.81 0.34  -1.52 -1.79 0.36  -1.67 -1.86 0.41  -1.64 -1.86 0.33 
5 -1.43 -1.69 0.31  -1.38 -1.67 0.32  -1.55 -1.72 0.41  -1.41 -1.72 0.23 
10 -0.98 -1.29 0.23  -0.94 -1.28 0.24  -1.00 -1.31 0.26  -1.02 -1.32 0.23 
20 -0.42 -0.83 0.12  -0.42 -0.83 0.13  -0.37 -0.84 0.09  -0.49 -0.85 0.15 
30 -0.06 -0.51 0.08  -0.06 -0.51 0.09  0.00 -0.51 0.06  -0.14 -0.52 0.13 
40 0.26 -0.23 0.06  0.24 -0.23 0.07  0.32 -0.23 0.04  0.24 -0.25 0.06 
50 0.54 0.02 0.05  0.52 0.02 0.06  0.59 0.03 0.04  0.58 0.01 0.04 
60 0.81 0.28 0.05  0.80 0.27 0.05  0.82 0.28 0.05  0.82 0.27 0.04 
70 1.12 0.55 0.04  1.11 0.54 0.04  1.15 0.56 0.04  1.11 0.54 0.04 
80 1.49 0.87 0.03  1.49 0.86 0.03  1.50 0.88 0.03  1.49 0.87 0.03 
90 2.00 1.32 0.02  1.99 1.31 0.02  2.05 1.33 0.02  1.99 1.33 0.03 
95 2.51 1.71 0.01  2.45 1.69 0.01  2.58 1.73 0.01  2.52 1.73 0.02 
96 2.61 1.82 0.01  2.58 1.80 0.01  2.73 1.85 0.01  2.59 1.86 0.03 
97 2.75 1.97 0.02  2.73 1.95 0.01  2.83 1.99 0.02  2.65 2.00 0.05 
98 2.97 2.18 0.02  3.02 2.15 0.02  3.00 2.22 0.02  2.82 2.24 0.08 
99 3.38 2.56 0.02  3.50 2.49 0.02  3.25 2.66 0.09  3.18 3.09 0.24 
                
Panel B: Net returns 
1 -3.52 -2.57 0.97  -3.16 -2.49 0.92  -3.18 -2.70 0.79  -4.50 -2.71 0.99 
2 -3.04 -2.18 0.97  -2.74 -2.14 0.90  -2.63 -2.25 0.77  -4.02 -2.22 1.00 
3 -2.70 -1.96 0.95  -2.40 -1.94 0.86  -2.25 -2.01 0.70  -3.87 -1.98 1.00 
4 -2.51 -1.81 0.94  -2.15 -1.79 0.81  -2.07 -1.85 0.69  -3.40 -1.85 1.00 
5 -2.28 -1.69 0.92  -2.00 -1.67 0.79  -1.94 -1.72 0.69  -3.31 -1.72 1.00 
10 -1.74 -1.30 0.86  -1.54 -1.28 0.75  -1.38 -1.31 0.60  -2.70 -1.31 1.00 
20 -1.11 -0.83 0.77  -0.96 -0.83 0.65  -0.80 -0.83 0.49  -2.13 -0.85 1.00 
30 -0.69 -0.51 0.68  -0.60 -0.51 0.60  -0.42 -0.50 0.43  -1.67 -0.52 1.00 
40 -0.37 -0.23 0.65  -0.31 -0.24 0.57  -0.13 -0.23 0.41  -1.33 -0.25 1.00 
50 -0.08 0.02 0.61  -0.03 0.02 0.54  0.15 0.03 0.36  -0.93 0.01 1.00 
60 0.23 0.27 0.53  0.27 0.27 0.49  0.37 0.28 0.38  -0.59 0.27 1.00 
70 0.53 0.54 0.48  0.58 0.54 0.42  0.62 0.56 0.38  -0.17 0.54 1.00 
80 0.87 0.86 0.45  0.90 0.86 0.42  0.99 0.88 0.33  0.32 0.86 0.97 
90 1.40 1.31 0.37  1.41 1.31 0.36  1.51 1.33 0.28  0.87 1.32 0.95 
95 1.85 1.70 0.31  1.86 1.68 0.28  2.00 1.72 0.19  1.32 1.72 0.90 
96 1.98 1.82 0.29  1.99 1.79 0.26  2.17 1.84 0.16  1.49 1.86 0.87 
97 2.17 1.96 0.25  2.17 1.94 0.23  2.31 1.98 0.16  1.67 1.99 0.83 
98 2.34 2.16 0.29  2.35 2.14 0.24  2.40 2.20 0.27  1.79 2.24 0.89 
99 2.79 2.54 0.22   2.81 2.47 0.15   2.71 2.63 0.39   2.16 3.27 0.89 
This table shows the results from a bootstrapping approach based on a sample that consists of 3,781 SAs over the period 1990 to 2017. 
The columns “Act” contain the t(a) estimates at selected percentiles of the cross-sectional alpha distribution based on actual returns. 
The columns “Sim” present the average estimated t(a) values from 1,000 simulated true zero-alpha cross-sections. The columns 
“%>Act” show the percentage of simulation runs that produce t(a) values that are greater than the actual values. This measure can be 
interpreted similar to a p-value. 
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6 Conclusion  
This dissertation aims to improve the general understanding of SAs and thus benefit research, 
regulation and various market participants.  
The first major topic addressed in Articles I and II is the diminishing effect of scale on 
risk-adjusted performance. Article I takes the unique organizational structure of SAs into 
account and shows that in SAs two dimensions of size − size in terms of total assets and in 
terms of number of accounts − diminish risk-adjusted performance respectively. Although the 
second effect prevails, both effects exist simultaneously side by side, so that the risk-adjusted 
performance of large SAs with many accounts suffer the most. This finding is novel, highly 
relevant and contributes to a better general understanding of SAs as it highlights the impact of 
their unique organizational structure on performance. Since we report an annualized difference 
in risk-adjusted performance before costs of 2.12% between the smallest SAs with the lowest 
number of accounts and the largest SAs with the highest number of accounts, this finding 
provides direct economic value for investors. Future studies on SAs need to consider these 
diminishing effects of scale in both dimensions. 
Article II addresses and contributes mainly to two important streams of academic 
literature. First, it contributes to the academic debate around the general mechanisms leading 
to diseconomies of scale. While most previous studies either focus on econometric issues or 
investigate the liquidity costs channel, only few studies have so far been able to test the 
information processing/hierarchy cost channel empirically. By contrasting SAs that pursue 
either a quantitative or a fundamental investment approach, we circumvent the issue of not 
knowing the firm’s level of soft information production and communication. This way, we are 
able to test our hypotheses on the mechanisms that are responsible for diseconomies of scale 
directly. In the process, we use and extend the equilibrium framework proposed by Pastor, 
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Stambaugh and Taylor (2020) by showing that equilibrium “tradeoffs” differ substantially for 
quantitative and fundamental investment strategies. 
Second, Article II also contributes to the literature on the performance of quantitative 
vs. fundamental investment strategies. While previous studies like Harvey et al. (2017) or Abis 
(2017) relied mainly on algorithmic text analysis to divide their sample into quantitative and 
fundamental investment strategies, we take advantage of the fact that SAs publicly disclose 
their investment style. This enables us to test and extend pervious assumptions and predictions 
based on a comprehensive sample with a reliable classification into quantitative and 
fundamental SAs. 
Article III of this dissertation proposes an innovative way to quantify the impact of 
unobserved constraints on portfolio management and performance. To analyze the 
simultaneous management of MFs and SAs, which is a common practice in the asset 
management industry due to economies of scale, it is important to enhance the general 
understanding of managerial incentives, economies of scale, and the business model of advisory 
firms in general.  
Future studies might use our portfolio difference measure (PDM) as an indicator of 
unobserved constraints and thereupon try to isolate specific constraints and examine their 
impact on manager behavior and performance. This way, future research might further 
contribute to the discussions of potential policy implications and regulators will be able to 
formulate specific policy guidelines. In addition, our study provides direct advice to investors. 
Since performance tends to be lower for both the MF and the SA, investors should be careful 




Article IV focuses on the risk-adjusted performance and the value that SAs can provide 
to its investors. The results show that on average SAs significantly outperform the market 
before costs and that the achieved outperformance is not solely explainable by pure luck. 
Moreover, their risk-adjusted net performance is close to zero, which is considerably better than 
most other actively managed investment alternatives like MFs. These results represent a 
promising foundation for future analyses. Following the approaches of Treynor and Mazuy 
(1966), Henriksson and Merton (1981), Ferson and Schadt (1996), Busse et al. (1999) or Elton 
et al. (2012), it might be interesting to investigate whether the measured outperformance is 
attributable to superior market timing or superior stock selection. A holdings-based analysis 
following Grinblatt and Titman (1993), Daniel et al. (1997) or Rohleder et al. (2017) could lead 
to even more accurate results.  
Another key aspect of Article IV is the extent to which retail investors can participate 
in the outperformance of the SA universe. While less than 30 years ago, customized portfolio 
management services were exclusively limited to institutional investors and ultra-rich 
individuals, today, digital solutions enable investment advisors to offer customized portfolio 
management services to various kinds of investors starting at a minimum investment amount 
of $50,000. However, Article IV emphasizes that although institutional and retail SAs achieve 
a similar risk-adjusted performance before costs, an average expense ratio of almost 2% leads 
to a significant underperformance of retail SAs based on net returns. Considering, that the recent 
studies of Barber, Huang and Odean (2016), Berk and van Binsbergen, (2016), Ben-David et. 
al. (2019) and Choi and Robertson (2020) on MFs identify expense ratios, returns and especially 
performance rankings to be the main drivers of new investor flows, from a retail perspective, 
SAs do currently not seem to be the favorite investment choice. However, if investment advisors 
manage to become even more efficient in their digital solutions so that they are able to offer 
customized portfolio management services at competitive costs, then the SA market has an 
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enormous potential for future growth in the retail segment. In this case, it becomes even more 
important for regulators, researchers and other market participants to broaden their 
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